The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War by Mofid, Kamran
The Economic Consequences of the 
Gulf War 
The Gulf War ranks in terms of scale of destruction and its 
consequent economic impact as one of the most devestating 
conflicts of modern times. Both Iran and Iraq are now confronted 
with the need to reconstruct shattered economies. What is clear, 
however, is that a return to the pre-war economic situation is not a 
realistic option. The cost of the conflict to Iraq means that it can 
never regain the lead it formerly held in economic performance 
and development levels. Similarly, the Islamic Republic cannot 
return to economic principles of the Shah's regime. What, then, 
does reconstruction mean? 
In The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, Kamran Mofid 
details the formerly neglected costs of the conflict to both Iraq and 
Iran and to the region as a whole. The catastrophic effect of the 
conflict on the economies of Iran and Iraq is examined, looking in 
particular at its impact on oil production and exports, foreign 
exchange earnings and foreign trade, and agricultural perform-
ance. Case studies of the militarization of each country are 
provided, with pre-war data included for comparative purposes. 
In exposing the pyrrhic nature of the Gulf War the author raises 
some crucial issues. Although the terminology of ceasefire has 
centred on the idea of reconstruction he questions the immediate 
future of the region, pointing out that regional stability is an 
essential pre-condition to the process of rebuilding. 
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The Iran-Iraq war may indeed be reaching the end of its turbulent 
and destructive road. The blood may have stopped flowing - for 
the moment - but the long march towards recovery - at a high 
price for the civilian population of both countries - has hardly 
begun. It is indicative of the extent and level of destruction, and 
the intensity of an 'old' conflict fought with the most up-to-date 
weapons that our 'modem' ( competing) civilizations of East and 
West have manufactured, that the terminology of the ceasefire 
period has centred around such ill-defined (but thankfully un-
ideological) vagaries as reconstruction, rejuvenation, rebuilding, 
etc. The concept 'development', defined by the orthodox political 
economists as the process of modernizing e.conomic structures and 
processes and catching-up with the advanced capitalist countries, 
has been shelved in this northern Gulf region, perhaps in response 
to the makeshift and unplanned strategies favoured by the bel-
ligerents themselves for two broad reasons. First, as Dr Mofid 
illustrates in this book, because, while these protagonists have 
been busy destroying each other's economies and the very fabric of 
their national infrastructures, the rest of the developing world has 
been preoccupied with the simultaneous struggle to weather and 
capitalize on the tantrums of the world economy and to get on with 
the difficult task of creating and consolidating modem industries 
and economies. Second, and more to the point, it appears that the 
direct and indirect destruction inflicted upon the two economies is 
such that it may actually be cognitively misleading to refer to the 
post-ceasefire economic processes in Iran and Iraq as anything 
but 'reconstruction'. Technically, 'development', the cumulative 
process of industrialization and modernization, may as yet not be 
occurring. 
But what does reconstruction mean? 'Going back' (i.e. rebuild-
ing) to the 1980 economic situation in the two countries? Surely 
not! Observers of the Persian Gulf region will be aware that, 
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at that time, Iran's socio-economic system had reached near-
collapse, and that (as all the major economic indices show) her 
economy was functioning at under 40 per cent of capacity. 
Moreover, it can hardly be the case that the rulers of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, having presided over the nearly complete 
annihilation of what was Pahlavi Iran, would now be willing to 
recreate the same (i.e. not even similar) structures once again. 
Although it can be argued that closer examination does show that 
the ruling mullahs and their technocratic servants have not really 
even attempted to change the fundamentals of the Pahlavi econ-
omic system, it is clear that they, and the country as a whole, will 
be unable to flourish if the return to the Pahlavi system is the 
agenda. 
In Iraq's case also the 'going back' is an unrealizable ideal, for 
three main reasons: 
(i) the country owes too prohibitive an amount of money to 
other countries today for her to have the complete indepen-
dence of action essential for recapturing the lead she has lost 
in Arab economic performance and development levels, 
(ii) the level of military expenditures and the political instabilities 
associated with them currently inhibit national expenditure 
levels achieved in the 'golden decade' of the 1970s, 
(iii) almost complete dependence on the international price of oil 
and petroleum exports makes nonsense of any careful plan-
ning and target assignments in the current situation, unlike 
that which was set and achieved in the last decade. 
It is pertinent to ask therefore that, if reconstruction does not 
denote a return to the prewar era, then what does it amount to? I 
believe that, as this war has produced neither a victor nor 
vanquished, and consequently, as both regimes have remained 
intact, reconstruction must, in the last analysis, only mean 
restrengthening. More precisely, it is feasible and probable that 
a long period of competitive restrengthening, stemming from 
mutual distrust, fear and regional ambitions, may have already 
been institutionalized. But, to grasp fully the basis of competitive 
restrengthening, we must systematically evaluate the lessons and 
legacies of this war in its domestic context, regional consequences, 
international perceptions and historical precedences. 
Domestic context 
Domestically, the pressures to militarize, which were in evidence 
in the 1970s, have increased, expanding both the role of the 
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military in national political life, and their consumption ration in 
the national budget. Furthermore, the fact that the two regimes 
have remained in power without gaining any tangible results from 
the war merely enhances their domestic positions vis-a-vis the 
disgruntled civilian populations and their respective national and 
ethnic adversaries. Without checks and balances within the politi-
cal system, and in the absence of constructive debate on issues of 
national importance in both countries, the regimes in power are 
able not only to define the threats, but also to mobilize their 
populations in the required direction and continue to bypass the 
legitimate demands of the masses for a better quality of life. Under 
these conditions, . war will give the protagonists a chance to test 
their strengths and weaknesses, and peace an opportunity to re-
arm, consolidate and prepare for further clashes: in other words, 
the institutionalization of functional instability par excellence. 
Regional consequences 
Regionally, the Iran-Iraq war has produced very interesting 
by-products; its commencement led to the creation of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council in 1981, and its (imminent?) termination has 
given birth to the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC} in 1989. The 
former was the reaction of the Southern Gulf states to the war, and 
the latter the result of the Iraqi war effort and the military support 
it received from within the region. Iraq's ACC partners, Jordan, 
Egypt and North Yemen, are the same countries which con-
sistently supported the Iraqi war effort; Jordan and Egypt offered 
military manpower, Jordan provided a safer land route for the 
beleaguered Iraqis, and all three supplied arms, ammunition and 
support systems. 
On another scene, the Iran-Iraq war forced the regional hands 
of the important Arab and non-Arab states in the complex game of 
power politics in this sub-system's microcosms. Syria, Libya and 
South Yemen abandoned their erstwhile radical ally - Iraq - in 
favour of the Islamic Iran. Israel, Syria's most immediate regional 
enemy, also supported the Iranian war effort against Iraq, which, 
as already mentioned, received uncritical support from a number 
of key moderate Arab countries including Egypt - the only Arab 
state with diplomatic ties to Israel. So, in this circus of short-term 
alliances, undercover partnerships and bizarre contractual agree-
ments, enemies from one regional theatre became objective 
bedfellows in the Persian Gulf politico-military crisis, and politico-
ideological allies on key regional issues ( on the Aralrlsraeli 
conflict, Palestinian statehood and the Camp David Accords, for 
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instance) ended up objective enemies in the respective Iraq-Iran 
war 'supporters clubs'. More disturbing, within the regional 
context, is the perseverance of these opportunistic musical-chairs 
tendencies since the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war. Syrian, Israeli, 
Iranian and now Iraqi involvement in Lebanese politics and 
factional fightings illustrates well the dangers associated with such 
loose loyalties. The living tragedies of the Lebanese situation help 
to explain its consequences. 
International perceptions 
In its international dimension the Iran-Iraq war has been declared 
one of the longest uninterrupted wars between modem nation-
states since 1945. Dr Mofid's efforts incidentally help to explain 
why it may also prove to have been one of the costliest since 
records began. 
The increased dependence of the belligerents on outside material 
and moral support provided unforeseen opportunities ( and as it 
turned out pitfalls as well) for extra-regional countries and forces 
to expand their influence in this oil- and natural-gas-rich part of 
the world, In many ways the decline in the influence of the 
American and Soviet superpowers in Iran and Iraq respectively, 
particularly after 1980, was a function of the expansion of other 
countries' involvement in Persian Gulf affairs. But the protagon-
ists had set different criteria for the demonstration of their 
commitment to the party of their choice. ltaq expected diplomatic 
and economic support and isolation of Iran in exchange for 
'favours'. Iran, on the other hand, insisted on barter deals and 
badly needed arms, ammunition and communication equipment. 
Many countries chose to satisfy both parties' demands by openly 
objecting to the war, on the one hand, and secretly supplying Iran 
with the range of American- and Western-European-made arms 
deployed by her regular and revolutionary armed forces on the 
other. Some others preferred to push for a significant market share 
in either one country. Vietnam, Sweden, South Africa and the two 
Koreas fall into this category, as far as the Iranian market is 
concerned. France and the Soviet Union, of course, had major 
military interests to protect in Iraq. But the most startling aspect of 
this war's 'international connection' is the fact that at one time or 
another nearly one-third of the United Nations membership was 
involved in providing either weapons, ammunition or support 
systems to both belligerents simultaneously, undermining totally 
the integrity of the United Nations (UN) system as an independent 
arbiter and the collective conscience of the community of nations. 
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It is ironic that the prime movers behind the UN Security Council 
Resolution 598 - the permanent members of the council - which 
led to the Gulf War ceasefire in July 1988 are all also on that list of 
countries which have supplied weapons and support systems to 
both parties to the conflict! 
The political and ideological mix of the countries that have been 
capitalizing on the misfortunes of Iran and Iraq supports the 
theory of global power-bloc decomposition as alluded to in the 
previous paragraph. The close - and at times intimate - military 
support and assistance obtained by the belligerents from the 
bewildering range of political 'authorities and systems' shows that 
the military collaborations were not based on ideological position 
and the pursuit of power-bloc politics. Indeed, if anything, the 
pattern of arms suppliers to the two warring countries indicates 
that either the superpowers were using their proxies to supply the 
belligerents; or the superpowers had lost control of their allies and 
proxies in this case; and/or the East-West global divide had 
actually been breaking down at the seams, thus enabling the two 
blocs' 'part-time' proxies to pursue an independent line based 
purely on their national interests and motives. If the latter is the 
case, then international support for the various parties to other 
regional wars may follow a similar pattern of dangerous 'prag-
matic' international relations which at the very least help to 
prolong war and increase the sufferings of the societies concerned 
and, at worst, encourage internationalization of a local conflict in 
the absence of power-bloc pressures and policy directives. The fact 
that Marxist Vietnam and Marxist China,, nemies in the Far East, 
both supported the anti-Marxist and overtly religious Iranian 
regime in its 'reactionary war' against Soviet-supported Ba'ath 
Socialist Iraq provides little comfort for those seeking political 
solutions and unideological approaches to international relations. 
The international lessons of the Iran-Iraq war point also to 
another field of investigation, namely that, while the international 
system has been looking for ways of unlocking the East-West 
ideological door to regional conflict resolution, it has managed to 
overlook the difficulties and instabilities arising from differences 
from within each ideological divide and global heterogeneity. The 
Iranian revolution was the first in the contemporary world to break 
out of the socialist versus capitalist global mould and her war with 
Iraq provided further evidence of this trend and its other facets. A 
short reference to the attitudes of the self-declared Marxist-
Leninist states towards the war shows that the three 'poles' of the 
International Communist Movement, the Soviet Union, China 
and Albania, adopted positions not only contrary to their own 
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doctrines but squarely in opposition to their ideological competi-
tors' interests, regardless of the international repercussions of 
their positions and actions. Albania concluded that Iran's position 
amounted to 'anti-imperialism' and she should therefore be sup-
ported in the war. China was seeking badly needed foreign 
exchange, profitable economic relations and ways of limiting 
Soviet influence - and indeed (if feasible) of hurting the Soviet 
position - and so ended up strongly supporting Iran. And the 
Soviet Union vacillated between countering the latent threat from 
an unstable and hostile Iran to her southern border and Muslim 
republics, and the need to support and protect her only long-
standing Persian Gulf ally, Iraq, regardless of the maxims of the 
state's official ideology. 
The divisions within the Western camp are more readily classifi-
able; all the parties, with the exception of the United States, 
France and the United Kingdom were interested solely in expand-
ing their commercial and trade ties with the belligerents, their aim: 
sell everything that the protagonists needed, including the means 
of obtaining an unconventional weapons capability. The three 
named countries, however, were playing a more complex game 
of foreign policy, combining politics, commercial and security 
interests and strategic concerns within the same formula. 
Historical precedences 
Beyond these observations what historical precedences has this 
war set? First, it was allowed to continue at a fairly intensive level 
by the belligerents themselves in the first instance, and outside 
forces in the second. For years everyone found a reward in this war 
and, so long as this perception persisted, concerted efforts to end 
the conflict were diluted by either impossible demands, unaccept-
able propositions or outdated proposals. Second, weaponry of the 
highest order were used by both protagonists. Although deployed 
inefficiently at times, the weapons utilized were amongst the most 
sophisticated available, routinely deployed by the world's great 
and major powers alike. The ease with which both sides obtained 
and deployed complex and sophisticated weapons systems in-
dicates that other Third World armies stockpiling similar weapons 
can easily annihilate those parties without them, thus encouraging 
regional arms races by the main actors involved 'to catch up and 
keep up'. Or else, if all parties deploy such complex and advanced 
weapons systems, then any ensuing war will be highly destructive 
and, if the supply routes are maintained and technical assistance 
channels present, long in duration as well. Third, the calculated 
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deployment of chemical weapons and the indiscriminate firing of 
surface-to-surface missiles on civilian targets have qualitatively 
raised the mode and accepted levels of warfare in regional 
theatres, thus increasing the dangers of escalation and the prob-
lems associated with conflict management. And finally, on a more 
positive note, this war has shown that, when the constructive will 
of the international community, as embodied in the increased 
efforts of the UN, coincides with the exhaustion of one or more of 
the parties to a conflict, then formulating peace can become a 
remarkably straightforward affair. The ending of the war though 
and the conditions that have emerged in the region since July/ 
August 1988 point towards an unsettled future and one that leans 
more towards confrontation in the long term than compromise. 
The Iran-Iraq war, it seems, is only the beginning of the long road 
towards long-term peace, a peace that will be based on mutual 
respect, extensive interdependence and substantial co-operation. 
If we judge by the history of Europe, there will be many many 
other wars and antagonisms in the Persian Gulf before any real 
peace between all the parties can emerge. Moreover, it took 
Europe two world wars in the twentieth century and the dis-
membering of a. powerful continental power (Germany), and 
many other continental wars besides, as well as the spectre of an 
invasion by a powerful and common enemy, before state violence 
was eventually erased from the agenda of inter-state relations of 
the Western European countries. The Western Europeans have 
paid a very high price for their current state of stable peace and 
co-ordinated and co-operative relations, as exemplified in the 
European Community and European Free Trade Association. It is 
tempting to prescribe similar solutions for eradicating the current 
structural problems that led to hostilities in the Persian Gulf region 
without taking account of the tortuous road towards the current 
European environment. But the geostrategic values of the Gulf to 
the superpowers and the dependence of developed and developing 
countries on its natural resources may cause such a massive 
regional and international competition for the full control of this 
region that the question of locally based co-operation agreements 
and the eventual unity of purpose may never even see the light of 
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In September 1980 the Iraqi army invaded Iran. From that 
moment onwards the war and its consequences have intermittently 
been a focal point of world attention. Many articles and books 
have been written analysing mainly the historical, socio-political, 
military and religious/cultural aspects of the conflict, with its 
national, regional and international implications.1 
Yet it is striking that the war, which in terms of scale of 
destruction and its consequent economic impact ranks as one of 
the most devastating conflicts since World War II, has not suf-
ficiently caught the eyes and the imaginations of economists. 2 The 
analysis of the economic consequences of the Gulf War has 
received very scant coverage. 
Furthermore it should be emphasized that it is the economic 
factors that have given rise to the paramount significance and 
importance of the war in general, and the Persian Gulf in 
particular. 
Among the most important economic factors to be noted is that 
the combined proven oil reserves of the Gulf countries are the 
highest in the world. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 5' 1udi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar together account for 56.9 per 
cent of the world's proven oil reserves. They also account for 25 
per cent of the world's proven natural gas reserves, the highest in 
the non-communist world (see further tables 1.1 and 1.2). 
Moreover, since the discovery of oil, the dependency of the 
outside world on imported oil from the Gulf has been increasing at 
a rapid rate. For example, North America's oil-import depen-
dency has increased from 6.4 per cent in 1950 to 36.7 per cent in 
1986, with most of the imports originating from the Gulf countries 
(see further tables 1.3 and 1.4). 
It should further be noted that, the ratio of oil reserves to 
production (RIP) in most of the non-Gulf oil producers has fallen 
rapidly. For example, the RIP ratio in the United States of 
1 
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Table I.I Proven oil reserves, 1 January 1987: the world and selected 












Note: * Author's calculation. 
























Table 1.2 Proven natural-gas reserves, 1 January 1987: the world and 














Note: * Author's calculation. 




























America (USA) has fallen significantly from 11.1 years in 1970 to 
9.5 years in 1980, 8.7 years in 1985 and 7.6 years in 1986,3 which 
undoubtedly will affect the USA crude-oil dependency in the not 
too distant future. 
Indeed, in a report concerning oil security in the US prepared in 
1986 by the US Energy Department for President Reagan, it is 
projected that by 1995 the USA will be importing more than 60 per 
cent of its oil needs. The report also notes that at least half the 
non-Communist world's oil imports will originate from the Persian 
Gulf. (MEED, 31 October 1987:5). 
2 
Table 1.3 World oil production and consumption by major areas: 1950-86 (selected years) (million barrels per day) 
Production Consumption 
1950 1973 1978 1983 1986 1950 1973 1978 1983 1986 
North America 6.2 13.6 13.3 11.7 12.0 6.6 19.6 21.4 15.6 16.4 
(6.4) (36.7) 
Western Europe 0.1 0.5 1.8 3.4 4.0 1.3 15.2 14.3 11.5 11.7 
Japan - - - - - 0.1 5.5 5.4 4.2 4.1 
Middle East 1.8 21.0 21.3 12.1 13.0 0.2 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.2 
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1987 and Shell Briefing Service, 'Background to Oil', November 1979 
Table 1.4 The major recipients of oil exports from the Persian Gulf, 1984--6 (thousand tonnes) 
Total oil imports % from the Gulf Imported from 
Iran Iraq 
1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 
USA 171,847 160,699 206,148 13 7 19 507 1,356 800 611 2,266 3,945 
(22,396) (12,045) (39,564) 
West Germany 66,934 64,194 66,569 17 11 15 2,422 2,667 2,037 1,988 330 733 
(11,071) (6,768) (10,112) 
France 69,946 68,657 65,998 31 31 39 3,399 4,076 2,924 3,126 6,430 4,835 
(21,532) (21,038) (25,662) 
Italy 66,358 63,434 71,908 38 31 44 9,306 7,254 6,740 3,554 4,669 4,019 
(25,246) (19,357) (31,475) 
Netherlands 43,950 37,791 46,098 33 34 44 8,450 4,438 3,326 1,038 1,290 3,019 
(14,681) (12,976) (20,121) 
Japan 183,065 168,825 164,987 64 61 61 12,879 12,294 11,050 712 3,504 7,962 
(116,946) (103,811) (99,603) 
Note: • Author's calculation. 
() Figures in brackets represents the total oil imports from the Persian Gulf. 
(-) None. 
Source: Stalistiques 1986 
Table 1.4 (continued) 
Imported from 
Kuwait Qatar UAE Saudi Arabia 
1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 
USA 1,213 1,823 1,400 204 - S20 4,419 1,680 1,817 15,442 6,561 31,082 
West Germany 258 136 7 737 496 - 1,118 262 81 4,548 2,877 7,254 
France 128 S51 439 2,174 1,645 1,287 4,195 2,369 1,526 8,510 S,961 14,651 
Italy 117 1,472 3,143 859 320 300 2,457 870 2,323 8,953 4,772 14,950 
Netherlands 2,994 2,899 3,538 769 356 323 78 812 110 1,358 3,181 9,805 
Japan 6,925 7,764 10,307 10,652 9,(i()l 7,872 27,549 35,543 35,284 SS,S29 35,105 27,128 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
This observation on the paramount global economic significance 
of the Gulf makes the relative neglect of the coverage of the 
economic consequences of the war even more striking. 
It is therefore expected that my study will contribute in some 
measure to a better understanding of the Gulf War and will fill the 
gap which currently exists in the coverage of the economic 
consequences of the conflict. 
The major consequences of the war in general are: 
destruction of wealth. There has been a massive loss of both 
human and non-human capital, leading to a large reduction in 
productivity, and loss of foreign-exchange earnings. 
Sacrifice of potential output, owing to the transfer of the labour 
force from a peace-time economy to a military and war-related 
economy. Therefore resources are not allocated to their most 
efficient uses or to their most efficient locations, thus resulting in 
increased costs and reductions in efficiency. 
a brain-drain and outgoing of human capital leading to a smaller 
skilled and semi-skilled labour force. 
a reduction in the quality of human capital resulting from an 
unprecedented call-up to military service of students in schools, 
high schools and universities, and from the flight of the 
academics and professional classes to Western countries. 
a rise in domestic inflation, arising from more expensive 
imports, an increase in black-market trading, and an increase in 
commercial activities (i.e. importing and its distribution) at the 
expense of domestic production. 
crippling of the agricultural sector, leading to massive shortfalls 
in production, thus resulting in a serious state of dependency on 
the outside world for food supplies. 
a huge rise in military expenditure (Milex), leading to an 
increased defence burden. 
a massive increase in defence-related imports, leading to an 
increased arms-imports burden, with much negative impact on 
the economy as a whole. 
the failure to diversity exports and thus the tendency to become 
increasingly more dependent on the oil sector to provide the 
much needed foreign-exchange earnings. 
in the case of Iraq, the loss of its $35 billion foreign-exchange 
reserves (at the start of the war) and the creation of a huge 
international indebtedness. 
This book, describing the economic consequences of the Iran-





This study is not of why nations go to war,4 but none the less it 
would be beneficial if at this stage we shed some light on the 
background to, and some of the apparent reasons for, the Iran-
Iraq war. 
By the mid-1970s Iran had become the absolute and undisputed 
power in the Gulf. This, for example, was acknowledged in 1975, 
when Iraq, formally accepted Iran's military superiority by signing 
the Algiers Agreement, which provided for the following: 
1 Demarcation of the land frontier in accordance with the 1913 
Protocol of Constantinople and the verbal accord of 1914. 
2 Agreement to demarcate the Shatt al-Arab waterway on the 
basis of the thalweg (i.e. deep-water line). 
3 Agreement to restore security and mutual confidence along 
their common boundaries, and to exercise a 'strict and effective 
control' with the aim of finally putting an end to 'all acts of 
infiltration of a subversive character' from either side. 
4 The pledge of both parties to regard the provisions negotiated 
at the 1975 OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] meeting as indivisible elements of a comprehensive 
settlement, such that a breach of any one would be considered a 
violation of the spirit of the Algiers Agreement. 5 
Given the above, as Karsh (1987) has noted, there is little doubt 
as to which party to the agreement made the most concessions. 
Whereas Iraq went a long way to acknowledge Iran's sovereignty 
over half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, Iran in practice made no 
concession. There is no doubt that to sign this agreement was a 
humiliating experience for Sadam Hussain. 
However, this agreement, leading to the Pax lrana of the 1975-9 
period, opened a new era in Iran-Iraq relations. The former status 
quo arrangements based on the 1937 Agreement,6 were replaced 
by a relationship that assumed unquestioned Iranian superiority 
and dominance in the Gulf. Given this, Iran under the Shah, 
now more aggressively than ever before, carried on with its 'big-
push' strategy of development, both in the civilian and military 
sectors. 
On the other hand, Iraq became much more 'inward' looking, 
focusing on the build-up of its infrastructure and improving its 
defences which had been considerably destabilized as a result of 
the Kurdish conflict which had been supported by Iran until the 
Algiers Agreement was signed. Moreover, it should be noted that, 
in contrast to Iran, Iraq adopted during this period a 'less-big' 
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strategy of development which in the end proved to be a much 
better and wiser policy. 
The origins of the war 
Many theories and points of view have been put forward to explain 
the Iran-Iraq war and its causes, ranging from centuries-old 
religious (Sunni vs. Shia) and ethnic (Arab vs. Persian) differences 
and disputes between the two people to personal animosity be-
tween Iraq's President Hussain and Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. 7 
A further model, based on the grand-design theory, identifies 
the main cause of the war as the Iraqi leader's personal ambitions. 
These range from the occupation of Iranian territories to the 
overthrow of the new revolutionary regime, which would remove 
the threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and thus make 
Iraq the pre-eminent Arab and Gulf State, as well as the leading 
force within the Non-Aligned Movement (see, for example, 
Cordesman 1984 and Standenmaier 1983). 
Another study rejects the above analysis and puts forward the 
point of view that the Iraqi invasion of Iran did not emanate from a 
premeditated grand design but was a pre-emptive move, intended 
to forestall the Iranian threat to the existence of the Ba'ath regime 
(Karsh 1988). 
However, as far as the present author is concerned, I would like 
to say that there exists some truth in all the above-mentioned 
theories, and together they provide a 'good' explanation of the 
main causes of the Iran-Iraq war. 
None the less it should be said that, by the time the Shah had 
fallen and was replaced by a totally and diametrically different 
regime, the war between the two countries had become inevitable. 
Iran was now a theocracy and traditionalist, while Iraq was secular 
and modernist. The two states now had unquestionably different 
views and objectives, domestically, regionally and internationally, 
views that, unlike the situation during the Shah's period, could not 
have been reconciled. Indeed, the duration of the war goes a long 
way to establish this point. 
Given the above, as well as the vacuum caused by the Shah's 
fall, a 'time bomb' condition was created which had to explode, 
and it did on 22 September 1980. 
In order to note why the 'explosion' happened so soon after the 
revolution, one has to know what Iran and Iraq were like on the 
eve of the war. Therefore, at this point the pre-war military and 
economic balances of the two countries will be noted. 
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The military balance on the eve of war 
If we look at the situation from a purely military point of view, it 
can be said that the timing of the Iraqi invasion could not have 
been better chosen. At the time of the Shah's overthrow, the 
Iranian armed forces were thrown into total disarray. They were 
regarded as the Shah's instrument of oppression, and also as the 
most serious potential source of counter-revolution, so the new 
revolutionary regime was quick to reduce the armed forces' 
capabilities even further by systematic purges. 8 
It has been noted that, by the outbreak of the war, some 85 
senior officers had been executed and hundreds more (including 
all major-generals and most of the brigadier generals) were 
imprisoned or forced to retire. In all, by the time of the war, some 
12,000 high-ranking officers had been purged, 10,000 of them from 
the army (Hickman 1982). Moreover, the armed forces were 
affected further by their inability to enlist new recruits, as well as 
the mass desertion in the early stages of the revolution. 
Furthermore, the purges and their consequences, as well as the 
attempts by the revolutionary regime to establish the Revolutionary 
Guard Corps, the Pasdaran, meant that, by the time of the 
invasion, Iran had no Joint Staff to co-ordinate the war strategy 
through a central command-and-control system (Karsh 1987). It is 
also noted that the US advisers on their departure from Iran had 
erased the data on the computer-based inventory-control system 
for spare parts, thus making it almost impossible for Iranian 
military personnel to locate and identify the mass of spares in 
depots (Karsh 1987). 
If Iran's armed forces were in disarray and in a state of 
humiliation, Iraq's forces were in a jubilant mood. The strength of 
the army which had brought disgrace upon them by forcing them 
to give in to the Shah's demands in Algiers had now diminished. 
By September 1980 Iraq, maybe for the first time, found itself 
militarily in a position where the balance of power had tipped in its 
favour (Karsh 1987). So it seems that, based on what was 
happening in Iran, Saddam Hussain made a calculation and then 
ordered his forces to invade the old-enemy's territory. 
The economic balance on the eve of war (with special reference to 
the oil sector and oil revenues) 
For about two years or so prior to the war, Iran's economy had 
been in turmoil. As the revolution was gathering momentum, so 
were the strikes and riots which by the end of 1978 had brought the 
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country to a standstill. By December 1978 there was a complete 
cessation of oil exports. In March 1979, under the new revolution-
ary regime, the oil exports were resumed, but at a lower level than 
before the revolution. Oil production in April-June 1979 was 3.9 
million barrels per day (mbd) as compared with 5.7 mbd in 1977 
and the first nine months of 1978. The corresponding figures for oil 
exports during the same period were 3.5 mbd and 5 mbd (for 
evidence on these figures see BP 1981 and Petroleum Economist, 
various issues). 
Furthermore, even the lower rate of production was not being 
maintained. For example, three months prior to the war, i.e. 
June-August 1980, production averaged 1.4 mbd, while oil 
exports had dropped to about 1 mbd, compared to 2.4 mbd in 
1979. (BP 1981 and Petroleum Economist, various issues.) 
The sharp rise in oil prices preceding the Iranian revolution had 
mostly offset the reduction in oil exports and thus Iran's oil 
revenues did not decline so drastically. Nevertheless the rapid 
decline in oil production and exports depressed the revenues to 
about $19.2 billion in 1979, from $23.6 billion in 1977 and $21.7 
billion in 1978. 
As far as Iraq is concerned, its situation was in total contrast to 
Iran's. Iraq's economy was booming during the late 1970s. Oil 
output had increased from 2 mbd in 1973 to 2.7 mbd in 1978, rising 
by 30 per cent to 3.5 mbd in 1979. Oil revenues had also risen 
significantly from $1.8 billion in 1973 to $10.8 billion in 1978. By 
1979 the oil revenues had risen by 97.2 per cent to $21.3 billion 
(for evidence on these figures see Statistiques 1978-81). In the first 
nine months of 1980, oil-export revenues were $22.4 billion, or 
about $29.8 billion on an annual basis (had the war not started 
on 22 September 1980, and if we assume a constant rate of 
production/export for the remainder of the year). 
In all, as far as the economy is concerned, Iran was in turmoil, 
with reduced oil production/exports and revenues, while Iraq was 
in a situation of 'never had it so good', with years of sustained 
economic growth, the build-up of its infrastructure, a rapid and 
unparalleled rise in oil production/exports and revenues. The 
difference between the two countries' oil ~xports, before and since 
the invasion, can best be observed in figure 1. 1. 
In sum, on the eve of the war, Iran and Iraq, economically 
speaking, could not have been more different and further apart 
than they were. 
The foregoing is a bird's-eye view of aspects of the Iran-Iraq 
war in so far as it relates to the origin, causes, and the military/ 
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Figure 1.1 Oil exports by Iran and Iraq, 1973--86 (million tonnes) 
Sources: Mofid 1987: l~l, table 4.3; Statistiques 1974-86; UN 
Department of International and Economic Affairs (1979--83) Yearbook 
of World Energy Statistics; OECD 1974-86; 1986, No. 1; BP (1986). 
It can be seen that, from a purely military and economic point of 
view, the timing of the Iraqi invasion of Iran apparently could not 
have been chosen more wisely. In the months prior to the 
offensive, Iraq for the first time found itself in a position to deliver 
the final and fatal blow against Iran. 
Regardless of why nations go to war, which could be argued 
under different theories and models, there is a real tangible and 
measurable consequence of the war; that is, the impact of the war 
on the economy, which is the main objective of this book. 
An overview of the book 
The analysis of the economic consequen· :s of the war on Iran's 
and Iraq's economies, as well as the economic consequences of the 
rapid militarization of the Gulf countries are the principal focus of 
this book. Chapters two and three therefore provide a study of the 
impact of the conflict on some aspects of the Iranian and the Iraqi 
economies. These two chapters will emphasize oil production/ 
exports; foreign-exchange earnings; non-defence foreign trade and 
the performance of the agricultural sector since the war. For the 
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purpose of comparison the corresponding data on the pre-war 
period of 1973-9/80 is also provided. 
One of the most significant consequences of the oil-price 
increases of 1973-4 was a rapid growth in military expenditure of 
Iran and Iraq. The revolution in Iran, after successfully deposing 
the old regime, had a major impact on Iran's Milex and arms-
imports. They were both reduced significantly. However, the Iraqi 
invasion of Iran in September 1980 has given rise to significant 
changes, not only on Iran's pattern of Milex and arms-imports, but 
also on Iraq's. Given the significance of these changes, and their 
consequent economic impacts, in chapters four to seven we have 
provided a somewhat detailed study of militarization of Iran and 
Iraq during the 1973-8 and 1979-85 periods respectively. 
In this book, we also attempt to demonstrate the world's 
hypocrisy and double standards in so far as the sales of arms to 
areas of conflict, i.e. the Iran-Iraq war are concerned. There is, it 
seems, hardly a country in East or West, South or North, where 
the rules of the 'game' have not been allowed to be broken, so that 
arms can be exported or re-exported to one or both countries. 
Chapter eight therefore will look at the Gulf War and the 
international arms trade. 
The revolution in Iran and the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism in 
largely Sunni-Muslim-dominated countries in the Persian Gulf 
were among the main reasons for a rapid increase in military 
expenditure and arms imports in the Gulf countries in the late 
1970s. It is important to note that such rapid increases in Milex 
have taken place at a time when oil revenues have been falling and 
thus resources have become more scarce. Now, more than ever 
before, the oil-exporting economies of the Gulf face a serious 
'butter vs. guns' dilemma. To shed light on these issues, in chapter 
nine we shall look at the impact of the war on Milex and the arms 
imports of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
In chapter ten we shall attempt to bring together the various 
component parts of the economic cost of the war to Iran and Iraq and 
to assign a dollar value to the war's costs. Chapter eleven, the 
conclusion to the book, summarizes the conclusions to the previous 
chapters and then tries to put forward some recommendations 
concerning the eventual post-war reconstruction of Iran and Iraq. 
Since major parts of this study cover topics such as foreign-
exchange earnings, foreign trade, agricultural production and 
imports, military expenditure and arms imports, etc., it was 
deemed necessary to provide the data and analysis supporting the 
arguments presented. These include the tables, graphs, charts, 
notes and appendices. For those less inclined to go though the 
mass of detail, brief summary chapters are included. 
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Iran and Iraq at war: the analysis of 
the economic consequences 
Introduction 
On 16 January 1979 the Shah's 37-year rule came to an end, when 
he left Iran never to return, a price that it seems he had to pay for 
his misguided and unacceptable policies, both in the civilian and 
defence sectors in Iran (for further reading on these issues see 
Mofid 1987). 
On 1 February of the same year, Ayatollah Khomeini returned 
to Iran and was. greeted by millions. In April Iran became an 
Islamic Republic. According to the revolutionary leaders, as a 
result of the Shah's policies, Iran had become too dependent on oil 
revenues and had failed to diversify its exports. 
Moreover, it was argued that ( demonstrated in Mofid 1987) 
much of these revenues was being spent on imports of lavish 
consumer goods and military-related hardware. It was also con-
tended that Iran under the Shah had become too dependent on the 
West for its imports. Furthermore it was also argued that the 
Shah's policies had resulted in the destruction of the agricultural 
sector, pushing Iran into a serious state of dependency on imported 
food. The revolution, it was claimed, would reduce Iran's military 
expenditures and arms imports, would expand the agricultural 
sector, make Iran self-sufficient in food, diversify and increase 
Iran's non-oil exports, reduce imports, especially consumer-goods 
imports, and finally reduce Iran's reliance on the West (Mofid 
1987). 
However, little did they (the revolutionary leaders) know that, 
while the revolution was still very young, fran was going to be 
invaded and that there would be serious consequences for the 
projected goals and objectives of the revolution. 
Given this, we shall now attempt to provide a study of the 
economic consequences of the war on Iran and Iraq, with special 
reference to oil production/exports, foreign-exchange earnings, 
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non-defence foreign trade and agricultural performance since the 
war. For the purpose of comparison, throughout this chapter, the 
corresponding data for the pre-Revolution/war period of 1973-8/ 
79 is also provided. The changes during these two periods will then 
be noted, and this in tum will present some of the economic 
consequences of the war on both countries. This will be done by an 
analysis of the effects of the war on each country separately, 
starting with Iran in this chapter, to be followed by Iraq in the 
following chapter. 
The economic consequences of the war for Iran 
In order to assess the economic consequences of the war for Iran, 
it would be most beneficial if, at this point, some of the objectives 
of the Islamic Republic with regard to their goals of planning, as 
illustrated in the First Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural 
Development Plan, are noted. These observations show, what 
Iran would have been like (a) if there had been no war and (b) if 
the Islamic Republic had been successful in achieving its objectives. 
Some of the main objectives and priorities of the Plan are as 
follows: 
securing economic independence. 
provision of food and clothing. 
provision of housing. 
elimination of unemployment. 
prevention of consumerism. 
agriculture as the axis of development. 
expansion of non-oil exports. 
preventing the expansion of large cities and implementing 
settlement policies (Mofid 1987: 206). 
As far as foreign-trade orientations are concerned, the Plan had 
projected 97 per cent and 3 per cent shares of oil and non-oil 
exports in total exports for 1983, with the latter's share rising to 
7.1 per cent in 1987 (Mofid 1987: 26, table 7.2). 
As for the imports, the Plan's major objective was to decrease 
Iran's dependency on the outside world by reducing the share of 
consumer-goods imports in total imports, from 22.3 per cent in 
1983 to 14.2 per cent in 1987 (Mofid 198', ). 
Therefore, when analysing the impact of the war on Iran's 
economy, not only should we compare and contrast the pre- and 
post-war changes, but also note the outcome of the Plan objectives. 
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Figure 2.1 Oil production and exports: Iran, 1973--86 (million tonnes) 
Sources: Mofid 1987: 150-1, table 4.3; Statistiques 1979-85; UN 
Department of International and Social Affairs (1979--81) Yearbook of 
World Energy Statistics; OECD 1984; 1986, No. 1; BP 1986. 
The impact of the war on oil production and exports 
The volume of oil production and exports has been subjected to 
much imbalance since the revolution and the start of the war. The 
figures for oil production and exports during the 1973-85 period 
are provided in table 2.1, and their graphical presentation is 
illustrated in figure 2.1. As can be seen, oil production decreased 
by 54 and 11 per cent between 1979/80 and 1980/1, where it 
declined from 159,496 thousand tonnes in 1979 to only 66,252 
thousand tonnes in 1981. By 1982 the situation had improved 
considerably, oil production had increased by 82 per cent to 
120,396 thousand tonnes. From then onwards oil production 
declined and, by 1985, it had fallen to 110,100 thousand tonnes. 
The corresponding figure for 1986 is 94,100 thousand tonnes 
(Statistiques 1986). 
In all, on average each year, oil produ<"tion has declined by 7.2 
per cent during the 1979-86 period. The ..:orresponding figure for 
the pre-Revolution/war period of 1973 to 1978 was a decline of 2.2 
per cent on average each year. 
Given the imbalance in oil production, there has also been an 
imbalance in oil exports. The export of oil fell by 67 per cent from 
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Table 2.1 Oil production and major recipients of Iran's oil exports, 
197J-85 ( thousand tonnes) 
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Oil 
production 293,908 299,949 266,676 293,951 282,224 262,436 159,496 74,!J77 
Oil export 263,443 268,207 233,406 260,685 242,891 220,436 121,187 40,112 
Destination: 
USA 12,496 21,655 13,693 28,230 39,790 43,061 27,733 1,!J77 
Canada 5,172 6,209 9,300 7,861 6,056 5,137 2,274 65 
West 
Germany 3,500 4,785 14,190 19,290 15,770 17,289 11,540 5,735 
UK 48,512 46,831 20,423 22,713 14,193 11,895 5,069 1,249 
Italy 12,691 6,509 12,860 14,530 14,410 14,335 2,224 952 
France 10,514 11,005 13,290 14,550 9,385 10,904 6,130 1,228 
Netherlands 19,925 32,839 17,415 17,690 13,525 20,559 5,284 644 
Belgium 7,221 4,685 5,358 5,338 7,296 7,478 2,685 1,066 
Spain 5,384 3,275 4,506 11,854 11,043 8,600 4,379 3,152 
Japan 84,580 66,752 55,611 46,168 40,570 38,860 23,659 13,443 
Australia 500 300 1,033 854 901 359 134 50 




bloc}° 52,116 62,495 65,446 69,938 68,212 36,989 26,966 8,121 
Note: • Author's calculation: all the percentages have been rounded up and therefore totals 
may not add up to 100. 
Sources: Mofid 1987: 150-1, table 4.3. Statistiques, 1919 to 1985, BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (1979-81) 
Yearbook of World Energy Statistics OECD 1984, 1986, No. 1., BP (1986) Statistical 
Review of World Energy, June 
121,187 thousand tonnes in 1979 to only 40,112 thousand tonnes in 
1980. It then rose significantly to 81,724 thousand tonnes in 1982. 
By 1985 oil exports had declined to 72,100 thousand tonnes and 
continued to fall to only 58,100 thousand tonnes in 1986 (Statistiques 
1986). 
In all, during the 1979/86 period, oil exports have declined by an 
annual average of 10 per cent, while, during the 1973-8 period, the 
corresponding figure was a decline of only 3.1 per cent. 
Therefore it could be said that one of the major consequences of 
the war has been the decline in oil production and its exports; 
while every effort has been made to inc1 ease them. 
With regard to the main recipients of oil exports, an important 
feature of table 2.1 is the fact that, in contrast to the many 
statements made by the officials, that 'the Islamic Republic of Iran 
16 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Oil 
production 66,252 120,396 122,150 101,400 110,100 % ,hart of total exports• 
Oil export 41,079 81,724 81,100 72,fJOO 72,100 1973 1977 1978 1979 1983 1985 
Destination: 
USA 3,388 2,608 5,028 2,896 3,412 4.9 16.4 19.5 22.8 6.2 4.4 
Canada 465 2,189 417 533 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.8 2.7 0.7 
West Gennany 1,504 2,311 2,067 2,423 2,666 1.3 6.5 7.8 9.5 2.5 3.4 
UK 1,284 2,578 749 2,m 623 18.4 5.8 5.3 4.1 0.9 0.8 
Italy 2,800 13,116 11,854 9,496 7$1. 4.8 5.9 6.5 1.8 14.6 9.4 
France 1,520 3,761 4,248 3,395 4,077 3.9 3.9 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 
Netherlands 473 7,220 6,855 7,653 4,381 7.5 5.6 9.3 4.3 8.4 5.6 
Belgium 1,494 1,198 950 808 1,413 2.7 3.0 3.3 2.2 1,2 1.8 
Spain 5,085 6,339 7,449 5,883 4,246 2.0 4.5 3.9 3.6 9.9 5.5 
Japan 6,820 11,595 19,587 12,805 12,894 32.1 16.7 17.6 19.5 24.1 16.6 
Australia 493 54 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 




bloc)* 15,266 26,114 14,748 16,598 30,418 17.9 26.2 14.7 22.2 18.2 39.3 
would never sell oil to America' (BBC 1982), Iran has been selling 
oil to that country. Although exports of oil to the US have been 
much reduced in volume since the revolution, none the less, by 
1985, 4.4 per cent of Iran's total oil exports were destined for the 
USA. In 1986, this share had increased to 7.8 per cent of the total 
as, in that year, the US had imported 4,541 thousand tonnes of oil 
from Iran (OECD 1987: third quarter). 
France is another interesting case. While France, as a major 
supplier of arms to Iraq, has indirectly been responsible for so 
much death and destruction in Iran, none the less Iran has 
continued to sell oil to that country. In fact, during the 1979-85 
period, on average each year France, like the US, has imported 
4.5 per cent of Iran's total oil exports. By 1986 this share had 
increased to 5.6 per cent of the total, as in that year France 
17 
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imported 3,425 thousand tonnes of oil from Iran (OECD 1987: 
third quarter). 
In all, while in 1979, Western Europe and Japan together had 
accounted for 50 per cent of Iran's total oil exports, by 1985 this 
share had changed to 58 per cent of the total, rising to 63 per cent 
in 1986 (OECD 1987: third quarter). Moreover, if we compare 
these figures with those of the pre-revolution (1973-8) period, it 
can be noted that, except for Italy, Spain and Turkey, the rest of 
the countries mentioned have reduced their overall imports of 
Iranian oil (i.e. they have reduced their overall dependency on 
Iran). 
Another important feature of table 2.1 is the emergence of 
Turkey as one of the main importers of crude oil from Iran. While 
in 1979 less than 1 per cent of Iran's total oil exports were destined 
for Turkey, by 1985 this share had increased substantially to 7 per 
cent of the total oil exports. In 1986 Turkey imported 6,613 
thousand tonnes of oil from Iran, representing 11.4 per cent of 
Iran's total oil exports in that year (OECD 1987: third quarter). 
The importance of oil in providing foreign-exchange earnings 
during the period under study and the failure of the Islamic 
Republic io diversify Iran's foreign-exchange earnings can best be 
seen in table 2.2, where the value of Iran's total exports and its 
composition during the 1973-86 period are given. As can be noted, 
in 1979 crude petroleum had provided 87.2 per cent of the total 
value of exports. By 1986, however, this share had increased to 94 
per cent. 
The share of non-energy merchandise exports has correspond-
ingly fallen from the high level of 5.6 per cent in 1980 to 3.5 per 
cent in 1986. One reason for this is the jump in oil prices in 1979-
80 (OPEC II). The absolute decline of non-energy exports, 
however, indicates that the government's intentions are very far 
from being realized, even if price changes are allowed for. 
Furthermore the failure to diversify the sources of foreign-
exchange earnings is also in contrast to the objectives of the First 
National Plan of the Islamic Republic. 
If we compare and contrast the figures for the post- and pre-
revolution periods, it can be noted that indeed, since the revolution, 
Iran has become much more dependent on oil revenues. During 
the 1973-8 period such revenues on average per year had provided 
91.5 per cent of the total value of exports, while during 1982--6 this 
has increased to 98 per cent per annum. 
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Share of petroleum in TX* 
Share of CPX in TX* 
Share of N-EX in TX* 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
TX Total exports. 
CPX Crude petroleum exports. 
N-EX Non-energy exports. 
426 1,459 1,367 1,652 1,713 1,558 1,408 
387 1,414 1,328 1,610 1,667 1,528 1,352 
365 1,336 1,245 1,539 1,539 1,470 1,228 
39 45 39 42 46 30 56 
% % % % % % % 
90.8 96.7 97.1 97.4 97.3 98.1 96.0 
85.7 91.7 91.1 93.1 93.0 94.3 87.2 
9.1 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.7 1.9 4.0 
994 981 1,632 1,685 1,128 1,219 840" 
938 944 1,608 1,660 1,103 1,194 810 
684 731 1,508 1,621 1,066 1,157 790 
56 37 24 25 25 25 30" 
% % % % % % % 
94.4 96.2 98.2 98.6 97.8 98.0 96.4 
68.8 75.5 92.4 96.2 94.5 94.9 94.0 
5.6 3.7 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.0 3.5 
The exchange rate for the period under observation: $1 = rials 68.9 (1973), 67.6 (1974), 67.6 (1975), 70.2 (1976), 70.6 (1977), 70.5 (1978), 70.5 (1979), 
70.6 (1980), 78.3 (1981), 83.6 (1982), 86.4 (1983), 90.0 (1984), 91.0 (1985), 79.0 (1986). 
• Author's estimation. 
Sources: IMFa International Financial Statistics 1986, 1987 
Statistiques 1986 
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The impact of the war on the value, composition and the origins of 
non-defence imports 
As was noted already, the revolution had much criticized the 
Shah's foreign-trade performance and had made many promises to 
reverse these policies. Therefore an area in which we could clearly 
observe the impact of the war should be in the foreign-trade sector 
where much emphasis has been laid on achieving the objectives of 
the revolution. 
It would be beneficial at this point if, once more, the main 
foreign-trade objectives of the revolution are noted. They are to 
reduce Iran's dependency on the West; to reduce the share of 
consumer goods in total imports; and to increase the share of non-
oil exports in total exports ( on these issues see further Mofid 1987: 
chapter seven). With these in mind, the value and the origins of 
Iran's non-military imports are the subject of the study at this 
point. 
Table 2.3 provides data on the money value of total non-military 
imports during 1973 to 1985. It can be seen that the value of 
imports during the period under study has been the subject of 
much fluctuation. This is due to the fact that the value of imports is 
closely related to the value of foreign-exchange earnings (i.e. the 
amount of oil exports and oil prices). Thus an imbalance in oil 
revenues has also caused an imbalance in the value of imports. 
As can be noted, total non-defence imports were $9,695 million 
in 1979, and rising to $11,630 million in 1982. However, by 1982/3, 
foreign-exchange earnings had improved significantly (see table 
2.2). Given the close relationship between this and the imports, by 
1983 the value of imports had increased also significantly to 
$18,227 million. 
However, since 1983, as a result of sustained Iraqi attacks on 
Iran's oil facilities, as well as a decline in oil prices in general, there 
has been a rapid decline in foreign-exchange earnings and thus the 
value of imports has fallen sharply. In 1984 total imports fell to 
$14,750 million and still further to $11,658 in 1985. By 1986 total 
imports had fallen to only $9,775 million (IMFb 1986). 
In all, total non-military imports have increased by only 0.1 per 
cent on average each year between 1979 and 1986. However, if we 
compare the 1986 imports with those of the 1983 period (the 
highest level since the revolution and the war), it can be noted that 
the total imports during this period have fallen by 18.7 per cent on 
average each year. 
Such a decline in imports and the fact that Iran's industrialization 
has been based on 'dependent capitalism' and the import-substitution 
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Table 2.3 Value and distribution of Iran's imports by main countries: 1973--85 (million current dollars)* 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
USA 477 1,313 2,316 1,974 2,347 1,508 1,181 25 330 134 209 178 81 
Canada 23 56 84 103 121 57 21 30 21 161 182 120 53 
West Germany 717 1,178 2,033 2,273 2,789 2,142 1,413 1,657 1,766 1,536 3,310 2,518 1,812 
UK 342 508 989 890 1,028 '843 542 1,006 811 635 1,047 1,030 745 
Italy 137 197 418 735 810 596 455 632 829 796 994 1,039 672 
France 176 241 519 715 661 508 468 793 735 367 408 201 176 
Netherlands 88 152 332 443 489 215 261 386 430 298 470 417 298 
Belgium 112 172 291 279 348 257 175 297 281 160 270 253 195 
Switzerland 71 115 188 227 271 275 245 304 260 211 336 311 219 
Sweden 52 79 151 140 192 145 75 207 215 226 464 522 210 
Spain 28 35 126 109 140 259 121 327 337 328 452 327 312 
Japan 537 993 1,853 2,200 2,321 1,757 1,013 1,697 1,629 1,033 3,102 1,862 1,496 
Australia 51 67 191 172 228 151 146 311 220 219 258 411 235 
Turkey 15 38 55 41 40 23 21 93 257 811 978 969 661 
India 54 113 435 315 193 94 118 144 158 150 129 132 110 
Brazil 52 24 59 66 69 68 79 263 214 231 385 328 234 
Others (including Soviet 
Union & Eastern 
Europe) 727 1,262 1,546 1,824 2,400 1,474 3,482 2,235 4,844 4,662 5,233 4,132 4,149 
Total Imports 3,659 6,543 11,586 12,506 14,447 10,372 9,695 10,080 13,000 11,630 18,227 14,750 11,658 
Note: • Excluding military-related imports. 
Sources: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1356, 1358 
IMFb 1981, 1985, 1986; IMFa International Financial Statistics, August 1985, December 1985 and November 1986 
Mofid 1987: 154, 155, table 4.5 
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strategy of development (see further Mofid 1987: chapters three 
and four) with its massive import requirements, must have created 
many problems and setbacks in the economy. It should be 
underlined that, since the revolution, the import dependency of 
the economy has increased. For example, while in 1977 each 100 
rials of non-oil gross domestic product (GDP) produced required 
33 per cent of imported primary and intermediate inputs, by 1983 
the corresponding figure had increased to 37 per cent (all figures 
based in constant rials, 1974 = 100) (for evidence on these figures 
see Behdad 1988: 10, table 4). 
The serious state of import dependency of the 'large' (with ten 
or more workers) manufacturing establishments can further be 
seen in the fact that, according to the Statistical Centre of Iran, 
imported primary products accounted for 54 per cent of these 
establishments' total imports in 1983. For chemicals and basic 
metal industries, these shares were 69.7 and 71.5 per cent respec-
tively in the same year (Statistical Centre of Iran 1985). 
Given such a high dependency on imports, it would not be too 
difficult to note the effect of such imbalance and fluctuation in 
total imports on the performance of the industrial sector in Iran 
since the revolution and the war. 
At this point, if the values of the pre- and post-war non-defence 
imports are compared, it can be noted that for example, during the 
1973--7 period, they had increased by 41 per cent on average each 
year, while the corresponding figures for the 1981-6 and 1983-6 
periods show a decline of 5.5 and 18.7 per cent respectively. 
Table 2.4 provides figures for the share of non-military imports 
in GDP; that is, the measurement of import penetration during the 
1973-86 period. As can be noted, the share of total non-military 
imports in GDP (including oil) on average per year during 1979 to 
1986 is 10.1 per cent. The corresponding figure for the period 
1979-83, to take account of the drastic fall in imports during 1984-
6, is 11.9 per cent. 
However, it should be noted that, in the first year of the 
revolution and the year preceding the Iraqi invasion, namely in 
1979, although oil revenues were at the high level of 1,408 billion 
rials, the imports were kept at only 685 billion rials, representing 
an 11.3 per cent imports burden for that year, a much lower 
burden than the previous years, i.e. 19.6 per cent in 1977. 
Therefore it appears that the revolutionary leaders were indeed 
genuine in their approach towards a new foreign-trade policy in Iran, 
and were serious in their initial actions to reduce Iran's import 
dependency. Thus the failure to achieve the objective of the revolu-
tion in this area can be said to be a serious consequence of the war. 
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Nota: • Author's calculation. 































Import ratio* GDP GDP (excluding oil) Import ratio* GDP 
14.0 1,196 21.0 
14.4 1,630 27.0 
22.S 2,103 37.0 
19.S 2,802 31.0 
19.6 3,54S 29.0 
14.7 3,692 20.0 
11.3 4,377 1S.7 
12.8 S,778 14.9 
12.0 7,288 13.S 
11.6 8,852 13.4 
11.7 11,662 13.6 
8.8 12,926· 10.3 
6.9 13,163· 8.1 
s.o 13,183· 6.0 
Sourcu: Central Bank of Iran, Annual R11pon and Balllnctl Sh«t, 13S1, 1356, 1357-32; IMFa (1980, 1987) lnumodonal FUllllldol SltltUtiu 
Table 2.5 Commodity composition of Iran's imports (non-military) classified by their use, 1973-86 (% )* 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Intermediate goods (a) 60.3 65.2 53.2 52.5 53.9 51.5 54.6 57.2 60.0 57.9 59.5 
Capital goods (b) 24.8 20.3 29.8 9.8 26.5 28.0 18.9 16.0 15.8 19.5 23.9 
Consumer goods ( c) 14.9 15.5 17.0 17.7 19.6 20.5 26.2 26.3 23.8 22.6 16.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Average share/Year (a) 1979--86° 
Average share/Year (b) 1979--86° 
Average share/Year (c) 1979--86° 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 




All figures rounded up, totals may not add up to 100. 
Average share/Year (a)* 1973--8 
Average share/Year (b )° 1973--8 
Average share/Year (c)° 1973--8 
Sources: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1356, 1358, 1361, 1362 














Iran and Iraq at war: economic consequences 
The composition of Iran's non-defence imports (percentage 
share in total) during the 1973-86 period is given in table 2.5. The 
import substitution (1-S) strategy of development and the goal of 
self-sufficiency since the revolution have meant that a large 
proportion of imports has been intermediate and capital-goods 
imports. Indeed, during the 1979-86 period, on average each year 
56.9 and 19.1 per cent of total imports were intermediate and 
capital-goods imports. 
At this point, if the figures of the pre- and post-revolution/war 
periods are compared, it can be observed that the share of 
intermediate goods imports has remained more or less unchanged; 
while the imports of capital goods on the other hand have declined 
significantly (see table 2.5). 
The most significant change, given the revolution's goals and 
objectives, in particular to 'prevent consumerism', has been a 
substantial rise in imports of consumer goods. As shown in table 
2.5, the import share of consumer goods, which during 1973-8 was 
17 .5 per cent of the total on average each year, has rapidly 
increased to 24 per cent on average per annum in the 1979-86 
period. 
In our analysis so far, we have used the current values of 
imports. We now analyse constant-price figures. The data on the 
value of total imports at 1974 constant prices has been calculated 
by using the index of industrial countries' export values, whose 
figures are given in table 2.6. As can be seen, the total non-military 
imports at 1974 constant prices was 434 billion rials in 1979, rising 
continuously and significantly to 983 billion rials in 1983. 
Since 1983, however, given the rapid decline in oil revenues and 
consequently the fall in imports at current prices, there has also 
been a decline in imports at constant prices. They fell significantly 
to only 462 billion rials in 1986. 
In all, during 1979 to 1986, the imports at 1974 constant prices 
have increased by 0.9 per cent on average each year. The 
corresponding figure for the 1979-83 period, to take account of the 
drastic fall in imports during the 1984-6 period, is the rise of 22.7 
per cent on average each year, while the figure for the 1983-6 
period is the decline of 22.2 per cent on average each year. Total 
imports at 1974 constant prices during the pre-war period of 1973-
8 had increased by 5.6 per cent on average each year. 
What all these figures tell us is the existence of very chaotic and 
disorganized economic conditions in Iran, which in turn, have 
created a nightmare for planners and planning in general. One 
cannot plan the economy on a long-term basis when there are 
yearly fluctuations of these magnitudes in imports, given the 
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Table 2.6 Estimation of Iran's non-military imports at 1974 constant prices*, 1973--86 (billion constant rials) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1981) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total non-military imports 
(current prices) 248 442 782 875 1,022 721 686 863 985 1,185 1,583 1,328 1,061 772 
Index of industrial countries' export 
values 1974 = 1 0.62 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Total non-military imports at 1974 
constant prices 400 442 711 673 730 555 434 482 573 714 983 862 689 462 
Average annual growth of imports at 1974 constant prices(%)* 1973-8 5.6 
1979--4!6 0.9 
1983-6 -22.2 
Note: • Author's calculations. 
Sources: Central Bank of Iran Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1356, 1359; IMFa (1980, 1985, 1987) lntemalional Financial Statistics 
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'dependent' capitalist nature of the economy. The war and the 
instability that it has caused have made a bad situation worse. 
At this point the origins of Iran's imports since the revolution/ 
war, whose data was provided in table 2.3, is the subject of 
analysis. At the outset, it should be underlined that, since the 
revolution, the motivation of foreign-trade policy has been partly 
political, as, for example, the ban on trade with the US, and there 
has been a declared preference for trading with the Third World, 
as well as attempts to reduce the volume of trade with the West 
(see further Mofid 1987: chapter 7). 
However, as it will be demonstrated shortly, the war and the 
desire to satisfy the immediate needs of the population, have made 
the achievement of the objectives of the revolution much more 
difficult, if not impossible. 
By looking at table 2.3, it can be noted that the major pre-war 
suppliers, namely, West Germany and Japan, are still the main 
exporters to Iran. In 1979 they had accounted for 14.5 and 10.4 per 
cent of Iran's total imports. The corresponding figures for 1985 are 
15.5 and 12.8 per cent. 
In all, while in 1980 industrial countries had provided 66 per 
cent of total impPrts, by 1986 not much had been changed, as in 
that year their share was 65 per cent of the total. However, the 
European countries' share of the total, during the same period, 
has increased from 7 to 14 per cent. The share of African countries 
has remained unchanged, accounting for about 0.4 per cent of the 
total during the same period (IMF 1986b). 
If we now compare the above figures with those of the pre-war 
period (i.e. 1979), it can be seen that the share of the industrialized 
countries in that year was 71 per cent of the total. Therefore, in 
comparison to 1986, since the war, there has been a modest 
decline (6 per cent) in Iran's total imports from these groups of 
countries. However, on the other hand, there has been a massive 
increase in the share of European countries, as their share in 1979 
was only 3.4 per cent of the total; at the same time the African 
countries' share has also declined from 3.4 per cent of the total to 
only 0.4 per cent (IMF 1986b). 
In conclusion, it can be said that, because of the fall in total 
Iranian oil exports, it is also true that Western European countries 
as well as Japan have substantially reduced their oil imports from 
Iran since the revolution. But, as was noted, Iran has not de-
creased its imports from these countries. Overall, although there 
has been some diversification of trading partners in post-revolution 
Iran, the changes have not been significant enough to reduce Iran's 
dependency on countries like West Germany and Japan, although, 
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Table 2. 7 Iran's production of principal crop products, 197H5 (thousand metric tonnes)* 
Item 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Wheat 4,600 4,700 5,570 6,044 5,517 5,526 5,800 5,700 6,518 6,500 5,956 5,500 6,000 
Rice 1,334 1,313 1,430 1,566 1,400 1,280 1,420 1,212 1,500 1,400 1,216 1,600 1,100 
Barley 923 863 1,438 1,487 1,230 1,276 1,000 1,100 1,351 1,400 1,413 1,550 1,650 
Com 25 25 65 80 55 60 51 60 50 53 55 50 50 
Sugar beet 4,940 4,200 4,670 5,250 4,150 3,653 3,900 1,500 2,318 2,100 3,650 3,290 3,385 
Sugar cane 1,050 1,200 940 600 1,000 898 1,399 1,400 1,400 1,300 1,600 2,200 2,150 
Cotton (raw) 615 715 470 510 535 472 278 180 211 294 202 226 200 
Bovine meat 99 102 104 108 160 160 161 171 181 190 165 165 168 
Mutton and lamb 158 152 167 171 176 224 230 232 225 225 230 234 234 
Poultry 100 103 106 130 189 208 211 211 213 215 230 235 240 
Cows' milk (fresh) 1,050 1,150 1,230 1,250 1,300 1,580 1,580 1,550 1,627 1,705 1,650 1,650 1,700 
Sheep milk (fresh) 555 570 593 617 640 664 687 690 710 731 705 705 715 
Cheese 77 81 85 86 89 98 98 99 102 105 104 104 106 
Butter 48 51 54 56 58 66 66 67 69 72 70 70 71 
Note: • Figures are rounded to the nearest 1,000 tonnes. 
Sourr:u: FAOa 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1985 
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at the same time, these countries have reduced their dependency 
on Iranian oil. 
The impact of the war on the agricultural sector 
One of the most tragic consequences of the war, as we will 
demonstrate shortly, has been the failure of the agricultural sector 
to meet the basic requirements of the people. This has been the 
case, even though, as was mentioned earlier, the revolution had 
declared agriculture as the 'axis of development', had promised 
self-sufficiency in food and, in all, a total reversal of the policies 
discredited in the past. Therefore the following is an attempt to 
demonstrate what has been happening in the agricultural sector 
since the revolution and the war. 
The figures for the estimated production of principal crop 
products and main livestock items during 1973--85 are given in 
table 2.7. It can be observed that the average annual growth rates 
for many items during the 1979-85 period have been either 
negative or increasing at a very insignificant rate. For example, the 
production of wheat during the period under study grew by 0.6 per 
cent on average each year; rice (-4 per cent); bovine meat (0.7 
per cent); mutton and lamb (0.3 per cent); sheep milk (0.7 per 
cent) and cheese (1 per cent). 
The above figures will prove more meaningful if they are 
compared with the rate at which the population has been growing 
during the same period. The population has increased from 37 .2 
million in 1979 to 44.2 million in 1985 (IMF 1986a), representing 
an average annual growth rate of 2.9 per cent. This observation 
very clearly demonstrates the failure of the agricultural sector to 
meet the food requirements of a growing population. The reasons 
for such an outcome are varied and complex. To elaborate on 
them is indeed beyond the scope of this study. However, there can 
be no doubt that the mounting costs of the war and the increased 
rural/urban migration caused by it are amongst the main reasons. 
The following is an attempt to clarify this observation. 
Since the revolution there have been many attempts to increase 
the productivity of the agricultural sector by shifting the emphasis 
from industrial to agricultural development. Thus, for example, 
land under cultivation has increased significantly. Table 2.8 pro-
vides information on land use since the revolution. As can be 
noted, between 1979 and 1985, land under use for wheat produc-
tion increased by 32.3 per cent; barley (47.4 per cent); sugar beet 
(10.3 per cent); cotton (31 per cent) and rice (58 per cent). 
However, given the significant increase in land under cultivation, 
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then why, as was noted earlier, has agricultural production either 
declined or been static during the same period? 




Sugar Beet 328.5 
Cotton 359.75 
Rice 750.41 
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture (1983, 1986) Agricultural Economic Report 










1984 1985 % change 
23,860 15,840 45.0 (1982-5) 
1,679 1,626 15.8 (1983-5) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (1986) Agricultural Economic Report 
The answer to this question is directly related to the con-
sequences of the war. Why? Because, as a result of the war and its 
mounting costs, there has been less money available for necessary 
expenditures in the agricultural sector. For example, as shown in 
table 2.9, the number of tractors sold and delivered to the farmers 
declined by 45 per cent during the 1982-5 period, and the volume 
of fertilizers also declined by 15.8 per cent during the 1983--5 
period, even though, as was noted already, there has been a 
significant rise in land use. 
However, the government in Tehran had hoped that, by employ-
ing more people on the larger area of cultivated land, production 
could be increased, with greater reliance on traditional methods of 
production, rather than employing more capital-intensive tech-
niques. Therefore, given this strategy, there was a need for a 
larger labour force to work on the land than ever before. How-
ever, the war very soon put an end to the realization of the said 
objective, as an increasing proportion of a young and able 
workforce from the rural areas was called up to go to the war 
front, while the remaining people either were too old to work on 
the land or chose to go to the larger cities themselves. 
Since the war, many villages have been deserted altogether. For 
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example, in Malayer, by 1983, 65 out of nearly 254 villages had 
been deserted (Keyhan: 20 July 1983). As far as internal migra-
tion is concerned, nation-wide data on rural-urban migration is 
scarce. Estimates, however, indicate that 40 per cent of the urban 
population growth between 1977 and 1983 has been due to peasant 
migration (Kazerooni 1985). According to official estimates, dur-
ing 1979-83, 2.2 million people have moved from rural to urban 
areas, although independent studies estimate this figure to be at 
least three times higher (Kazerooni 1985). It is interesting to note 
that, according to another independent observer (Simpson 1988), 
the population of Tehran, for example, has increased from 6 
million in 1978 to more than 10 million in 1986, representing an 
average annual increase of over 19 per cent during the same 
period. 
The official information on the (percentage) share of the econ-
omically active population in agriculture in Iran for selected years 
between 1965 to 1985 is given in table 2.10. As a matter of interest, 
the corresponding figures for India, Pakistan and Turkey are also 
given. 
By looking at table 2.10 and comparing the different sets of 
data, the scale of Iran's rural-urban migration, in absolute, as well 
as relative terms, becomes very clear. As can be seen, in 1965, 49 
per cent of Iran's economically active population were in rural 
areas. By 1980 these figures had dropped to 36 per cent and the 
corresponding figure for 1985 is 33 per cent. 
Table 2.10 Percentage share of economically active population in 
agriculture - a measurement of urbanization - Iran, India, Pakistan and 
Turkey (selected years) 
Iran India Pakistan Turkey 
1965 49 73 60 75 
1970 44 72 59 71 
1975 40 71 57 65 
1980 36 70 55 58 
1985 33 69 52 52 
Source: FAOa 1985 
One of the many reasons for the rapid urbanization in Iran, at 
least up to the revolution, was the misguided and inappropriate 
agricultural and industrial policies under the Shah, which have 
been addressed by the present author elsewhere already (Mofid 
1987). 
The revolution, however, had made the rural-urban migration a 
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very important issue, and indeed the 'prevention of the expansion 
of large cities and implementing settlement policies' became one 
of the main objectives of planning in the post-revolution period. 
Given this, the failure of the Islamic Republic to stop or even to 
slow down the urbanization process is one of the most costly and 
tragic consequences of the war. 
The failure to produce enough agricultural products has resulted 
in a significant increase in Iran's dependency on the outside world 
for food. 
Table 2.11 provides figures on imports of principal agricultural 
products and main livestock items during 1973 to 1985. As can be 
seen, the imports of many items on average each year have 
increased significantly both before and since the revolution. But it 
should not be forgotten that the revolution had promised self-
sufficiency in food and had declared agriculture as the 'axis of 
development'. All the planning and policy instruments, it seems at 
least at the beginning, were directed towards the achievement of 
this objective. 
Therefore the failure to reverse past policies and at least reduce 
Iran's dependency on the outside world for food supplies, 
although all the intentions were there to do so, must be one of the 
major consequences of the war. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we mainly analyzed some of the major economic 
consequences of the war on Iran during the 1980-5 period. 
However, as noted in chapter one, economically and militarily 
speaking, at the time of the invasion the two countries could not 
have been more different and further apart. 
Iran's armed forces were disintegrated and demoralized, and the 
economy was in ruins, while Iraq was enjoying a major boom 
under a situation of 'never had it so good', so to say. 
The chapter noted that the economic consequences of the war 
on Iran have been devastating. In a nutshell it can be seen that the 
most damaging consequence of the war on Iran has been the 
failure of the Islamic Republic to reverse the Shah's policies. 
The revolution had promised to reduce Iran's dependency on oil 
revenues, diversify the economy, increase non-oil exports, reduce 
Iran's dependency on trade with the West, make agriculture the 
'axis of development', increase food/agricultural production, re-
duce consumer-goods imports and finally put an end to the ruraV 
urban migration. 
In this chapter these issues were addressed and discussed and 
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Table 2.11 Iran's import of principal agricultural products, 1973-85 {thousand metric tonnes)* 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Wheat and flour (wheat equivalent) 785 1,456 1,472 844 1,159 1,354 750 1,341 1,620 1,770 2,688 3,919 2,819 
Rice 12 191 286 250 590 500 500 402 586 432 622 710 400 
Barley 107 178 203 230 334 464 200 388 472 420 471 581 450 
Com 131 223 78 215 344 450 500 647 869 652 979 640 810 
Sugar (total raw equivalent) 299 228 633 313 488 876 746 412 652 866 310 643 598 
Sugar (refined) 161 98 424 220 449 732 686 379 600 674 285 592 550 
Fresh/frozen bovine meat 4 5 15 22 40 28 42 60 46 53 119 85 50 
Fresh/frozen sheep meat 12 19 38 58 60 50 59 110 124 162 114 145 130 
Fresh/frozen poultry 3 2 17 22 18 21 28 64 65 40 43 42 10 
Dry/fresh milk 7 11 14 11 19 28 29 21 47 41 53 25 20 
Butter 16 21 27 26 28 26 45 38 66 43 67 59 52 
Cheese 2 7 11 22 41 40 46 62 78 67 92 138 100 
Note: • Figures are rounded to the nearest thousand tonnes. 
Sources: FAOb 1975, 1977, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1985 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
the changes since the revolution/war were noted. We established 
that, in all cases, the situation has deteriorated and become more 
and more problematic. 
The war therefore has had a most damaging and devastating 
effect on Iran's economic, industrial and agricultural develop-
ment. Given that the revolution in Iran was a popular revolution, 
then the chances were that at least some, if not all, the objectives 
of the revolution could have been achieved by now. 
Therefore the failure to realize any of the economic objectives 
of the revolution and to break from past economic policies can be 
identified as one of the most serious consequences of the war. 
How successful the revolution would have been, in the absence 
of the war, in bringing about changes is a question beyond the 
ability of the present author to answer. However, let us not forget 
that the revolution was only seventeen months old when the 
country was invaded. 
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Chapter three 
Iraq at war: the analysis of the 
• economic consequences 
Introduction 
This chapter, which is a continuation of chapter two, provides a 
study of the impact of the war on some aspects of the Iraqi 
economy. As with the discussion of Iran, in this chapter we shall 
also emphasize oil production/exports; foreign exchange earnings; 
non-defence foreign trade and the performance of the agricultural 
sector since the war. As in chapter two, for the purpose of 
comparison, the corresponding data on the pre-war period of 
1973-9 is also given. The changes during these two periods will 
then be noted, and this in turn will enable us to assess some of the 
economic consequences of the war on Iraq. 
As noted in chapter one, Iraq's economy during the late 1970s 
was going through a period of unparalleled boom. Oil output had 
increased from 2.7 mbd in 1978 to 3.5 mbd in 1979, representing 
an increase of nearly 30 per cent. Oil revenues had also risen by 
97.2 per cent from $10.8 billion to $21.3 billion during the same 
period. In the first nine months of 1980, oil revenues had increased 
further to $22.4 billion. 
In all, Iraq was going through a period of 'never had it so good', 
with years of sustained economic growth, the building of its 
infrastructure, and a rapid and unparalleled rise in oil exports and 
revenues. Iraq had also started to build up new infrastructure and 
facilities in preparation for hosting the Non-Aligned Conference in 
September 1982 in Baghdad and had, by the time of the invasion, 
accumulated at least $35 billion in foreign-exchange reserves. 
Therefore, when analysing the impact of the war on Iraq, it 
must be noted that, in contrast to Iran, Iraq, at the time of the war, 
was at its apex of development and modernization, with a promis-
ing future ahead of it. 
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Table 3.1 Oil production and major recipient of Iraq's oil exports 1973--85 (thousand tonnes) 
1973 1974 1975* 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Oil production 99,400 102,900 110,100 117,300 122,100 125,500 170,300 130,000 
Oil export 89,200 98,000 100,100 110,000 112,900 116,800 160,400 120,400 
Destination: 
USA 205 - 95 1,544 4,010 3,039 4,514 1,636 
Canada 1,057 471 1,639 1,427 917 1,200 415 956 
West Germany 1,613 3,570 1,404 1,734 1,114 2,913 2,233 2,943 
UK 2,762 3,815 3,064 5,880 5,616 8,664 6,963 4,310 
Italy 18,491 13,429 18,688 15,630 14,235 18,952 24,549 11,783 
France 18,678 16,739 12,018 16,812 18,234 20,537 24,449 23,262 
Netherlands 652 456 1,940 3,015 3,342 3,677 1,976 656 
Belgium 818 362 1,617 1,254 2,202 1,876 2,427 1,660 
Spain 2,327 3,408 6,032 3,857 5,586 5,962 5,831 6,171 
Japan 111 1,871 4,650 6,654 7,355 7,973 12,703 15,863 
Australia 1,663 - 1,227 570 1,806 1,500 1,009 183 
Turkey 3,107 4,219 7,610 6,614 6,600 8,664 6,963 3,957 
Others (including Eastern 
bloc countries)* 37,716 49,660 40,116 45,009 41,883 31,943 66,368 47,020 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 % share of total exports* 
1973 1978 1979 1985 
Oil production 43,900 49,600 53,800 59,800 68,778 
Oil export 34,100 39,300 32,500 35,500 48,549 
Destination: 
USA 539 132 510 627 2,322 0.2 2.6 3.0 5.0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 1.0 0.2 0.0 
West Germany 2,423 779 1,472 1,989 329 1.8 2.5 1.0 0.7 
UK 5,549 5,447 622 413 1,964 3.1 7.4 4.0 4.0 
Italy 7,674 5,715 4,865 4,532 6,243 20.7 16.2 15.0 13.0 
France 2,282 1,474 1,998 3,257 6,428 20.9 17.6 15.0 13.0 
Netherlands 0 2,877 141 1,038 1,290 0.7 3.1 1.0 3.0 
Belgium 51 407 1,611 1,856 732 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 
Spain 2,277 2,875 2,071 3,176 5,692 2.6 5.0 4.0 12.0 
Japan 2,914 3,285 470 471 3,103 0.1 6.8 8.0 6.0 
Australia 465 0 0 0 0 1.8 1.3 0.6 0.0 
Turkey 392 1,016 4,374 4,072 5,631 3.5 7.4 4.0 12.0 
Others (including Eastern 
bloc countries)* 9.534 15,293 14,366 14,069 14,815 42.3 27.3 41.0 31.0 
Note: * Author's calculations. All the percentages have been rounded up and therefore totals may not add to 100. 
Sources: Statistiques 1974-86; 
United Nations International Economic and Social Affairs (1979-83) Yearbook of World Energy Statistics 
OECD 1974-86 
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The impact of the war on oil production and exports 
By far the most severe blow to the economy of Iraq as a result of 
the war has been to the oil sector. Within the first few days of the 
war the Iraqi refinery at Basra, off-loading facilities at Fao, Khor 
al-Amaya and Mina al-Bakr, as well as the key K-1 pumping 
stations in the Kirkuk field in the north, were put out of action. 
Thus, within a week of the outbreak of the hostilities, Iraq was 
forced to suspend virtually all its oil exports. 
The significant decline in oil production/exports can best be seen 
in table 3.1 and figure 3.1, where the volume of oil production and 
its exports during the 1973-85 period are noted. As can be seen, 
oil production decreased by 24 and 66 per cent between 1979/80 
and 1980/1, where it fell from 170,300 thousand tonnes in 1979 to 
130,000 thousand tonnes in 1980 and then fell drastically to only 
43,900 thousand tonnes in 1981. Since 1982 the situation has 
improved somewhat, although not rising to anything nearing the 
pre-war levels. By 1985 and 1986 oil production had increased to 
68,778 and 82,665 thousand tonnes (Statistiques 1986). 
In all, on average each year, oil production has declined by 9.7 
per cent between 1979 and 1986. The corresponding figure for the 
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Figure 3.1 Oil production and exports: Iraq, 1973--86 (million tonnes) 
Sources: Statistiques 1974--86; United Nations International Economic 
and Social Affairs (1979-83) Yearbook of World Energy Statistics; OECD 
1974--86 
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The decline in oil production has resulted in a massive reduction 
in oil exports. The export of oil fell by 25 per cent between 1979 
and 1980. The corresponding figure for the 1980/1 period was 72 
per cent, where oil exports fell from 120,400 thousand in 1980 to 
only 34,100 thousand tonnes in 1981. Then, as a result of improve-
ments in oil production, oil exports were also increased, and by 
1985 48,549 thousand tonnes of oil were exported. The correspond-
ing figure for 1986 is 62,100 thousand tonnes (Statistiques 1986). 
In all, during 1979 to 1986, oil exports have declined by 12.7 per 
cent on average each year, while, during 1973--9, the correspond-
ing figure was an increase of 10.3 per cent. 
Therefore, it can be seen that one of the most serious con-
sequences of the war has been in the oil sector, where oil 
production/exports have declined significantly, while every effort 
has been made to increase them. 
With regard to the main recipients of oil exports, it can be said 
that all the countries mentioned in table 3.1 have reduced their 
overall imports of Iraqi oil (i.e. they have reduced their depen-
dency on Iraq). 
The importance of oil in providing foreign exchange during the 
period under study and the failure of the Iraqi government to 
achieve one of the main objectives of its planning policies, namely, 
reducing the country's dependency on oil revenues as the main 
supplier of foreign exchange, and also to increase non-energy 
exports, as outlined for example in the Five-Year National 
Development Plan, 1981/85 (Plan and Budget Organization 1982), 
can best be seen in table 3.2, where the value of total exports and 
its composition during the 1973-86 period are given. 
As can be noted, given the serious damages to oil-export 
facilities, the revenue generated by petroleum exports has fallen 
drastically. It fell from 7,718 million dinars in 1980 to only 2,752 
million dinars in 1986, representing an average annual decline of 
16 per cent during the same period. The value of non-energy 
exports has remained more or less static at around 40-42 million 
dinars a year. It should, however, be noted that in both cases the 
figures quoted are in current prices. Therefore, if inflation is taken 
into consideration, the actual decline in constant prices during the 
period under study can be very substantial indeed. 
At this point, if the pre- and post-war foreign-exchange earnings 
are compared, it can be seen that, during the 1973--9 period, Iraqi 
oil revenues as well as its total export earnings continuously 
increased each year. The average annual rates of increase were 50 
and 48 per cent respectively. 
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Table 3.2 Value of Iraq's total exports, 1973-86 (million current dinars) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
TX 588 1,949 2,450 2,738 2,850 3,266 6,329 7,7(1.) 3,110 3,056 3,042 3,545 3,903 2,792 
CPX 555 1,921 2,415 2,692 2,807 3,204 6,287 7,718 3,068 3,014 3,000 3,495 3,862 2,752 
N-EX* 33 28 35 46 43 62 42 42 42 42 42 50 44 40 
Share ofCPX % % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
inTX• 94.4 98.6 98.6 98.3 98.5 98.1 99.3 99.4 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6 99.0 99.0 
Share of N-EX 
inTX• 5.6 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.9 0.7 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
TIC Total exports. 
CPX Crude petroleum exports. 
N-EX Non-energy exports. 
The exchange rate for the period under study: $1 = 0.30 dinars (1973), 0.29 (1974-82) and 0.31 (1983-6). 
Sources: IMFa 1987 
Statistiques 1986 
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The impact of the war on the value, composition and the origins of 
non-defence imports 
The money value of Iraq's total imports during the 1973--85 
period, like those of Iran, has been the subject of much fluctua-
tion. However, at the outset it should be noted that, at least for the 
first two years of the war, Saddam Hussain, with the help of his 
friends in the region, was a man determined to have both guns and 
butter. As it will be shown in a later chapter, not only has the value 
of military expenditures (Milex) increased significantly since the 
war, but there was also a rapid increase in non-military imports in 
the early years of the invasion. 
Given the drastic fall in Iraq's foreign exchange earnings, the 
simultaneous increases in Milex, arms imports and non-defence 
imports would not have been possible without outside help. Two 
Arab countries, amongst others, have become indispensable to 
Iraq's war efforts. They are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Both have 
played a primary role in sustaining Iraq's economy. 
It has been estimated that Arab-source financial support for 
Iraq, mainly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, during the first two 
years of the war amounted to $1.0 billion a month (for evidence on 
this statement see, for example, Karsh 1987, Goose 1987, Stauffer 
1985). This undoubtedly enabled Iraq to follow a policy of not only 
'guns and butter', but also with added honey and jam. 
Indeed the government in Baghdad deliberately set out to 
accelerate the pace of economic development and went to con-
siderable effort in the first two years of the invasion to cushion the 
population and to ensure that the average Iraqi citizen would not 
suffer economically because of the war. 
Furthermore, the scale of government expenditures and imports 
during this period becomes even more clear when we note that, in 
spite of all the outside financial help, by the end of 1982/3 Iraq had 
still exhausted its $35.0 billion foreign-exchange reserves and had 
become a major debtor nation, a point to which we shall return in 
a future chapter. 
Table 3.3 provides data on the money value of total non-military 
imports between 1973 and 1985. As can be seen, the value of 
imports was $8,984 million in 1979, increasing to $14,067 million in 
1980, $20,922 million in 1981 and still increasing to an all-time high 
of $21,728 million in 1982, representing an average annual growth 
rate of 32.2 per cent during the same period. 
However, two years into the war, Saddam Hussain had not 
delivered the goods, as Khomeini was still in charge in Iran, while 
the burden of supporting the Iraqis was ever increasing. Thus ·the 
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Table 3.3 Value and distribution of Iraq's imports• by main countries, 1973--85 (million current dollars) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
USA 50 188 370 218 218 426 486 797 
Canada 2 22 79 72 71 10 99 137 
West Germany 36 191 754 848 802 476 1,258 1,980 
UK 78 126 238 273 '307 261 470 823 
Italy 30 79 164 192 228 217 741 1,037 
France 76 175 263 309 252 296 877 1,179 
Netherlands 14 38 61 75 184 80 260 275 
Belgium 39 53 99 70 106 110 315 374 
Switzerland 12 29 48 40 85 141 152 233 
Sweden 17 54 92 82 62 119 353 397 
Spain 20 22 45 33 45 56 159 213 
Japan 61 270 765 518 789 881 1,759 2,413 
Australia 4 89 45 98 88 51 204 221 
Turkey 19 32 24 31 58 52 116 148 
India 18 56 71 57 61 38 75 75 
Brazil 53 131 200 77 70 48 264 318 
Others (including Soviet 
Union and Eastern 
Europet 365 816 897 904 1,055 951 1,316 3,447 
Total non-military imports 894 2,371 4,215 3,897 4,481 4,213 8,984 14,067 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 % share of total imports" 
1973 1978 1979 1985 
USA 1,005 931 563 731 470 6 10 5 4 
Canada 198 173 105 140 57 0 0 1 0.5 
West Germany 3,179 3,452 1,618 947 926 4 11 14 9 
UK 1,382 1,698 669 500 630 9 6 5 6 
Italy 1,475 1,827 878 691 1(1J 3 5 8 7 
France l ,flJl 1,588 894 752 151 9 7 10 7 
Netherlands 314 322 175 187 181 2 2 3 2 
Belgium 351 371 175 146 132 4 3 4 1 
Switzerland 298 369 220 112 118 1 3 2 1 
Sweden 626 519 144 116 137 2 3 4 1 
Spain 306 299 102 133 107 2 1 2 1 
Japan 3,324 3,019 695 884 1,450 7 21 20 14 
Australia 106 221 99 216 177 0 1 2 2 
Turkey 615 672 352 1,028 822 2 1 1 8 
India 86 95 85 77 61 2 1 0.8 0.6 
Brazil 328 350 453 385 699 6 1 3 7 
Others (including Soviet 
Union and Eastern 
Europe)b 5,728 5,882 5,048 4,133 3,050 41 23 15 29 
Total non-military imports 20,922 21,728 12,275 11,178 10,534 100 100 100 100 
Notes: • Excluding military-related imports. 
b Author's calculation, all the percentages have been rounded up, thus totals may not add up to 100. 
Sources: IMFb 1980, 1983, 1986 
IMFa 1986 
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Arab financiers of Iraq's war efforts changed their tactics by 
reducing their direct 'loan' of cash to Iraq ( except for the payments 
of arms deliveries by the Soviet Union which is directly paid for by 
the Saudis) in favour of exporting 300,000 barrels of oil a day from 
the Neutral Zone on behalf of Iraq (Stauffer 1985). (This issue is 
noted further in chapter ten.) 
The reduction in total cash support, as well as the exhaustion of 
the foreign-exchange reserves, reduced Iraq's ability to sustain 
high levels of imports. Indeed, between 1982-3, 1983-4 and 1984-
5 the value of imports fell by 44, 9 and 6 per cent respectively. By 
1986, total imports had fallen further to only $8,847 million (IMF 
1987b). 
Such a decline in imports and the fact that Iraq's industrializa-
tion, like that of Iran, has been based on 'dependent capitalism' 
and the import-substitution strategy of development, with its 
massive import requirements, must have created many problems 
and set-backs in the economy. 
At this point, it should be noted that the government of Iraq has 
not published much data and information on different aspects of 
the economy since the war. However, it can be argued that the 
consequences of the war itself, i.e. dislocation of the labour force, 
flight of the educated people, reduction in foreign workers, etc., as 
well as the significant reduction in imports, have meant that the 
industry is operating far below its actual potential. Also now, more 
than ever before, consumer-goods imports form a very large share 
of the total imports with no apparent contribution to the develop-
ment of the domestic economy. 
Table 3.4 provides figures for the share of non-military imports 
in GDP. As can be seen, in 1979, the share of imports in GDP 
(including oil) was 22.8 per cent. However, given the reduction in 
GDP since the war, as well as the massive increase in imports, by 
1982 the corresponding share had increased to 50 per cent. In all, 
during 1979 to 1985 on average each year the burden of imports 
has amounted to 32.5 per cent of the GDP (including oil). 
If the above figures are compared with the pre-war ones, it can 
clearly be noted that indeed, since the war, there has been an 
unprecedented increase in Iraq's import dependency. For example, 
during the 1973-8 period, on average each year, Iraq had spent 2.9 
per cent of its GDP (including oil) on its non-defence imports. 
Therefore it can be argued that one of the major consequences of the 
war for Iraq has been the rapid and significant increase in its import 
dependency. As noted in chapter one, the Iraqi strategy of develop-
ment and modernization during the post-oil-price-increase period 
of 1973-4 was mainly based on a 'less big' approach to development. 
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Table3.4 Iraq's share of non-military imports in GDP* (oil inclusive and oil exclusive) 1973--85 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Total non-military 
imports 0.058 0.083 0.123 0.138 0.172 0.205 2.6 4.1 6.1 6.3 3.8 3.5 3.3 
GDP (including oil) (a) 1.6 3.4 4.0 5.2 5.9 7.0 11.4 15.8 11.1 12.6 13.1 13.9 16.8 
Import/GDP ratio % • 3.6 2.4 3.1 2.6 2.9 2.9 22.8 25.9 54.9 50.0 29.0 25.2 20.0 
GDP (excluding oil) (b) 0.65 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.8 5.0 6.0 7.9 5.1 6.6 7.6 10.8 
Import/GDP ratio % • 8.9 6.4 7.7 6.6 7.5 7.3 52.1 68.3 77.2 123.5 57.6 46.0 30.6 
% 
Average share/year (a) 1973-8* 2.9 
Average share/year (b) 1973-8* 7.4 
Average share/year (a) 1979-85* 32.5 
Average share/year (b) 1979-85* 65.0 
Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures for total non-military imports and GDP are in current billion dinars. 
Sources: IMFb 1980, 1986; IMFa 1980, 1986; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 1981 and Republic of Iraq 1983; United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 1986 
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Thus it can be said that, given the past policies, it is most likely 
that, during the post-1979-oil-price-increase period, if the war had 
not taken place, Iraq would not have increased its non-defence 
imports so significantly. Therefore, not only would she not have 
exhausted her foreign-exchange reserves, but, also by now, the 
actual $35.0 billion of reserves would have increased a few times 
over. 
In our analysis so far we have used the current values of imports. 
We now analyse constant-price figures. The data on the value of 
total imports at 1974 constant prices has been calculated by using 
the index of industrial countries' export values, whose figures are 
given in table 3.5. As can be seen, the value of non-military 
imports at 1974 constant prices was 1.6 billion dinars in 1979, rising 
significantly to 3.8 billion dinars in 1982. 
Since 1982, however, given the decline in imports at current 
prices, there has also been a decline in constant-price figures. They 
fell to 2.4 billion dinars in 1983 and still further to only 1.6 billion 
dinars in 1986. 
In all, between 1979 and 1986, there has been a zero growth in 
imports at 1974 constant prices. The corresponding figure for the 
1979--82 period, to take account of the drastic fall in imports 
between 1982 and 1986, is the rise of 33.4 per cent on average each 
year, while the figure for the 1982-6 period is a decline of 19.5 per 
cent on average each year. Total imports at 1974 constant prices 
during the pre-war period of 1973--8 had increased by 15.5 per cent 
on average each year. 
At this point, the origins of Iraq's imports (non-military) since 
the war, whose data was provided in table 3.3, is the subject of 
analysis. As can be seen, it seems that between 1979 and 1982, all 
the countries mentioned in the table had decided to reward Iraq 
for invading Iran by exporting as much as they could to that 
country. For example, Iraq's imports from the USA, West 
Germany, the UK, Italy, France and Japan increased by 24, 40, 
53, 35, 22 and 20 per cent respectively on average each year during 
the same period. 
Furthermore, by looking at the figures given in table 3.3, it can 
be noted that, during the post-war period of 1980-5, Japan has 
remained the major supplier of Iraq's non-military imports, 
supplying 14 per cent of the total in 1985, followed by Germany (9 
per cent), Turkey (8 per cent), Italy and France (7 per cent) each 
and the UK (6 per cent). 
If the above figures are compared with those of 1979 (i.e. 
before the invasion), the biggest major change that can be 
noted is in the value of imports from Turkey, as in that year 
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Table 3.5 Estimation of Iraq's non-military imports at 1974 constant prices,* 1973-86 (billion constant dinars) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total non-military imports 
( current prices) 0.058 0.083 0.123 0.138 0.172 0.205 2.6 4.1 6.1 6.2 3.8 3.5 3.3 2.7 
Index of industrial countries' 
export values 1974 = 1 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 
Total non-military imports at 
1974 constant prices 0.073 0.083 0.111 0.123 0.142 0.150 1.6 2.3 3.5 3.8 2.4 2.3 2.2 1.6 
Average annual growth of non-military 
imports at constant 1974 prices(%)* 1973-8 1979-86 1979-82 1982--o 
15.5 0 33.4 -19.5 
Note: • Author's calculation. 
Sources: IMFb Direction of Trade Statistics, 1980, 1987; IMFa International Financial Statistics, 1980, 1986 
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Turkey had accounted for only 0.8 per cent of Iraq's total 
imports. 
The rapid increase in trade with Turkey is an important issue 
which should be analysed further. As noted in chapter two, 
Turkey has also become a major trading partner of Iran, ever since 
the war, importing vast quantities of oil and exporting a large 
volume of merchandise in exchange. 
This has meant that, while Turkey has been receiving oil from 
both Iran and Iraq, she has been selling to them goods and services 
which might not have been sold elsewhere, i.e. in the Western 
world, with such ease. 
Therefore trade of this kind must have been greatly advanta-
geous to Turkey, leading to much improvement in her foreign-
exchange earnings and economic well-being. However, when the 
war ends, the result could be a serious economic blow to Turkey, 
should Iran and Iraq decide to curtail their trade with that country. 
Thus, if events follow this scenario, the peace might bring 
economic hardship or even instability to those countries that have 
greatly benefited from the war and have become dependent on 
trade with Iran and Iraq. 
The impact of the war on the agricultural sector 
The potential of the agricultural sector in Iraq is substantial, both 
in terms of abundant agricultural land and also availability of 
ample water resources, mainly from the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers. In 1980 the importance and potential of agriculture in Iraq's 
overall development was once more highlighted when Saddam 
Hussain declared that agriculture was Iraq's 'permanent oil' and 
that he wanted to see the country become self-sufficient and a net 
exporter of food within this century (see further Turkuje Sinai 
Kalkinma Barkasi 1983). However, this statement was made 
before he ordered his army to invade Iran. 
At this point therefore it is appropriate to note what has been 
happening to the agricultural sector since the war, especially 
in terms of production and imports/exports of agricultural 
commodities. 
The figures for the estimated production of principal crop 
products and main livestock items between 1973 and 1985 are 
given in table 3.6. As can be noted, the average annual rate of 
production of many items such as wheat, rice, corn and bovine 
meat has fallen significantly during the 1979-85 period. The 
production of dates which has traditionally provided the major 
share of non-energy exports has drastically fallen from 581 thousand 
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Table3.6 Estimated production of principal agricultural products and main livestock items, Iraq, 1973-85 (thousand 
metric tonnes)* 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Wheat 957 1,339 845 1,312 696 910 1,492 1,300 1,100 965 841 471 650 
Rice 157 68 200 163 199 172 284 250 250 163 111 109 105 
Barley 462 533 437 579 458 602 620 575 600 550 700 482 700 
Com 19 20 20 55 82 85 100 90 90 28 28 31 32 
Dates 385 350 400 372 578 581 392 395 405 374 345 251 100 
Sugar cane 98 100 100 128 152 160 210 260 260 146 82 86 85 
Bovine meat 50 45 41 47 48 49 51 52 53 36 34 40 35 
Mutton and lamb 32 34 34 39 37 38 37 38 38 48 48 55 50 
Poultry 26 27 29 34 35 36 37 38 41 155 113 125 150 
Cows' milk 254 253 254 255 245 252 255 259 265 301 319 336 300 
Sheep milk 124 125 125 130 125 126 129 130 130 165 165 165 168 
Butter 10 11 11 11 10 10 7 7 7 8 8 7 8 
Cheese 34 50 50 50 26 26 27 27 27 33 33 32 33 
Note: • Figure rounded to the nearest 1,000 tonnes. 
Sources: FAOa 1975, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1985 
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tonnes in 1978 to only 100 thousand tonnes in 1985, representing 
an average rate of decline of 23 per cent each year. 
At this point, if the pre- and post-war figures of agricultural 
production are compared, it can be argued that, although the pre-
war performance was far from being perfect, none the less, by 
looking at the figures, there can be no doubt that since the war 
there has been a major deterioration in agricultural productivity. 
Given the scope of this study, it is not possible to provide a 
detailed study of the reasons for the poor performance of the 
agricultural sector. However, as with Iran, there can be no doubt 
that the mounting costs of the war and the increased rural-urban 
migration caused by it1 are amongst the main reasons for the 
increased deterioration of the agricultural sector. 
Table 3. 7 provides figures for imports of principal agricultural 
products and main livestock items from 1973 to 1985. As can be 
seen, since the war, the imports of all the items mentioned in the 
table, except for barley, has significantly increased during the 
period under study. It is also important to note that since the war 
Iraq has become much more dependent on the outside world for 
its basic food supplies (see further table 3.7). 
In all, as with Iran, the failure of the agricultural sector to 
provide food for a growing population and to reduce the country's 
overall dependency on the outside world for food, can, in our 
view, be identified as another major consequence of the war. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have looked mainly at some of the major 
economic consequences of the war on Iraq during the 1980-5 
period. It was noted that, on the eve of the invasion, Iraq was 
enjoying a period of 'never had it so good', with years of sustained 
economic growth, a rapid and unparalleled increase in oil 
production/exports and revenues. 
However, through our analysis, it has been established that 
there has been very serious deterioration in all aspects of the 
economy since the war, with oil production/exports and revenues 
suffering most. 
We also noted that, since the war, there has been a massive 
increase in Iraq's import dependency, rising from 2.9 per cent of 
GDP (including oil) between 1973 and 1978 to 32.5 per cent in the 
1979-85 period. It was also demonstrated that, since the war, there 
ha~ been a major deterioration of the agricultural sector, leading 
to decreases in agricultural production and consequently an in-
crease in food imports. 
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Table 3.7 Imports of principal agricultural products and main livestock items, Iraq, 1973-8 (thousand metric tonnes)+ 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Wheat and flour 154 672 512 616 723 997 1,806 1,698 1,615 2,247 2,627 3,317 2,317 
Rice 16 198 120 194 235 180 320 345 350 370 440 487 500 
Barley - - 25 24 127 163 274 233 110 165 270 500 160 
Com - - - 6 26 86 150 125 200 70 190 346 408 
Sugar (total raw 
equivalent) 474 427 378 329 480 428 513 737 517 542 488 523 611 
Sugar (refined) 188 121 159 181 197 180 107 229 200 287 304 367 562 
Bovine meat (fresh/ 
frozen) 0.2 10 1 - - 9 7 10 21 80 70 80 85 
Sheep meat (fresh/ 
frozen) - 6 - - 15 3 14 14 31 20 16 35 30 
Poultry (dry, fresh 
cond.) 0.2 0.8 1 5 18 18 55 100 173 140 85 70 75 
Milk 1 11 8 17 18 19 41 39 54 39 44 53 63 
Butter 0.4 2 1 3 5 6 5 6 9 4 6 7 8 
Cheese 1 4 4 3 3 4 15 20 20 30 15 32 33 
Note: + Figure rounded to nearest 1,000 tonnes. 
Sources: FAOb 1975, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1985 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
In all, the failure to achieve any of the main objectives of 
planning in general, and the deterioration of the economy as a 
whole, can be said to be some of the major consequences of the 
war. 
The chapter also noted that, since the war, Turkey has become a 
major trading partner of both Iran and Iraq, importing vast 
quantities of oil and exporting a large volume of merchandise in 
exchange. 
It was then argued that, while Turkey has been receiving oil 
from Iran and Iraq, she has been selling to them goods and 
services which might not have been sold elsewhere, i.e. in the 
Western world, with such ease. 
Furthermore it was also contended that trade of this kind must 
have been greatly advantageous to Turkey, leading to improve-
ments in her foreign-exchange capabilities and economic well-
being. However, should Iran and Iraq decide to curtail their trade 
with Turkey, when the war ends, and spend their moneys on 
importing high technology and higher-quality goods and services 
from the West instead, then the result could be a serious economic 




Militarization of Iran 1973-8: an 
economic analysis 
Introduction 
One of the most significant consequences of the oil-price increases 
on 1973--4 was a rapid growth in military expenditure in the Middle 
Eastern oil-exporting countries. The biggest military build-up was 
in Iran which by the mid-1970s had become the 'absolute' military 
power in the Gulf. 
Military expenditure (Milex), arms imports and attempts to 
militarize a country are controversial areas of study. There are 
different 'pull' and 'push' factors causing them. Factors such as 
'security', 'stability', 'image', 'linkage' with 'development', 
'modernity' and 'regional design' can be named as just a few (for 
further reading see Arlinghaus 1984, especially chapter three). 
A peculiarity of high Milex in the Middle East, which has a 
serious effect on the political economy of these countries, is its 
very high import content. There are two main reasons for this. 
One is that, after the oil-price increases, the 'petro-dollars' had to 
be recycled. Therefore arming the oil-exporting countries became 
a means by which the said objective could be achieved. 
Thus, in contrast to a not too distant past, i.e. before the early 
1970s when most of the military imports were part of the total 
military-aid package of the suppliers, the arms importers became 
responsible for the payment for their military imports. This 
obviously has changed the character of recent military transfers 
and has put the burden of military imports on to the recipient 
countries (see further Palme 1982: 4-21). 
Second, given the sums involved, and the scale of arms transfers 
envisaged, arms sales became in many ways the principal instru-
ment of foreign policy in the Third World (Arlinghaus 1984* 4-
21). As Andrew Pierre (1981/2: 4-21) has noted, 'Arms sales have 
become more now than ever before, a crucial dimension of world 
politics. They are now major strands in the warp and woof of 
53 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
international affairs. Arms sales are far more than an economic 
occurrence, a military relationship or an arms control challenge -
arms sales are foreign policy writ large' (emphasis in original). 
The above is a brief presentation of some of the important 
reasons concerning 'pull' and 'push' factors causing high Milex and 
arms imports. Given the scope of this chapter and the limits of our 
coverage, we shall not attempt to provide a detailed and cdmpre-
hensive study of topics such as politico-strategic, military 'domestic' 
or 'foreign' objectives of a rapid increase in militarization.1 What 
we intend to do is to provide a brief study of the economic 
consequences of such expenditures on Iran and Iraq. 
Therefore, in this and in the following chapters, we will note the 
defence burden, estimate the value of arms imports and provide 
data on the measurement of arms-imports burdens. The major 
arms agreements and the main arms suppliers will be identified. 
The rate at which different countries in the Gulf have been 
militarized, measured by the changes in the numbers of military 
personnel, as well as the availability of main military hardware, 
will be noted. Analysis of these topics will start in this chapter, 
where Iran's experience with rapid militarization during the 1973-
8 period is given. 
The estimation of defence and arms-imports burdens 
The figures for Milex and defence burden - that is, the share of 
military expenditure (Milex) in GDP during 1973-8 are given in 
table 4.1. As can be noted, during the period under study, Milex 
Table 4.1 Ratio of military expenditures (Milex) in GDP* (oil including 







































Average annual growth of Milex Average defence burden(%) 1973-8 
(%) (1973-8) 
37.0 in GDP (including oil) in GDP (excluding oil) 
13.0 19.9 
Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures for Milex and GDP are in current billion rials. 
Source: Based on Mofid 1987: 181, table S.2 
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increased from 145 billion rials in 1973 to 693 billion rials in 1978 
which represents a 37 per cent average annual increase for the 
period. 
The highest rate of increase in Milex was between 1974 and 
1975, where it increased by more than 224 per cent. This, in our 
view, clearly demonstrates the relationship between the militar-
ization of Iran, and the petro-dollar-recycling objective of the 
arms sale. Furthermore, the share defence in GDP (including oil) 
increased from 8.1 per cent in 1973 to 14.1 per cent in 1978. 
At this point, if we compare the above sets of figures with those 
of selected countries whose figures are given in table 4.2, we can 
indeed note the scale at which Iran had become militarized during 
the period under observation. 
Table 4.2 World military expenditures (Milex) as percentage of GDP*, 
selected countries, 1973-8 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Canada 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 
USA 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.4 5.4 5.2 
Belgium 2.8 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 
Denmark 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 
France 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 
FR Germany 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 
Greece 4.1 4.3 6.5 5.9 6.8 6.6 
Italy 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 
Turkey 4.3 4.1 6.0 6.4 6.0 5.5 
UK 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.7 
India 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 
Pakistan 6.1 6.0 6.1 5.6 5.4 5.3 
Indonesia 3.7 3.1 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.3 
Japan 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Australia 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Note: • GDP at current market prices. 
Source: SIPRI 1981: 166-7 Table 6A.4 
As can be seen, countries such as Canada, USA, UK, Indonesia 
(i.e. oil-exporting economies outside the Middle East), Greece 
and Turkey, India and Pakistan (both sets of countries with a long 
history of conflict) were spending between 3 and 7 per cent of their 
GDP on Milex. (For further details see table 4.2.) 
As was mentioned earlier, one of the peculiarities of Milex in 
the oil-rich economies of the Middle East has been its very high 
import content. During the period under study Iran became the 
main importer of major weapons in the region. This can clearly be 
seen in table 4.3, where rank order of major Middle East arms 
importers during 1970-4 and 1975-9 is given. 
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Table 4.3 Rank order of major Middle East arms importers, 1970-4 and 1975-9 
Middle East Largest recipient % of region's Largest supplier % of country's The four largest % of the region's 
% of Third countries total to each total suppliers of the total 
World total country region 
1970--4 50 Syria 25 Soviet Union 95 Soviet Union 51 
Egypt 23 Soviet Union 98 USA 34 
Iran 22 USA 60 UK 10 
Israel 18 USA 97 France 2 
Iraq 4 Soviet Union 85 
Saudi Arabia 3 USA 51 
1975--9 48 Iran 31 USA 81 USA 61 
Saudi Arabia 14 USA 79 Soviet Union 15 
Jordan 13 USA 98 France 7 
Iraq 12 Soviet Union 85 UK 5 
Israel 10 USA 95 
Syria 6 Soviet Union 84 
Sources: Based on SIPRI 1980: 96-7, tables 3.6 and 3.7 
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While in 1970-4 Iran was the third largest importer of weapons 
in the Middle East (after Syria and Egypt), by the 1975-9 period it 
had become the largest, importing 31 per cent of the region's total 
weapon imports, only a few percentage points less than the 
combined imports of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria. It is also 
important to note that, during the 1973-4 and 1975-8 periods, the 
USA had supplied 60 and 81 per cent of Iran's total arms imports. 
We shall return to this point once more, when the value of Iran's 
arms imports is the subject of study. 
Table 4.4 provides data on the estimated values of Iran's arms 
imports, as well as the ratio of arms imports to total imports; that 
is, the trade burden of arms imports during 1973-8. As can be 
noted, the value of arms imports increased from 87 billion rials in 
1973 to 416 billion rials in 1978, representing a 37 per cent aver~ge 
annual increase during the same period. 
An important point to note is the fact that arms imports had 
increased from 87 billion rials in 1973 to 424 billion rials in 1975, 
representing a 121 per cent average annual increase. This obser-
vation is another example of the direct relationship between the 
oil-price increases of 1973-4 and arms sales as a way of recycling 
petro-dollars back into the advanced economies. 
As for the arms-import burdens, as can be seen, the ratio had 
increased from 26 per cent in 1973 to 37 per cent in 1978. In all, the 
trade burden of arms imports was 29.5 per cent on average each 
Table 4.4 Ratio of arms imports in total imports (burden of arms 
imports)•, Iran, 1973-8 
Arms Imports" Non-Defence Total Imports Ratio of arms imports/ 
Import total imports (%) 
A B (A)+ (B) A 
(A)+ (B) x I()() 
1973 87 248 335 26.0 
1974 131 442 573 22.9 
1975 424 782 1,206 35.2 
1976 399 875 1,274 31.3 
1977 337 1,022 1,359 24.8 
1978 416 721 1,137 37.0 
Average annual growth of arms imports 197H: 37.0 per cent 
Average annual growth of arms imports burden 197H: 29.5 per cent 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
b For the way in which arms imports have been estimated see Mofid 1987. 
The figures quoted for defence and non-defence imports are in current billion rials. 
Sources: Based on Mofid 1987: table 3.1; 183: table 5.3 
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year during the same period; a substantial increase by historical 
standards. For example, between 1968 and 1972 the arms-import 
burden ratio had increased by 12.2 per cent on average each year 
(for evidence see Mofid 1987: 183, table 5.3). 
Given the sums involved, it would be very interesting to note 
what Iran had received in exchange for such an impressive 
payment. The shopping list (i.e. the arms agreements) negotiated 
between Iran and the US, the UK, France, the Soviet Union, Italy 
and the Netherlands are shown in tables 4. 7-9 at the end of the 
chapter. Because of the revolution, the hostage crisis, and the war 
with Iraq, not all the items noted in these tables have been 
delivered. None the less, they establish beyond any doubt the 
extent to which Iran's militarization process was in progress. Later 
on, we shall provide the list of major weapon items that had been 
supplied by the time of the Shah's downfall. 
These tables present some interesting observations. The US was 
the only supplier of fighter planes. They also supplied the majority 
of helicopters and air transport tankers. Destroyers and sub-
marines were also US supplied, as were some of the tanks. The 
UK provided Chieftain and Scorpion tanks and many armoured 
carriers and ships. 
France and the Netherlands provided transport aircraft and 
frigates. Missiles of all sorts were mostly supplied by the US, 
followed by the UK and France. Strangely enough, even the 
Soviet Union (the main supplier of Iraq) had joined the Western 
nations in selling arms to the Shah). They provided surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM), guns and armoured carriers. 
As was mentioned earlier, not all the items ordered by the Shah 
had been delivered by the time of the revolution. However, the 
following is an attempt to identify the weapons that were in service 
in Iran by 1979. 
Table 4.5 illustrates major weapon systems held by the Iranian 
armed forces in 1972/3 and 1979/80. As can be seen, the numbers 
of tanks, combat aircraft and helicopters had increased from 960, 
160 and 140 to 1985, 445 and 684 respectively during the same 
period. 
In all, by 1979/80, the army, in addition to the previously held 
American-supplied tanks, had received 875 Chieftain and 250 
Scorpion tanks from Britain, armed with many different types of 
missiles. The armour was strengthened by the addition of 100 
radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns, Hawk surface-to-air missiles, 
as well as 570 helicopters of various types. 
The navy had received 1 'Tang' submarine, 3 destroyers, 4 
'Saam' frigates, 4 PF 103 Corvettes, 7 large patrol ships, 2 inshore 
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Table 4.5 Major weapons systems held by the armed forces, Iran, 
1972/3-1979/80 
197213 1979/80 
Tanks 960 1,9858 
Combat aircraft 160 445b 
Helicopters 140 684C 
Armoured fighting vehicle 1,100 825 
Notes: • Among them 875 were Chieftain, 250 Scorpion (both British supplied); the rest 
included 400 M-47/-48, and 460 M-60AI (American supplied). 
• All American supplied; among them 190 F-4D/E, and 166 F-5E/F. 
c Mostly American supplied. 
Sources: IISS 1972/3 and 1979/80 
minesweepers, 2 landing ships, 1 replenishment and 2 supply 
ships. The naval air force had 6 reconnaissance planes, 6 Sikorsky 
heavy helicopters, 20 SH-30 anti-submarine helicopters, and 24 
helicopters of various types. 
The air force had obtained 445 combat aircraft, among them 190 
Phantoms, 166 Tiger 11, 77 Tomcat and 14 Phantom reconnaissance. 
It also had 13 Boeing 707 and 9 Boeing 747 tankers, as well as 84 
helicopters of various types. The transport squadron included 18 
E27s, 3 Aero Commander 690 and 4 Falcon 20. The fighters were 
armed with several different types of missiles, among them 
Phoenix, Sidewinder, Sparrow air-to-air missiles (AAM), Maverick 
and Condor air-to-ship missiles (ASM) (IISS 1978/9 and 1979/80). 
In table 4.4, the estimated value of Iran's defence imports in 
billions of current rials was given. Given the yearly exchange 
rates, 2 the estimated values of arms imports in $US ( current 
prices) were: $1.3 billion in 1973, $1.9 billion (1974), $6.2 billion 
(1975), $5.7 billion (1976), $4.7 billion (1977) and $5.9 billion 
(1978). Therefore the total estimated value of arms imports is 
$25.7 billion during the same period. 
Moreover, as was noted earlier, in the 1973/4 and 1975/8 
periods, the USA had supplied 60 and 81 per cent of Iran's total 
arms imports. Therefore, during the period under observation, the 
US had supplied $20 billion worth of arms to Iran. This is very 
important, as it shows the significance of the revolutionary leaders' 
action, when they cancelled most of the arms agreements with the 
US soon after the revolution, a point which we shall return to in 
chapter five. 
At this point the scale of Iran's militarization, in terms of 
increases in military manpower during the 1972/3 to 1979/80 period 
(before the start of the Revolution) will be noted. As can be seen 
in table 4.6, the total military manpower increased from 191 
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thousand in 1972/3 to 415 thousand in 1979/80, representing an 
increase of 117 per cent during the same period. 
Table 4.6 Military manpower and its composition, Iran, 1972/3-1979/80 
(thousands) 
197213 Change 0 1979180" 
% 
Total military manpower 191 117 415 
of which: 
Army 160 78 285 
Air Force 22 354 100 
Navy 9 233 30 
Paramilitary forces: 
gendarmerie 40 85 74 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
b Relates to the period before the start of the revolution. 
Sources: IISS 1972/3 and 1979/80 
The highest percentage increase was in the air force where its 
manpower increased from 22,000 to 100,000 during the period 
under study. The air force was followed by the army and the navy 
respectively. There was also a major increase in the number of 
gendarmerie (paramilitary) forces. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter a brief study of the militarization of Iran during the 
period 1973-8 has been presented. It was noted that during the 
period under study 2,989 billion rials was spent on Milex. This sum 
represents a 13 per cent average annual share of GDP (including 
oil) during the period under observation. A large part of this 
expenditure was on 'ready-made' arms imports from abroad. 
Indeed, during this period, 1,794 billion rials was spent on 
importing, in off the shelf fashion, arms into Iran. 
The chapter also clearly demonstrated the relationship between 
the massive increase in Iran's Milex/arms imports and the objec-
tive of the recycling of petro-dollars after the oil-price increases of 
1973/4. 
The militarization of Iran at break-neck speed was once described 
by Senator Frank Church as 'the most rapid build-up of military 
power under peace-time conditions of any nation in the history of 
the world' (Klare 1980: 12). 
Such a build-up, especialy when it had linked the Shah so closely 
with US policies in the Gulf, had gone a long way to compromise 
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the Shah's image with the Iranians. As Bani-Sadr noted at the time 
of the revolution: 
The economic health, social welfare and cultural integrity of the 
nation are all being sacrificed so that the Shah can continue to 
rule within the frame-work of American strategic objectives 
(Bani-Sadr 1978). 
Given such an observation and feelings towards the Shah's 
militarization of Iran, it is no wonder that one of the first foreign-
policy changes by the revolutionary leaders, was to bring an end to 
this policy and also to end the 'special' US-Iranian relations. 
Table 4.7 US-Iranian arms agreements, 1973-9, by quantity, type and 
date of order" 
Quantityb Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
80 Gruman F-14 Tomcat Fighter/interceptor 1974 
176 MCD-D F-4E Phantom Fighter 1973, 1974 
169 Northrop F-5E Tiger II Fighter 1973, 1975 
49 Beechcraft F33C Bonaza Aircraft 1973, 1974 
28 MCD-DRF-4E Phantom Fighter/recce aircraft 1974, 1977, 1978 
28 Northrop F-5F Fighter/trainer 1975 
160 General Dynamics F-16 Fighter 1976 
5-10 Gruman E-2C Hawkeye Early warning and 1976 
control aircraft 
10 Lockheed C-5A Galaxy Long-range transport 1975 
7 Boeing 707-320C Tanker/transport 1977 
7 Boeing 707-39JC Tanker/transport 1975 
12 Boeing 747-131 Freighter/transport 1975 
10 Boeing E-3A AWACS Airborne warning and -
control system plane 
4 Boeing 747-200F Freighter 1977 
3 Lockheed P-3C Orion Anti-sub 1976 
202 Bell AH-U Sea Cobra Gunship, helicopter Dec. 1972 
287 Bell 214A-1 (Isfahan) Utility helicopter Dec. 1972 
39 Bell 214C Advanced utility 1976 
helicopter 
2 Bell 214B Big Lifter Cargo helicopter 1975 
6 Bell 214A Utility helicopter 1977 
6 Sikorsky S-G5A Heavy-lift helicopter 1975 
6 Sikorsky RH-53D Helicopter 1975 
91 Bell-Agusta 206 Jet RangerHelicopter 1973 
6 Bell-Agusta 21P Helicopter 1974 
22 Boeing-Meridionali Helicopter 1974 
CH47C 
2 Sikorsky-Agusta S-GlA-4 Helicopter 1976 
7 'Spruance' class 7600t Destroyer 1974 
6 'Spruance' class 7800t Destroyer 1974 
3 'Tang' class Submarine 1975 
2,500+ Hughes AGM-O54 TV guide A-S missile 1973 
Maverick 
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Quantityb Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
704 Hughes A TM-54A A-A missile 1973, 1976 
Phoenix 
6,200 Hughes BGM-71A tow ATM 1972-6 
222 MCD-D AGM-84A A-S/S missile 1974 
Harpoon 
634 MCD-D FGM-77A ATM 1975 
Dragon 
754+ Raytheon AIM-9J AAM 1974-6 
Sidewinder 
516+ Raytheon AIM-7E AAM 1973, 1974, 1976, 
Sparrow 1977 
432 Raytheon AIM-7F AAM 1974 
Sparrow 
3,168 Raytheon AIM-9L AAM 1974, 1975, 1976 
Sidewinder 
186 Raytheon AIM-9H AAM 1978 
General Dynamics ShShM/Sh AM 1974 
RIM-67A 
Rockwell International ASM 1974 
AGM-53A 
414 Torpedo MK 46 1975 
Ford M-113 Al APC 1976 
Raytheon MIM-23B Hawk SAM 1977 
10,000 Koll/MOD/Raytheon Landmob/port 1977 
FGM-TIA 
Notes: • Compiled by the author from the sources below. 
b Not all the items were delivered, as the revolution, the hostage crisis and the war with 
Iraq have affected the deliveries. 
For meaning of abbreviations see pp. 155-7. 
Source: SIPRI 1974-80 
Table 4.8 UK-Iranian arms agreements, 1973--9 
Weapon designation 
Chieftain MK3 and MKS 

















Armed recon. vehicle 
Scout car 
Armoured car 
Armoured recovery vehicle 
AVLB 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 




BAC Rapier Blindfire and 
Short Tigercat 








Note: For meaning of abbreviations see pp. 1S5-7. 







Table 4.9 Iranian arms agreements with France, Soviet Union, Italy and 
Netherlands, 1973-9 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
France Dassault Falcon 20 Transport aircraft 1975 
'Kaman' class Missile boat 1974 
AS 11/12 ASM 1973-4 
AS 12 ASM 1974 
MM.38 Exocet ShShM 1974 
Hot ATM 1979 
Soviet Union• SAM-7 and SAM-9 6000 SAM 
of each 
VCI BMP-1 APC Nov. 1979 
ASU-85 and ZSU-23-4 SP Alf and A/Agan 
BMP-76 Armoured car 1976 
Italy SH-30 Sea King Helicopter 1977 
Seakiller/Marte AShM 1978 
CH-47C Chinook Helicopter 1977 
Netherlands Fokker-VFWF.27 Transport Feb. 1973 
Friendship Sept. 1973 
F-27MK400 M and Transport 1976 
F27MK600 
Kortenaer class Frigate 1978 
Notes: • Under $414 million. 
• Agreement signed during War Minister Toufanian's visit to Moscow in November 
1976. 
Source: SIPRI 1974-80 
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Chapter five 
The political economy of military 
expenditure in Iran during the war 
Introduction 
As noted in chapter four, during the Revolution, the Shah's 
militarization of Iran, and in particular the massive arms imports 
from the US were much criticized by the revolutionary leaders. It 
was promised that, if successful in toppling the Shah's regime, the 
revolution would reduce Iran's military expenditure (Milex) and 
change the country's military orientations and arms imports. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to note that the revolution, after 
successfully deposing the old regime, had a major impact on Milex 
and arms imports. They were both reduced significantly, while at 
the same time many arms agreements with the US were cancelled. 
Among them were the agreements for 160 F-16 fighters, worth 
$3.5 billion, seven AWACS worth $1.3 billion and 400 Phoeni;x: 
missiles worth $1.6 billion. In addition, the agreement for building 
the Chah Bahar naval base worth $1.2 billion was cancelled, as 
were numerous other contracts. Many agreements with Western 
European countries were also terminated. Iran, for example, 
asked the UK to suspend or alter arms contracts, with a total value 
of $4.0 billion (SIPRI 1980). 
The arms exporters to the Middle East, in particular those from 
the US and the UK, were openly complaining about the severe 
economic problems caused by these cancellations. For example, as 
noted before, during the 1973-8 period, Iran had purchased $20 
billion worth of arms from the US alone. As well as these huge 
arms imports, Iran had also contributed towards research and 
development (R & D) for the production of certain arms in the US 
during the 1970s period. 
Thus, during that period, arms sales to Iran, as well as the 
receipt of large sums in defence R & D, had meant that, first the 
US armed forces were in a position to purchase military hardware 
at a lower price than would have otherwise been possible, given 
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the reduction in unit costs. Second, the US was in a position, 
having reduced its unit costs of arms production, to export arms 
elsewhere at a more competitive price than it would have been 
otherwise possible. Therefore, the very serious concern shown by 
the military industrial complex (MIC) in countries such as the US 
is understandable. 
The seriousness of reducing Iran's Milex and arms imports can 
be understood better if we can imagine what would have happened 
if the example set by Iran had been followed by other countries in 
the region. This is to say that, if Iran had reduced its Milex and 
arms imports, then other countries in the region could not have 
found any justification for their own high Milex and arms imports. 
Given the dependency of the MICs in industrialized economies 
on arms sales, it cannot be too difficult to note the probable 
consequences of such a rapid and sudden demilitarization of the 
Gulf on advanced economies. However, the Iraqi invasion of Iran 
put an end to the opportunity of testing this scenario. 
The focus in this chapter is an attempt to demonstrate the effects 
of the revolution and the subsequent war on Iran's Milex and the 
value of arms imports. The defence and arms-imports burden will 
be noted, and the changes since the revolution/war will be 
analysed. As will be demonstrated in chapter eight, much of Iran's 
military imports are acquired through third parties and from the 
black markets. Given this, it seems an impossible task to calculate 
the true cost of such arms acquisitions. None the less an attempt is 
made in this chapter to provide the reader with an educated guess 
as to the value of arms imports since the revolution. 
Since the downfall of the Shah, there have been many changes 
in military manpower and its composition. Therefore these, as well 
as changes in major weapon systems held by the Iranian armed 
forces before and after the revolution, will form a further part of 
study in this chapter. 
The impact of the war on Milex and defence burden 
The figures for Milex and the measurement of defence burden 
during the 1979--85 period are provided in table 5.1. The GDP/ 
Milex figures during the 1973-85 period ( selected years) are 
graphically presented in figure 5.1. In 1979, as can be seen, Milex 
was 278 billion rials, representing a massive reduction of over 60 
per cent on the 1978 expenditure (see table 4.1). Therefore, in 
1979, namely the first year of the revolution, the defence burden 
was 4.5 per cent representing a rapid decline since the fall of the 
Shah, as the corresponding figure for 1978 was 14.1 per cent. 
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Table 5.1 Ratio of military expenditures (Milex) in GDP (oil including and excluding)-defence 
burden,• Iran, 1979-85 
Mi/ex GDP Share of defence GDP Share of defence 
(induding oil) in GDP(%) (exduding oil) in GDP(%) 
1979 278 6053 4.5 4377 6.4 
1980 317 6759 4.7 5778 5.5 
1981 1,007 8218 12.3 7288 13.8 Average annual 
1982 1,300 10,621 12.3 8852 
1983 1,500 13,471 11.1 11,662 
1984 1,853 15,030 12.3 12,926b 
1985 1,295 15,306 8.5 13,163b 
Average share for year• 9.3 
Notes: • Author's calculations. The figures quoted for Milex and GDP are in current billion rials. 
b Estimated by the author. 
14.7 growth of Milex -




Sources: 11SS 1980/1 to 1986/7; Central Bank of Iran, Annual Repon and Balance Sh«t, 13S8, 1362; IMFa November 1986 
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Figure 5.1 GDP and military expenditures (Milex): Iran, 1973--85 
(selected years) 
Source: Based on Mofid 1987: 181, table 5.2; IISS 1980/1-1986/7; 
Central Bank of Iran: 1358, 1362; IMFa, November 1986 
Between 1979 and 1980 Milex was raised by 14 per cent, where it 
increased to 317 billion rials. 
Therefore we can with certainty claim that the revolution, as it 
had promised, in the first two years of its existence, successfully 
reduced the amount of Milex and had lowered the defence burden 
in Iran. 
However, such a major achievement was stopped when, in 
September 1980, the Iraqis invaded Iran. This attack put an end to 
the revolutionary regime's policy of keeping Milex low, as it had 
managed to do directly after the revolution. 
As can be seen in table 5.1, Iran's Milex increased by 218 per 
cent between 1980 and 1981, rising from 317 billion rials to 1,007 
billion rials. In all, during the period under study, Milex has 
increased by an average annual growth rate of 29.2 per cent, 
representing an average defence burden of 9.3 per cent in GDP 
(including oil). 
The corresponding figures for the pre-revolution period of 1973-
8 were 37 and 13 per cent respectively. Thus it can be seen that, 
since the revolution, there has been a decline both in the average 
annual growth of Milex and in the defence burden. 
However, if the corresponding figures of the pre- and post-war 
periods are compared, it can be noted that indeed there has been a 
massive increase in Milex and the defence burden since the war. 
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Figure 5.2 Defence burden: Iran, 1973-85 (%) 
Sources: Based on Mofid 1987: 181, table 5.2; IISS 1980/1-1986/7; 
Central Bank of Iran: 1358, 1362; IMFa, November 1986 
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Figure 5.3 Defence burden: Iran, USA, UK, Turkey and Indonesia, 
1973-85 (%) 
Sources: Based on Mofid 1987: 181, table 5.2; IISS 1980/1-1986/7; 
Central Bank of Iran: 1358, 1362; IMFa, November 1986 
This can best be seen in figure 5.2 where the pre- and post-war 
defence-burden ratios are graphically illustrated. 
The defence-burden figures of selected countries during the 
1979-85 period are given in table 5.2. As can be seen, in 1979, for 
the first time, Iran's defence burden was more or less comparable 
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with the countries outlined in the table. All except the USA and 
Greece were spending 4.5 per cent or less of their GDPs on Milex. 
In figure 5.3, Iran's defence burden during the 1973-85 period has 
been compared to those of the USA, UK, Turkey and Indonesia. 
The figure speaks for itself and, as can be seen, Iran by far has had 
a much higher defence burden than all other countries. 
Moreover, while the defence burden for many countries, as 
shown in table 5.2, has remained more or less the same during the 
period under study, Iran's defence burden since the war has 
increased rapidly (see figure 5.3). 
Table 5.2 World military expenditure (Milex) as percentage of GDP*, 
selected countries, 1979-85 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Canada 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 
USA 5.9 6.3 6.6 7.0 7.1 7.0 7.0 
Belgium 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.0 
Denmark 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2 
France 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 
FR Germany 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 
Greece 6.3 5.7 7.0 6.9 6.3 7.2 7.1 
Italy 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Turkey 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.2 4.9 4.4 4.5 
UK 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.2 
India 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 
Pakistan 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.5 5.4 (5.5) (5.4) 
Indonesia (4.1) (3.8) (4.0) (4.4) (3.9) (3.6) (3.3) 
Japan 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Australia 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.2 
Notes: • GDP at current market prices. 
( ) Uncertain data. 
Source: SIPRI 1987: table 6A3 
The impact of the war on the value of arms imports and on the 
arms-imports burden 
Table 5.3 provides figures of estimated arms imports as well as the 
estimation of arms-imports burden during the 1979-85 period. The 
graphical presentation of arms-imports burden during the whole of 
the 1973-85 period is shown in figure 5.4. As can be noted, given 
the rapid decline in Milex soon after the revolution, the arms 
imports were also correspondingly reduced. The value of arms 
imports fell by 67 per cent, from 416 billion rials in 1978 (see table 
4.4) to 139 billion rials in 1979. The corresponding rise between 
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1979 and 1980 was 14.4 per cent, where it increased to 159 billion 
rials, representing an arms-imports burden of 16.8 and 15.6 per 
cent respectively during the same two years. 
Table 5.3 Ratio of arms imports in total imports (burden of arms 
imports),• Iran, 1979--85 
Arms imports" Non-military Total imports Ratio of arms 
A imports A+B imports to total 
B imports" (%) 
A 
A+B 
1979 139 686 825 16.8 
1980 159 863 1,022 15.6 
1981 504 985 1,489 33.8 
1982 650 1,185 1,835 35.4 
1983 750 1,583 2,333 32.1 
1984 927 1,328 2,255 41.1 
1985 648 1,061 1,709 37.9 
Average annual growth of military-imports• 1979-85: 29.2% 
1979-80 1979--85 1981-5 
Burden of arms imports, average per year 16.2 30.4 36.1 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 1be figures quoted for defence and non-defence imports are in 
current billion rials. 
b Military-related imports have been estimated at 50 per cent of total military 
expenditure for each year. These have been calculated under the assumption that, 
unlike the Shah's period, no major advanced military items have been received. Most 
of the imports are spare parts, small arms and ammunition. The imports of 'major 
weapons' have been those of the 'second best' and not those of the most expensive 
types. However, most of the imports have come via black market and third parties, 
and this should have increased their costs significantly. In consideration of all these 
factors, our estimation of military-related imports has been based on 50 per cent of 
the total military expenditures for each year, as opposed to 60 per cent for 1973-a. 
We, however, admit that this is only an educated guess. 
Sources: IMFa 1985; and IISS 1980/1 to 198617 
However, as a result of the invasion and the subsequent increase 
in Milex, arms imports were also increased significantly. They 
increased to 217 billion rials in 1980 and 504 billion rials in 1981, 
representing an increase of 217 and 132 per cent respectively. 
In all, during 1979-85, arms imports increased by 29.2 per cent 
on average each year, a substantial rate of increase by any 
standard. However, the fact that, since the revolution, no major 
advanced military items have been received and that most of the 
supplies are of the 'cheaper' and 'second-best' varieties, has meant 
that there has been a reduction in the annual average growth rate 
of military imports. For example, during the 1973-8 period (a 
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Figure 5.4 Arms-import burden: Iran, 1973--85 (%) 
Sources: Based on SIPRI 1980: 96-7, tables 3.6 and 3.7; IMFa 1985: 
IISS 1980/1-1986/7 
period of massive militarization), arms imports had increased by 
37 per cent on average each year. 
None the less it should be underlined that, since the invasion, 
there has been a massive increase in the arms-imports burden. 
This burden during 1979 and 1980 on average each year was 16.2 
per cent, rising to 36.1 per cent between 1981 and 1985. Therefore, 
if the pre-war (i.e. 1973-80) and post-war (1981-5) defence 
burdens are compared, it can be seen that there has been a 
significant increase in such a burden. The corresponding figures for 
the arms-imports burden during the same period are 26.1 and 36.1 
per cent respectively (see further figure 5.4). 
In conclusion, it can be said that one of the major consequences 
of the war on Iran has been the inability of the revolutionary 
regime to keep the Milex and arms imports low, as they had just 
done in the first two years of the revolution before Iran was 
invaded. 
The impact of the revolution and the war on military manpower 
and its composition, as well as on the quality and quantity of major 
weapon systems held in Iran 
The revolution, as noted in chapter two, had a major impact on 
the armed forces. Many high-ranking officers were either purged 
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or executed. The total number of men in the three forces (army, 
air force and the navy) fell from the high of 415,000 in 1979/80 
(pre-revolution) to only 240,000 in 1980/1, representing a decline 
of over 42 per cent. Table 5.4 provides information on the military 
manpower of the regular army since the revolution. 
Table 5.4 Military manpower of the regular armed forces and its 
composition, Iran, 1979/80, 1980/1, 1984/5, 1986/7 and 1987/8 (thousands) 
1979/80 1980/1 198415 198617 1987/8 
(pre- (post-
Revolution) Revolution) 
Total 415 240 305 355 355 
of which: 
Army 285 150 250 305 305 
Air Force 100 70 35 35 35 
Navy 30 20 15 15 15 
Sources: IISS 1979/80 to 1987188 
It can be seen that, given the initial near disintegration of the 
forces soon after the revolution, even by 1987/8, they had not 
regained their pre-revolution strength. The total manpower of the 
regular armed forces has increased to 355,000, which is still 14.5 
per cent less than what it was in 1979/80. 
A major impact on the armed forces since the revolution, 
however, has been a parallel rise and a rapid development of the 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC) or Pasdaran-e Enqelab. From 
a modest beginning in 1979/80 to protect the revolution, they now 
have become a major force not only in protecting the revolution, 
but also since the Iraqi invasion in defending the country. 
By 198617 the RGCs had formed themselves into different 
branches, consisting of ground forces, naval forces, marines and 
air forces. It is estimated that by 1986 there were some 300,000 
volunteers in ground forces, with 11 regional commands. Their 
artillery included surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and air defences. 
They serve independently or with the regular army. They also 
control Basij (see below). 
The strength (i.e. the number of men under arms) of the 
Revolutionary Guards' Naval Forces is not clearly known. They 
have, however, five island bases, namely Al Farsiyah, Halul (oil 
platfrom), Sirri, Abu Musa and Lark. These forces have some 
40 Swedish Boghamma fast boats armed with anti-tank guided 
weapons (ATGW); recoilless launchers (RCL) and machine guns. 
The coast-defence elements' artillery includes some Ch HY-2 
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missiles, better known as silkworm SSM, in at least three of their 
sites. It is also believed that they might have Italian SSM in their 
possession. The marine corps is reported to include some three 
brigades. Not much has been reported on their activities at this 
stage. 
The Revolutionary Guards' air forces have gone through much 
improvement in the last couple of years. They now have an 
important role in the air defence of major installations. It is 
estimated that in 1986, they had at least 22 F-6 fighter planes. 
As well as the establishment of the RGCs, in 1981 the Youth 
Brigades (Basij) was also formed. It is believed that by 1986/7, as 
many as 1 million were in Basij Forces.1 
Therefore, in all, since the revolution, there has been an 
increase of at least 310 per cent (excluding women under arms) in 
the number of people under arms, as by 1987 their number had 
increased to 1,700,000. 
Table 5.5 illustrates the list of major weapon systems held by the 
regular armed forces for selected. years since the revolution. If the 
quality and quantity of these weapons are compared with those of 
the pre-revolution period, some major changes can be observed. 
Table 5.5 Major weapon systems held by the regular armed forces, Iran, 
1979/80, 1980/1, 1984/5 and 1987/8. 
1979180 1980/1 198415" 198718" 
(last year of the (first year of the 
Shah) Revolution) 
Tanks 1,985 1,985 1,050(?) 1,310(?t 
Combat Aircraft 445 445 95(?) 60(?)c 
Helicopters 684 684 320(?) 300(?)d 
Armoured fighting 
vehicles 825 825 1,190 1,060 
Notes: • Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply make it impossible to estimate true 
numbers. 
b Among them: perhaps 1,000 T-54/-55; 250 T-59, T-62, T-72 (all Russian and East 
European-supplied, many captured from the Iraqis), and a very small number of 
Chieftain, M-47/-48, and M-60AI. Therefore, since the war, near total losses in pre-
war tank holdings and major changes in types and supplies of tanks. 
• Still pre-revolution/-war holdings. No new supplies of any significance. 
d Same as•. 
(?) Questionable if all operational. 
Sources: IISS 1979/80 to 1987188 
As noted in chapter four, during the 1973-8 period, the US was 
by far the biggest supplier of the most advanced weapons to Iran. 
It was also noted that, by 1979/80, Iran had received 445 combat 
aircraft, among them 190 F-4s and 166 F-Ss. There were also 1,985 
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tanks delivered to Iran; among them were 875 Chieftains and 250 
Scorpions. 
However, given the revolution and the subsequent embargoes 
against direct arms sales to Iran, as well as losses due to the war, 
by 1987/8 there were only some 1,310 tanks, 60 combat aircraft 
and 300 helicopters held by the armed forces. 
Since the revolution and the war the most important change in 
Iran's armoury has been in the tank division. Most of the advanced 
British-made Chieftain and Scorpion tanks have been destroyed. 
The new tanks are mainly all Russian/Eastern European made, 
amongst them are 1,000 T-54/55s and 250 T-59s. Therefore, as 
shown in table 5.5, since the war, not only has the quality of the 
tanks held been totally changed, but also, as far as quantity is 
concerned, in 1987 Iran had 675 tanks less than what it had in 
1980. 
As for the combat aircraft and helicopters, no new major 
systems have been supplied since the revolution. However, due to 
losses incurred since the war, their actual numbers have been 
reduced significantly, from 445 and 684 in 1980 to 60 and 300 in 
1987 respectively. Futhermore, it is believed that, due to parts 
shortages and other technical problems, not all of the above are 
operational anyway. 
As it appears, it can therefore be said that, since the war, there 
has been a near collapse in the availability of advanced major 
weaponry systems held by the armed forces in Iran. Therefore it 
seems safe to conclude that the very large sums that Iran has been 
spending on arms imports has been mainly on spare parts, 'second-
rated' weapons, as well as shells, mines and missiles, amongst 
others. 
None the less high expenditures have been necessary since arms 
prices have been much inflated, given that most have been 
acquired through third parties and black markets, a point to which 
we will return in chapter eight. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter it was demonstrated that the revolutionary leaders, 
in the first two years of their existence and prior to the Iraqi 
invasion, rapidly and significantly reduced Iran's Milex and arms 
imports. However, this major post-revolutionary achievement was 
abruptly ended when the country was attacked. 
Since that time Milex and arms imports, as well as correspond-
ing defence and arms-imports burdens, have all been increased 
significantly. 
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It was also noted that, since the war, there has been a massive 
rise in the number of people under arms in Iran. We observed 
that, while there has been a major reduction in the importance 
of the regular armed forces, there has been a parallel rise in 
importance and functions of the Revolutionary Guards. 
It was also demonstrated that there has been a major change in 
quality and quantity of major weaponry systems held in Iran. We 
noted that there has been no new delivery of advanced fighter 
planes and helicopters. We established the fact that their numbers 
have been reduced significantly and, due to technical problems, 
not all the available stock is fully operational. 
We noted that, since the revolution/war, the most important 
change in Iran's armoury has been in the tank division. There has 
been a total change in their quality and quantity during the period 
under study. 
In all, it can be said that one of the most damaging consequences 
of the war has been the inability of the revolutionary leadership to 
keep the Milex, the arms imports and their corresponding burdens 
low, as they had managed to do immediately after the revolution 
and prior to the invasion. 
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Chapter six 
Militarization of Iraq 1973-8: an 
economic analysis 
Introduction 
In chapter four some aspects of the militarization of Iran under the 
late Shah, during the 1973-8 period, were noted. The Shah's drive 
for regional hegemony through increases in Milex and a massive 
arms imports programme did not fail to have an impact on Iraq, 
which had its own aspirations towards its own regional role. 
The reasons for and the style in which both countries pursued 
their militarization policies are varied and complex. Given the 
scope of this chapter, no attempt is made here to discuss and 
analyse the differences. However, the reader interested in these 
issues is encouraged to refer to Karsh 1987, Helms 1984, Brown 
and Snyder 1985, Abdulghani 1984, King 1987 and Litwak 1981, 
amongst others. 
Therefore, what we intend to do, in this chapter is to provide an 
economic balance sheet of Iraq's militarization, similar in style and 
scope to that which was provided for Iran in chapter four. 
The estimation of defence and arms-imports burdens 
The figures for Milex and defence burdens during the 1973-8 
period are given in table 6.1. As can be seen, Milex increased from 
0.165 billion dinars in 1973 to 0.586 billion dinars in 1978, 
representing an average annual increase of 29 per cent. 
An intersting observation to be seen in this table is that, while 
the military expenditure during the period under study had 
increased significantly, it had not increased at the rate at which 
GDP had grown. This is so, as the share of defence in GDP 
(including oil) had fallen from 10.3 to 8.4 per cent between 1973 
and 1978. This is in contrast to Iran's experience during the same 
period. As was noted in chapter four, Iran's defence burden had 
increased from 8.1 per cent in 1973 to 14.1 per cent in 1978. 
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Table 6.1 Ratio of military expenditure (Milex) in GDP (oil including 
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Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures quoted for Milex and GDP are in current billion 
Iraqi dinars. 
b Calculated by the author, based on the information in EIU 1980. 
Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 1981; IMFa 1986; 
IISS 1973/4; and EIU 1980 
Furthermore, Iran's Milex had increased by 37 per cent on average 
each year, while, as was noted, the corresponding figure for Iraq is 
29 per cent. 
At this point, if we compare Iraq's defence burden figures with 
those of other selected countries whose figures were given in 
chapter four, table 4.2, we can note that, Iraq, like Iran, during 
the period under observation, tad allocated a much larger share of 
its GDP to defence than any other country mentioned in that table. 
This observation once more reinforces the relationship that 
exists between oil revenues on the one hand and high levels of 
Milex on the other. 
Table 6.2 provides data on the estimated value of Iraq's arms 
imports, as well as the ratio of arms imports to total imports during 
the 1973--8 period. As can be noted, the value of arms imports 
increased from 0.058 billion dinars in 1973 to 0.205 billion dinars in 
1978, representing an average annual growth of 29 per cent. 
As for the arms-import burden, it can be seen that, like the 
defence-burden figures, the ratio had declined from 17 .8 per cent 
in 1973 to 14.4 per cent in 1978. Once again, this is in contrast to 
Iran's experience, where, as noted in chapter four, these ratios had 
increased significantly. 
However, although the sums spent on arms imports were much 
less than what Iran had spent, none the less, in absolute terms, 
they represent a significant expenditure. Therefore, as in the study 
which was provided in chapter four for Iran, it is very interesting to 
note what Iraq had received in exchange for such impressive 
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Table 6.2 Ratio of arms imports in total imports - burden of arms 
imports•, Iraq, 1973-8 
Arms imports" Non-military Total imports Ratio of arms 
imports imports to total 
A B (A)+ (B) imports (% )" 
A 
(A)+ (B) 
1973 0.0S8 0.268 0.326 17.8 
1974 0.083 0.688 0.771 10.8 
1975 0.123 1.22 1.343 9.1 
1976 0.138 1.13 1.268 10.9 
1977 0.172 1.3 1.472 11.7 
1978 0.205 1.22 1.425 14.4 
Average annual growth of military imports• 1973-8: 29.0% 
Burden of arms - imports average per/year 1973-8• 12.4% 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 1be figures quoted for defence and non-defence impons are in 
current billion Iraqi dinars. 
b Military related imports have been estimated at 35 per cent of the total military 
expenditures for each year under observation in this table, based on the information 
given in the US 1972-82. 
Sourcn: IMFa 1985; SWRI, 1974 to 1979; IISS, 1973-4 to 1980'1; and USACDA 1984 
payments. First, the confirmed arms suppliers to Iraq during the 
period under study will be noted. 
As can be seen in table 6.5 at the end of this chapter, the Soviet 
Union was the major arms supplier. Indeed, if we refer to table 
4.3, it can be seen that the Soviet Union had supplied 85 per cent 
of Iraq's total arms imports during the period under study. 
Different types of MiG fighter planes, helicopters, air transport 
tankers, heavy and light tanks, armoured carriers, and many 
different types of missiles were supplied by the Soviet Union. 
France was the next major supplier of modem weapons to Iraq. 
The numbers and types of major weapon systems held by the 
Iraqi armed forces between 1972/3 and 1979/80 are illustrated in 
table 6.3. As can be seen the number of tanks, combat aircraft, 
helicopters and armoured fighting vehicles increased from 925, 
189, 46 and 360 to 1,900, 339, 231 and 1,500 during the same 
period. This table shows that the great majority of the weapons 
supplied to Iraq were Russian made. 
This, as well as our observations in chapter four, clearly 
demonstrates the fact that the main beneficiaries of the arms build-
up in the Persian Gulf are the superpowers as well as the 'mini' and 
'second-rated' powers in Europe. 
Table 6.2 gave figures of the estimated value of arms imports in 
current billions of Iraqi dinars. Given the exchange rates, 1 the 
total estimated value of arms imports in $US ( current prices) 
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Notes:• Among them: 1700 T-54/-55/-62 and 100 T-34 medium tanks (Russian supplied). 
b Among them: lZfU-22; 80 MIG-238; and 115 MIG-21 (Russian supplied). 
< Among them: 35 Mi-4, 14 Mi-6, and 80 Mi-8 (Russian supplied). 
Sources: IISS 1972/3 and 1979/80 
during the 1973-8 period is the sum of $2.7 billion. If we refer to 
chapter four, it can be noted that this sum was indeed much less 
than Iran's total military imports, which were $25.7 billion during 
the same period. 
As mentioned before, the Soviet Union had supplied 85 per cent 
of Iraq's total arms imports. Therefore, the total Soviet arms sales 
to Iraq during the period under study was the sum of $2.2 billion. 
At this point the military manpower and its composition during 
1972/3 to 1979/80 will be noted. As can be seen in table 6.4, the 
total military manpower increased by 137 per cent from 102,000 to 
222,000 during the same period. The army increased its numbers 
from 90,000 to 190,000, while the corresponding figures for the air 
force were 10,000 increasing to 28,000 during the same period. 
Table 6.4 Military manpower and its composition, Iraq, 19721>-1979/80 
(thousands) 
1972/3 Change• 1979/80 
% 
Total military manpower 102 137 222 
of which: 
Army 90 122 190 
Air force 10 280 28 
Navy 2 100 4 
Note: • Author's calculation. 
Sources: IISS, 1972/3 and 1979/80 
The growth of the Iraqi armed forces was not as balanced as that of 
Iran's. The Iraqi navy did not develop to the same degree as the 
other branches of the armed forces. This was mainly due to Iraq's 
geographical limitations, as the country is virtually land-locked with a 
Gulf coastline of only 10 miles compared with 1,243 miles for Iran. 
79 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we looked at some economic aspects of the Milex 
and arms imports of Iraq during the 1973-8 period. We noted that 
military expenditures and military imports had increased by 29 per 
cent on average each year during the period under study. We 
showed that the Soviet Union was by far the main supplier of 
major weapons to Iraq. 
It was shown that Iraq, in contrast to Iran, had not gone for a 
military build-up at the break-neck speed which by 1978 had 
produced fatal flaws in Iran. We noted that, again in contrast to 
the Iranian experience, both defence- and arms-imports-burden 
ratios had fallen in Iraq during the period under study. 
None the less, in absolute terms, Iraq had spent significant sums 
of money to modernize and improve its armed forces. The total 
number of men under arms had increased by 137 per cent, from 
102,000 in 1972/3 to 222,000 in 1979/80. The focus during this 
period was on the expansion of ground forces where their numbers 
increased from 90,000 to 190,000 during the same period. We also 
demonstrated that by the end of the period under observation, 
Iraq had received an impressive assortment of weapons, mainly 
from the Soviet Union. 
In all, it should be noted that, by adopting a 'less big', as 
opposed to 'big-push' strategy of development and modernization, 
both in the civilian and military sectors, Iraq, by the end of the 
1978/9 period was in an enviable position, a far cry from the 
situation which Iran had pushed itself into. 
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Militarization of Iraq 1973-8 
Table 6.5 (continued) 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
Dassault Falcon Transport 1975 
Dassault Mirage F-1 Fighter 1975 
Aerospatiale SA-321 Helicopter 1976 
Dassault Mirage F-1 Fighter 1976 
Aerospatiale AS-11/12 ASM 1974 
France/UK Aerospatiale/Westland Helicopter 1976 
SA-342 
Dassault-Bregeut BAC Fighter 1976 
Jagnan 
USA Lockheed C-130 Hercules Transport Aircraft 1976 
Soviet Union 'Scud' SSM 1975 
ATM 1975 
T-64 Tank 1975 
152-mm SP rapid fire 1975 
MilMi-8 Helicopter 1975 
Mil-Mi-24 Helicopter 1975 
France AM-39 Exocet ASM 1976 
AMX-lOP Armoured Car 1977 
AMX-30 MDT 1977 
Mirage FlC Fighter 1977 
HOT ATM 1976 
R-550 Magic AAM 1976 
SA-3210 Super Ferlon Helicopter 1977 
France/UK SA-330 Puma LOT 1976 
Switzerland MBB-223 K Flamingo Trainer 1977 
Soviet Union AA-2 Attol AAM 1976 
AN-12 Transport 1976 
AN-24 Transport 1976 
Mig-23 Fighter 1976 
Osa Missile Patrol boat 1976 
SA-6 SAM 1977 
SSB-2 Styx ShShM 1976 
T-62 MBT 1976 
An-Civil Transport 1976 
1/1-76 Candid Transport 1978 
Mi-lOHawke Helicopter 1978 
MIG-23S Fighter 1976 
SA-6 Gainful SAM 1976 
Osa-2 Class FPB 1976 
Switzerland AS-202 Brarto Trainer 1978 
France Mirage F-1B Trainer 1977 
AM-39 Exocet ASM 1978 
Crotale SAM 1976 
Sources: SIPRI 1972/3 to 1979 
For meaning of abbreviations see pp. 155-7 
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Chapter seven 
The political economy of military 
expenditure in Iraq during the war 
Introduction 
In chapter six some aspects of the militarization of Iraq during the 
197~ period were noted. It was shown that Iraq, in contrast to 
Iran, had not gone for a military build-up at break neck speed. 
Indeed, we demonstrated that both the defence- and arms-imports 
burden ratios had fallen during this period. This was so, as military 
expenditure (Milex) had not increased as fast as the GDP in the 
period under consideration. 
However, it was noted that in absolute terms significant sums of 
money had been spent on modernization and the improvement of 
Iraq's armed forces. It was also shown that during that p~·riod the 
Soviet Union was by far the largest supplier of advanced weapons 
to Iraq. 
Since the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980, there has 
been a significant change in Iraq's militarization, in terms of the 
value of Milex/arms imports, the number of people under arms 
and the quantity of military equipment held by the armed forces. 
Therefore the focus of this chapter is an attempt to demonstrate 
the effects of the war on Iraq's Milex and arms imports. The 
defence- and arms-imports-burden ratios will be noted, and 
changes since the invasion will be analysed. Then the changes in 
military manpower, as well as the changes in major weapon 
systems held by the Iraqi forces before and since the war, will be 
the subject of study. 
The impact of the war on Milex and the defence burden 
The figures of Milex and the measurement of the defence burden 
during the 1979-85 period are provided in table 7.1. The GDP/ 
Milex figures during the 197~5 period (selected years) are 
graphically illustrated in figure 7.1. As can be seen, in 1979, Milex 
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was 0.789 billion dinars, representing a defence burden of 7 per 
cent in GDP (including oil). By 1980, while GDP (including oil) 
had increased by 41 per cent, Milex had been raised by only 11.4 
per cent. Given this, therefore, the defence burden for the same 
year had actually fallen to 5.6 per cent. 
Table 7.1 Ratio of military expenditure (Milex) in GDP (oil including 
and excluding) - defence burden•, Iraq, 1979--85 
Milex GDP Share of defence GDP Share of defence 
(including in GDP* (excluding in GDP* 
oil) oil) 
1979 0.789 11.4 7.0 5.0 16.0 
1980 0.879 15.8 5.6 6.0 14.6 
1981 1.4 11.1 12.6 7.9 17.7 
1982 2.4 12.6 19.0 5.1 47.1 
1983 3.2 13.1 24.4 6.6 48.5 
1984 4.3 13.9 31.0 7.6 57.0 
1985 4.0 16.6 24.0 10.8 37.0 
Average defence burden: 
1979-85 17.6 34.0 
1973-9 8.2 20.4 
Average annual growth of Milex 1979-85: 31% 
Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures quoted for Milex and GDP are in current billion 
Iraqi dinars. 
Sources: IISS 1979/80 to 1986f7; OPEC 1985; Republic of Iraq, 1983 and United Nations 
Economic and Statistical Commission for Western Asia, 1986 
Then came the invasion of Iran in September 1980. In 1981, 
GDP (including oil) fell by 30 per cent to 11.1 billion dinars, while 
at the same time Milex increased by 59 per cent to 1.4 billion 
dinars. As a result of this rapid increase in Milex, accompanied by 
a significant decrease in GDP, the corresponding defence burden 
increased to 12.6 per cent in the same year. 
In all, during the period of 1979 to 1985, there was an un-
paralleled rise in Milex on the one hand, followed by a massive fall 
in GDP on the other (see figure 7.1). Given this, there has been a 
significant increase in the defence burden, which has amounted to 
17.6 per cent on average each year of GDP (including oil), a rapid 
rate of increase by any standards, including Iraq's own pre-war 
standards. During the 1973--9 period, the average annual defence 
burden was 8.2 per cent. Therefore it can safely be argued that, as 
a result of the war, there has been a rapid increase in Milex, while 
at the same time GDP has been falling significantly, resulting in a 
massive rise in the defence burden. This can best be seen in figure 
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Figure 7.1 GDP and military expenditures (Milex): Iraq, 1973-85 
(selected years) (billion Iraqi dinars) 
Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia 1981, 1986; IMFa 1986; IISS 1973/4, 1979/80-1986n; EIU 1980; 
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Figure 7.2 Defence burden: Iran and Iraq, 1973-85 (%) 
Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia 1981, 1986; IMFa 1986, November; IISS 1973/4, 1979/80-1986n; 
EIU 1980; OPEC 1985; Republic of Iraq 1983; IISS 1980/1-1986n; 
Central Bank of Iran: 1358, 1362 
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7.2, a graphical presentation of Iraq's defence burden (1973--85). 
For the purpose of comparison, Iran's defence burden during the 
same period is also illustrated. 
As noted in chapter six, while in pre-war Iraq Milex had 
increased, the rate of growth had always been far less than the rate 
at which GDP had grown. Thus another major consequence of the 
war, as far as Iraq is concerned, is a departure from past policies. 
The impact of the war on the value of arms imports and the arms-
imports burden 
At the outset it should be emphasized that, as with Iran, a wall of 
secrecy surrounds Iraq's arms imports, especially when different 
countries have been financing its imports (see chapter ten). 
Therefore it seems an impossible task to try to calculate the true 
cost of such imports. However, in this chapter we have attempted 
to provide an educated guess on the value of arms imports since 
the war. 
Table 7 .2 provides figures of estimated arms imports, as well as 
an estimation of the imports burden during the period under 
study. As can be seen, the value of arms imports in 1979 was the 
Table 7.2 Ratio of arms imports in total imports - burden of arms 
imports• Iraq, 1979--85 
Arms imports" Non-military Total Ratio of arms 
imports imports imports to total 
imports"(%) 
A B A+B 
1979 0.484 2.6 3.08 15.7 
1980 0.539 4.1 4.64 11.6 
1981 0.858 6.1 6.96 12.3 
1982 1.47 6.3 7.77 18.9 
1983 1.96 3.8 5.76 34.0 
1984 3.00 3.5 6.5 46.1 
1985 2.8 3.3 6.1 45.9 
Average annual growth rate of military-inputs• 1979-85: 34.0% 
Burden of arms imports average for year, 1979-85• 27.0% 
Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures quoted for defence and non-defence imports are 
current billion Iraqi dinars. 
b Military-related imports have been estimated at 61.3 per cent of total military 
expenditures for each year during the 1979-a3 period. This estimation has been based 
on the information given in US H85. For the years 1984 and 1985, the military-
related imports have been calculated at 70 per cent of the total military expenditures. 
This is based on the information provided in SIPRI (see sources below) concerning 
large-scale military agreements signed in 198415 between Iraq, the Soviet Union and 
France. We, however, admit that this is only an educated guess. 
Sourcn: IMFa 1985; SIPRI 1984, 1985, 1986; US ACDA 1985; and JISS 1979/80 to 1986f7 
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sum of 0.484 billion dinars, rising by 11.4 per cent to 0.539 in 1980. 
Then, as a result of the invasion, it increased by 59.2 per cent to 
0.858 billion dinars in 1981. However, as noted in chapter three, 
during this period there was a massive increase in non-military 
imports. Given this, the ratio of arms-imports burden fell from 
15.7 per cent in 1979 to 11.6 per cent in 1980 and 12.3 per cent in 
1981, while rising to 18.9 per cent in 1982. 
However, since 1983, as can be seen, there has been a massive 
increase in arms imports ( mostly due to increased arms deliveries 
from the Soviet Union), accompanied by a rapid decline in civilian 
imports. Thus the arms-imports-burden ratio increased to 34 per 
cent (1983), 46.1 per cent (1984) and 45.9 per cent (1985). These 
can best be seen in figure 7 .3, where Iraq's arms-import burden 
during the 1973-85 period is illustrated. For the purpose of 
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Figure 7.3 Arms-import burden: Iran and Iraq, 1973-85 (%) 
Sources: Based on Mofid 1987: 181, table 5.2; IISS 1979/80 to 1986/7; 
Central Bank of Iran: 1358, 1362; IMFa 1985, November 1986; SIPRI 
1984-6; USACDA 1985 
The impact of the war on military manpower, its composition, as 
well as on the quality and quantity of matjor weapon systems held by 
Iraq 
Table 7 .3 provides information on the Iraqi armed forces during 
the 1979/80 to 1987/8 period. As can be seen, there has been a 
huge increase in the number of people involved, one way or 
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another, with the armed forces since the war. As shown in the 
table, the total military manpower in 1979/80 was 222,000, rising 
by 9 per cent to 242,000 in 1980/1. Then, as a result of the invasion 
and the continuing war, by 1984/5 the figure had increased by 166 
per cent (1980/1 = base) to 643,000, rising by 31.4 per cent to 
845,000 in 1986/7. By 1987/8 it had risen to the grand total of 
1,000,000. 
Table 7.3 Military manpower and its composition: Iraq, 1979/80, 1980/1, 
1984/5, 1986/7 and 1987/8 {thousands) 
1979180 198011 198415 1986/7 198718 
Total 222 242 643 845 1,000 
of which: 
Army 190" 200 600 800 955b 
Air force 28 38 38 40 40 
Navy 4 4 5 5 5 
Notes: • Excluding around 250,000 reserves. 
b Including around 480,000 active reserves. Furthermore, while in 1979/80 there were 
750,000 in the People's Army ( a paramilitary force), this number has increased to 
650,000 in 1987/8. 
Sources: nss, 1979/80 to 1987/8 
In all, the total military manpower has increased by 350 per cent 
during the same period, a massive rate of increase, even compared 
with Iraq's own rate of militarization before the war. In 1972/3 to 
1979/80, the total military manpower figure had increased by 137 
per cent (see table 6.4). 
This, indeed, is a massive rate of militarization of a country in 
terms of the percentage of the population under arms. In 1979/80, 
only 1.7 per cent of the total population was in the forces, while 
the corresponding figure for 1987/8 has massively increased to 17 
per cent of the total. If the above figure is compared with Iran's it 
can be noted that, given Iran's much larger population, only 3.6 
per cent of the total population were, one way or another, in the 
forces in the same year. Thus it can be seen that the war has had a 
much bigger impact on the Iraqi population, when it comes to 
active service, than on Iran's. 
As for the composition of the Iraqi armed forces, it can be said 
that the biggest rate of increase has been in the army where 
numbers have increased from 190,000 in 1979/80 to 955,000 in 
1987/8, followed by the air force which has increased its numbers 
from 28,000 to 40,000 in the same period. 
Table 7 .4 illustrates the list of major weapon systems held by the 
Iraqi forces for selected years since the war. At this point, it should 
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Table 7.4 Major weapon systems held by the armed forces: Iraq, 1979/80, 1980/1, 1984/5 and 1987/8 
1979/80 Change" 198011 Change" 1984/Sb Change" 1987/lf' 
% % % 
Tanks 1,900 so 2,850 73 4,920 28 6,310" 
Combat aircraft 339 0 339 71 580 ? 500+d 
Helicopters 231 19 276 38 381 11 422 
Armoured fighting vehicle 1,500 67 2,500 28 3,200 25 4,000 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
b Due to losses and incomplete reporting of resupply, all figures tentative. 
c Among them: some 4,SOO T-54/-SS/-62/-72; l,SOO T-S9/-69, lSO Chieftain, M.(i(), and M-47 (mostly captured from Iran). 
d Among them: 1 squadron of TU-22, 1 squadron of TU-16, 4 squadrons of MIG-23BM, and 4 squadrons of Mirage F-IEQS (Exocet-equipped). 
As well as some 2S MIG-2S; 40 MIG-19; 200 MIG-21 and 30 Mirage F-IEQ. 
Sources: USS 1979/80 to 1987/8 
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be emphasized that nowhere better can the difference in availability 
of military hardware to Iraq and Iran be observed than in tables 
7.4 and 5.5. While, as noted before, Iran has been starved of any 
kind of weapons, table 7 .4 shows that Iraq, on the other hand, has 
been suffering from a very serious case of obesity! In a nutshell, it 
must be said that the figures in table 7 .4 are indeed 'unbelievable'. 
As can be seen, the seven-year conflict, with all the destruction 
that it has caused in terms of weapons lost, none the less has 
resulted in the numbers of tanks, combat aircraft, helicopters and 
AFVs being increased by 232, 47, 83 and 167 per cent respectively, 
between 1979/80 and 1987/8. 
In all, we must admit that the information provided in table 7.4 
is mind-boggling to say the least. How can a country which has lost 
much of its oil revenues and all of its foreign reserves and has gone 
through a seven-year war end up with so much more military 
hardware than at the beginning of the war? In the following 
chapter an attempt is made to shed light on this issue. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have attempted to shed light on the militariza-
tion of Iraq since its invasion of Iran in 1980. It has been shown 
that, although since the war there has been a significant decline in 
Iraq's GDP (both including and excluding oil), there has also been 
a rapid increase in Milex, resulting in an unparalleled rise in the 
defence burden. 
It was also noted that the value of arms imports has increased by 
34 per cent on average each year during the 1980-5 period, 
representing an average defence burden of 27 per cent each year. 
By comparing the above figures with the pre-war period of 1973-9, 
we were able to demonstrate that indeed, since the war, there has 
been a massive increase. 
It was also observed that, since the war, there has been a huge in-
crease in the number of people under arms in Iraq. In fact, their number 
has increased by 350 per cent between 1979/80 and 1987/8. Thus the 
percentage share of the total population involved with the armed 
forces has increased from 1.7 to 17 per cent during the same period. 
As for the quality and quantity of major weapon systems held by 
the Iraqi forces, we demonstrated that the numbers of tanks, 
combat aircraft, helicopters and AFVs too have increased by 232, 
47, 83 and 167 per cent respectively since the war. In all, given the 
size of the Iraqi population, it can be argued that, since the war, 
Iraq has been turned into a 'military machine', with major 
consequences for the post-war period, as the readjustment to a 
more 'normal' life may prove too difficult. 
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Chapter eight 
The Iran-Iraq war and the arms 
trade 
Introduction 
This is a chapter in which we hope to demonstrate the world's 
hypocrisy. We hope to establish beyond any reasonable doubt how 
immoral and indifferent the world has been in so far as the sales of 
arms to the areas of conflict, i.e. the Iran-Iraq war, are concerned. 
Nowhere better in the world can one observe these low standards 
than in a study of arms sales to the warring countries in the Gulf. 
There is, it seems, hardly a country, in East or West, South or 
North, where the rules of the 'game' have not been allowed to be 
broken, so that weapons can be exported or re-exported to one or 
both countries. 
Because of the extensive involvement of many countries, with 
numerous scandals and forging of documents, it is impossible to 
cover the entire subject in this chapter. Therefore, here, we will 
identify those countries that have supplied the necessary 'fuel' for 
the 'engine' of war and destruction in the Gulf. We will also 
demonstrate the connection between the duration of the war and 
the ever increasing number of suppliers of weapons to both 
countries. 
Thus, at this stage, no attempt will be made to discuss the 
composition of the weapons delivered, or how the arms have been 
supplied, etc., although confirmed arms deliveries will be identified. 
However, the reader interested in following this subject further, is 
strongly encouraged to consult the works of Walter De Bock and 
Jean-Charles Deniau (1988), Anthony H. Cordesman (1987a), 
Michael Brzoska (1987), Thomas Ohlson and Elisabeth Skons 
(1987), Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson (1986) and the 
Tower Commission Report (1987), amongst others. 
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Arms suppliers to Iran and Iraq since the war 
Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Iran, there was already an embargo 
on arms sales to Iran, imposed by President Carter in reaction to 
the taking of American 'hostages' in Tehran. 
Moreover, as noted in chapter two, the near disintegration of 
the regular armed forces in Iran soon after the revolution, as well 
as the departure of American military advisers, meant that Iran 
had major problems in operating its highly advanced weaponry 
systems at the time of the conflict. 
Therefore, immediately after the invasion, the low level of 
operational ability of the armed forces and the newly created 
Psadarans had meant that Iran was in desperate need of un-
sophisticated and simply operated arms, including shells, bombs, 
dynamite, explosives, missiles, etc. 
Moreover, Iran's need for such weapons coincided with the 
equally desperate need of many other countries to increase their 
conventional, unsophisticated arms sales. These sales had dropped 
significantly because of huge rises in the export of advanced 
weapons and military hardware following the oil-price increases of 
1973-4. 
Futhermore, as noted in previous chapters, the Soviet Union 
had reduced its arms exports to Iraq soon after its invasion of Iran. 
This had also created an opportunity for other countries to supply 
Iraq with much needed weapons. 
The above factors, amongst others, had created a situation 
which may never have existed before. Namely, two very rich 
countries at war, both desperate for arms (Iran in particular), and 
both willing and able to pay huge sums for their supplies. There-
fore the sky was the limit, so to speak, for the rest of the world to 
'satisfy' them. 
Tables 8.la to 8.lc illustrate the extent of the world's involve-
ment in supplying weapons to Iran and Iraq. Table 8.la identifies 
the countries supplying arms and other support to Iran during the 
1980-3 period. The corresponding information on Iraq is provided 
in table 8.lb. Table 8.lc lists the 'clever' countries, namely those 
who have been arming the two countries at the same time. These 
tables, in our view, can be taken as a starting point to show the 
hypocritical nature of the supplying nations. 
By looking at these tables, it can be seen that by the end of 1983 
there were 8 countries supplying arms to Iran only, while 9 
countries were supplying Iraq. In the 'clever' category, there were 
9 more countries supplying both Iran and Iraq. In all, during the 
same period, there were 26 suppliers of weapons to Iran and Iraq; 
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Table 8.la Arms supply and other support to Iran, 1980-3 
Countries supplying Weapons' Other support" Major weapon supplier 
Iran only before the war 
Greece • • USA and Britain 
Israel • • 
Syria • • 
Yemen, South • 
Korea, South • • 
Taiwan • 
Vietnam • 
Algeria • • 
Libya • • 
South Africa • 
Argentina • • 
Notes: • The term 'weapons' includes major weapons, small arms, ammunitions or explosives. 
b 'Other support' includes military transport vehicles, spare parts, training, military 
advisers, logistic support or financial support. 
Source: Based on SIPRI 1984: 198, table 7.5 
Table 8.lb Arms supply and other support to Iraq, 1980-3 
Countries supplying Weapons' Other support" Major weapon supplier 
Iraq only before the war 
Belgium • Soviet Union and France 
FR Germany • • 
Portugal • 
Spain • • 
Czechoslovakia • • 
Hungary • 
Poland • • 
Yugoslavia • 
Austria • 
Egypt • • 
Jordan • • 
Kuwait • 
Saudi Arabia • 






Notes: • The term 'weapons' includes major weapons, small arms, ammunitions or expl01nves. 
b 'Other support' includes military transport vehicles, spare parts, training, military 
advisers, logistic support or financial support. 
Source: Based on SIPRI 1984: 198, table 7.5 
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Table 8.lc Countries supplying arms to both Iran and Iraq, 1980-3 
Iran Iraq 
weapons' Other support" weapons' Other support" 
USA • • • 
Soviet Union • • • • 
China • • 
France • • • • 
Italy • • • • 
German DR • • • 
Switzerland • • 
Korea, North • • • • 
Brazil • • • • 
Notes: • The term 'weapons' includes major weapons, small arms, ammunitions or explosives. 
b 'Other support' includes military transport vehicles, spare parts, training, military 
advisers, logistic support or financial support. 
Sowce: Based on SIPRI 1984: 198, table 7.S 
'other' military-related support was also provided by some of the 
same countries as well as many more. (For more details see tables 
8.la to 8.lc) 
Tables 8.2a to 8.2c illustrate the number of countries supplying 
arms or 'other' military-related support to Iran, Iraq or both, 
during the 19~ period. As shown in table 8.2a, by the end of 
1986 there were 12 countries supplying weapons to Iran only. This 
Table 8.2a Arms supply and other supports to Iran, 1980--6 
Supplying Iran only Weapons' Other support" 
Algeria • • 
Argentina • • 
Canada • • 
Denmark • 
Finland • • 
Israel • • 
Kenya • 
Korea, South • • 
Libya • • 
Mexico • • 
Singapore • 
Syria • • 
Taiwan • • 
Turkey • • 
Vietnam • 
Yemen, South • 
Notes: • The term 'weapons' includes major weapons, small arms, ammunitions or explosives. 
b 'Other support' includes military transport vehicles, spare parts, training, military 
advisen, logistic support or financial support. 
Source: Based on SIPRI 1987: 204-S, table 7.8 
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Table 8.2b Arms supply and other supeorts to Iraq, 1980--6 
Supplying Iraq only Weapons" Other supporl' 
Egypt • • 
Jordan • • 
Kuwait • 
Morocco • 
Phillipines • • 
Sudan • 
Tunisia • 
United Arab Emirates • 
Yemen, North • 
Notes: • The term 'weapons' includes major weapons, small arms, ammunitions or explosives. 
b 'Other support' includes military transport vehicles, spare parts, training, military 
advisers, logistic: support of financial support. 
Soun:e: Based on SIPRI 1987: 204-S, table 7.8 
Table 8.2c Countries supplying arms to both Iran and Iraq, 1980--6 
Country Iran Iraq 
supporting both weapons" Other supporl' weapons" Other supporl' 
parties 
Austria • • • 
Belgium • • • 
Brazil • • • • 
Bulgaria • • • • 
Chile • • 
China • • • • 
Czechoslovakia • • • • 
Ethiopia • • 
FR Germany • • • • 
France • • • 
German DR • • • • 
Greece • • • • 
Hungary • • • • 
Italy • • • • 
Korea, North • • 
Netherlands • • 
Pakistan • • • • 
Poland • • • • 
Portugal • • 
Saudi Arabia • • 
South Africa • • 
Soviet Union • • • • 
Spain • • • 
Sweden • • • 
Switzerland • • 
UK • • • • 
USA • • • • 
Yugoslavia • • • • 
Notu: • The term 'weapons' includes major weapons, small arms, ammunitions or explosives. 
b 'Other support' includes military tramport vehicles, spare parts, training, military 
advisers, logistic support or financial support. 
Soun:e: Based on SJPRI 1987: 204-S, table 7.8 
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represents an increase of 4 countries since the 1980-3 period. The 
newcomers include Canada, Denmark, Finland and Singapore. 
If we look at table 8.2b, it can be seen that there were only 3 
countries, namely Egypt, Jordan and the Philippines, that were 
supplying Iraq only. This represents a decline of 6 countries since 
the 1980-3 period. A reason for this can be related to the huge 
increase in arms exports by the Soviet Union to Iraq since 1982/3 
and thus to a lesser need for arms imports from other sources, 
supplying Soviet-made weapons. This can clearly be observed by 
noting that the countries that were not supplying Iraq only in the 
1983-6 period, but were in 1980-3, included Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. 
The scale of the world's involvement in supplying arms to both 
Iran and Iraq can best be noted in table 8.2c. It can be seen that by 
1986 there were 26 countries supplying weapons to both countries. 
This means that by the second period of the war (i.e. 1983 to 
1986), 17 new countries had joined in arming both Iran and Iraq at 
the same time. 
We noted that tables 8. la to 8. lc were the start of the journey 
into hypocrisy. We have now reached our destination. Table:; 8.2a 
to 8.2c are the final points of our journey. These tables rep,esent 
the selfishness and lack of moral standards of 41 countries which 
have put their profits and self interest before their loyalty to fellow 
human beings elsewhere in the world. 
One final thing that we would like to do is to draw the reader's 
attention to the fact that the Iran-Iraq war and the supply of arms 
to both countries are not the only examples of arms being 
delivered to an area of conflict. 
In fact, the whole issue of arms sales to the Third World, where 
resources are scarce and the majority of governments are unable 
to provide for the basic needs of the population, must be brought 
to the forefront of world attention (i.e. the people of the major 
advanced economies). This is a vital issue, given the sums spent 
and, thus, the huge scale of opportunity cost incurred. 1 
For example, it has been estimated that during the 1982~ 
period, the total value of arms exports from the leading major 
weapon exporting countries, namely the USA, the Soviet Union, 
France, the UK, FR Germany and Italy, has been the sum of 
$142,591 million at 1985 constant prices (SIPRI 1987: 183, table 
7.1). A point to be noted is the fact that the greatest share of the 
global arms trade is not between the advance economies them-
selves, but with the Third World. 
Indeed, during the same period, 51.6 per cent of total US arms 
exports were destined for the Third World. The corresponding 
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figure for the Soviet Union is 76.1 per cent, France 86.1 per cent, 
the UK 66.5 per cent, FR Germany 62.9 per cent and Italy 98 per 
cent (SIPRI 1987: 183, table 7.1). The reader, at this point, is 
invited to compare and contrast the scale of arms sales to the 
countries of the Third World on the one hand, with their global 
indebtedness, hunger and poverty, to name but a few, on the 
other. 
Given the scope and limit of this study, we cannot discuss this 
issue any further. However, it is hoped that, although very brief, 
we were able to highlight the scale of the militarization of the 
Third World, and the fact that the Iran-Iraq war is part and parcel 
of that militarization. 
A further point to be noted is that the Iran-Iraq war has led to 
the rise of a few prominent Third World arms exporters, such as 
China and Brazil. As noted in Business Week (29 December 1986), 
these two countries have built up arms industries that are thriving 
as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. It has been estimated that Brazil's 
annual arms sales of $250 million at the time the war began had 
increased to $1. 7 billion in 1986 (ibid.), with 37 per cent on average 
each year destined for Iraq during 1982 to 1986 (SIPRI 1987: 198, 
table 7.6). Given the direct and indirect Brazilian arms sales to 
Iran, it is estimated that the total share of Brazil's arms exports to 
the warring nations in the Gulf might be as high as 50 per cent. 
China, thanks to the Gulf War, has also been able to increase its 
arms exports to the Third World. The total share of the developing 
countries' arms imports from China has increased from 1.7 per 
cent in 1977-81 to 4.3 per cent during 1982-6 (SIPRI 1987: 183, 
table 7 .1). It is understood that the increased share is a result of 
arms sales to Iran and Iraq since the war. Indeed, during the 1982-
6 period, the confirmed Chinese arms sales to the Third World 
(i.e. it does not include the re-export of Chinese weapons from 
other countries to Iran and Iraq) had amounted at 1985 constant 
prices to $4,902 million (SIPRI 1987: 183, table 7.1), representing 
3.1 per cent of the world's total during the same period. 
The Iran-Iraq war has also created a major boom in the re-
export of arms in the Third World. The main arms re-exporters are 
Egypt, Jordan, Libya, North Korea and Syria. As noted before, al! 
these countries deliver arms to one or other warring parties in the 
Gulf. Although it is very difficult to estimate the value of profits 
earned through re-export, it can be argued that the returns must 
have been substantial, to say the least. 
Given the above, it seems that many countries in the Third 
World in one way or other, are thriving as a result of the war. An 
important question at this point is: what is the effect going to be on 
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these countries now that the war has ended, and Iran and Iraq 
might return to more conventional arms imports and to their 
traditional suppliers? The effect on these countries, especially 
on Brazil and China which, as noted above, have developed a 
major arms industry as the result of the war, could be very 
serious indeed. As long as the war continued, there existed an 
easy and welcoming market for outside penetration. Therefore it 
can be argued that another consequence of the Gulf War is the 
unparalleled rise in the number of arms merchants in the Third 
World. 
So far in our presentation, an attempt has been made to 
demonstrate the complexities of arms sales to Iran and Iraq, in 
terms of unconfirmed and 'unconventional' sales. However, at this 
point we are able to shed light on confirmed arms suppliers to both 
countries since the war. Tables 8.3-5 at the end of this chapter 
illustrate the arms agreements between Iraq and the Soviet Union, 
France and other major suppliers during the 1979-87 period. 
Table 8.6 provides the corresponding information for Iran. 
These tables go a long way to establish the ability of Iraq to 
import much of its arms needs from its traditional suppliers on one 
hand, and the inability of Iran to obtain any large-scale replace-
ments for most of its pre-war and US-supplied weapons on the 
other. At the same time, while Iraq has been able to receive more 
weapons, both in quality and quantity, in virtually every category, 
Iran has suffered badly in its inability to obtain high-performance 
and advanced weaponry systems. 
In all, as can be seen, the Soviet Union and France, as in the 
pre-war period, have remained Iraq's major arms suppliers since 
the war, supplying the most modem and advanced arsenal of 
weapons. Brazil and Italy are other major suppliers to Iraq. 
Confirmed arms agreements with other countries include China, 
Egypt, Spain, Jordan, the UK and the USA. (For further details 
see table 8.5.) 
In looking at table 8.6 it becomes clear that, in contrast to Iraq, 
there are not many confirmed arms agreements between Iran and 
other countries, hence the existence of, as noted before, a large 
'grey' and 'black' market in arms exports to Iran. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was an illustration of the world's hypocrisy. We 
attempted to demonstrate how immoral and indifferent the world 
has been, in so far as the sales of arms to Iran and Iraq, i.e. 
countries at war, are concerned. 
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It was noted that there is hardly any country in East or West, 
South or North, where the rules of the 'game' have not been 
allowed to be broken, so that weapons can be exported or re-
exported to one or both countries. 
We observed that many factors, such as the US-imposed embargo 
on sales of arms to Iran, the low level of operational ability of the 
Iranian armed forces, the desire on the part of the suppliers to 
supply Iran with unsophisticated military hardware, and finally the 
actual reduction in the Soviet arms exports to Iraq soon after the 
invasion, had created a situation which had probably never existed 
before: namely, two very rich countries at war, desperate for arms 
and spare parts, and willing and able to pay large sums for their 
supplies. 
In all, it was noted that, during the first part of the war (1980-3), 
there were 26 countries supplying all kinds of weapon to Iran and 
Iraq. This figure, however, had increased to 41 by the end of the 
second period (1983-6). 
We also observed that the Gulf War has led to the rise of a few 
prominent Third World arms exporters, in particular China and 
Brazil, who have developed a thriving arms export business 
because of the Gulf War. We noted that, as long as the war 
continued, there existed an easy and welcoming market for outside 
penetration. However, this might not necessarily be the case now 
that the war has ended and Iran and Iraq might return to their 
more traditional arms suppliers. The consequences of such an 
action on Brazil and China could be profound, to say the least. 
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Table 8.5 Confirmed arms agreements between Iraq and major arms 
suppliers (excluding the Soviet Union and France), 1979-87 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
Brazil EE-11 APC 1979 
EE-17 TD 1979 
EE-9 Reece AC 1979 
MAS-1 ASM 1980 
EE-3 SC 1982 
EE-11 APC 1982 
EE-11 APC 1983 
EE-9 AC 1984 
11-SS-30 MRS 198S 
EE-3 SC 1987 
EE-9 AC 1986 
China T-59 MBT 1981 
TYPE 531 APC 1982 
Type 69 MBT 1982 
T-69 MBT 1982 
Egypt AT-3 ATM 1981 
T-SS MBT 1981 
EMB-312 Trainer 1983 
F-6 Fighter 1983 
F-7 Fighter 1983 
T-SS MBT 1983 
Italy AB-212 Hel 1980 







A-109 Hel 1984 
AB-212 Hel 1984 
Indonesia BO-lOSCB Hel 1980 
Switzerland PC-7 Trainer 1981 
German DR T-S4fl'-SS MBT 1980 
German FR BO-l0SCB Hel 1984 
BK-117 Hel 1984 
Poland T-SS MBT 1980 
SA-6 SAM 1985 
Yugoslavia T-72 MBT 1980 
Frigate 1979 
Spain BMR-600 ICV 1981 
C-101 Trainer 1981 
C-212-200 Transport 1981 
BO-lOSCB Hel 1980 
Jordan Khalid MBT 1982 
GHN-45 TH/fG 1982 
F-6 Fighter 1983 
GHN-45 TH/fG 1984 
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Table 8.5 (continued) 















Note: For meaning of abbreviations, see pp. 155-7. 






Table 8.6 Confirmed arms agreements between Iran and major arms 
suppliers, 1979--87 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
Libya T-54 MBT 1981 
T-55 MBT 1981 
T-66 MBT 1981 
SCUD-B SAM 1986 
Syria T-55 MBT 1982 
T-62 MBT 1982 
SCUD-B SSM 1984 
Argentina TAM Tank 1983 
China F-6 Fighter 1983 
T-59 MBT 1985 
130mm TG 1985 
122 mm TG 1985 
CSA-1 SAM 1985 
HY-5 SAM 1985 
F-7 Fighter 1985 
CSA-1 Sams SAM System 1985 
North Korea T-62 Tank 1981 
F-6 Fighter 1985 
SA-2 SAM 1985 
South Korea LS 1984 
UK LS 1977 (delivered 
since the war) 
KhaBg type Support ship 1974 (delivered 
since the war) 
AR-30 3-D radar 1986 
Watchman Radar 1987 
USA AIM-9L AAM 1985 (150 delivered) 
MIM-23B Hawk SAM 1986 (235 delivered) 
BGM-71ATow ATM 1986 (2,W! delivered) 
Vietnam F-5E Fighter 1986 
UH-H Hel 1986 
M-107 SPG 1986 
M-113-Al APC 1986 
M-48 MBT 1986 
AIM-9E AAM 1986 
Note: For meaning of abbreviations, see pp. 155-7. 
Source: Based on SIPRI 1987 
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Chapter nine 
The impact of the war on the military 
expenditure and arms imports of 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
Introduction 
The revolution in Iran, the rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism in 
largely Sunni-Muslim-dominated countries in the Persian Gulf and 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were among the main reasons 
for a rapid increase in military expenditure and arms imports in the 
Gulf countries in the late 1970s. 
However, the present security threats, arising from the Gulf 
War, have resulted in a more rapid militarization and further 
acquisition of weapons in the neighbouring countries. Since 1979/ 
80 all the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) members have 
spent billions of dollars on importing major sophisticated weapon 
systems. It is important to note that such rapid increases in military 
expenditure (Milex) and arms imports have taken place at a time 
when oil revenues have been falling, and therefore resources have 
become more scarce. This obviously has a profound economic 
effect on the economies of these countries. Futhermore, given the 
small size of the population in these countries, the wisdom of 
receiving such advanced weapons in such quantities can seriously 
be questioned. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first provides a brief 
study of Milex in and arms imports by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It 
is expected that this presentation will more clearly establish the 
case that the Gulf has been further militarized since the war. The 
second attempts to assess the cost of high military burdens arising 
from militarization in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
especially in terms of forgoing potential foreign exchange. 
Mlle:x and arms imports, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: 1973-85 
Table 9 .1 provides information on the value of Milex and the ratio 
of defence burden of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the 1973-85 
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Table 9.1 Ratio of military expenditures (Milex) in GDP- defence burden•, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 1973-85 
GDP Kuwait Kuwait's Milu Kuwait's 














Average annual growth of GDP* 1973-8 
Average annual growth of GDP 1979-85 
Average annual growth of Milex• 1973-8 
Average annual growth of Milex• 1979-85 
Average annual defence burden• 1973-8 
Kuwait Saudi 
6.4% 14.8% 
















Kuwait 13.8% Saudi 40. 7% 
Kuwait -2.1% Saudi 5.3% 
Kuwait 33.1% Saudi 52.9% 
Kuwait 8.3% Saudi 5.4% 
GDP (Saudi 














Note: • Author's calculation. All the figures quoted are in local c:urrenc:y and at current prices. 
Sources: IMFa 1980/2 and 1986; OPEC 1985; and 11SS 197314 to 198617 
Saudi's Milu Saudi's defence 














The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
period. As can be seen, in 1973 and 1974 (before OPEC I), Saudi 
Arabia had spent 4.3 billion riyals and 9.2 billion riyals on Milex. 
Then, as a result of the oil-price increases, Milex had increased to 
23. 7 billion riyals in 1975, representing an increase of 167 per cent. 
Since 1976 and up to 1978 (i.e. the start of the Iranian revolution), 
the Saudis' Milex had remained at between 32-36 billion riyals. 
However, since the revolution and the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the 
Saudis' Milex has been increased at an amazingly high rate. By 
1980, Milex had increased to 57.2 billion riyals, representing an 
increase of 58 per cent since 1978. The corresponding figures for 
1983 were 95.2 billion riyals and 164 per cent. 
As a result of the rapid decrease in oil prices in recent years, 
Milex has correspondingly fallen to 64 billion riyals in 1985. In all, 
during the 1978-83 period, Milex had increased by 21 per cent on 
average each year, while GDP had grown by 13 per cent. The 
corresponding figures for the 1978-85 period, to take account of 
the decline in oil prices, were 9 and 6 per cent on average each 
year. 
As far as Milex in Kuwait is concerned, it can be seen that again 
as a result of oil-price increases in 1973/4, Milex had increased, by 
1975, to 0.210 billion dinars, representing an increase of 184 per 
cent since 1973. However, since the initial increase in Milex, the 
expenditure had remained at about 0.300 billion dinars up to 1978. 
Since 1978 Milex and defence burdens have rapidly increased. 
Milex has grown by an average annual rate of 8.5 per cent during 
the 1978-85 period, while the corresponding figure for GDP 
growth is only 4.9 per cent (see further table 9.1). Moreover, by 
1985 the defence burden had increased significantly to 9.3 per cent 
from 5.1 per cent in 1981. 
Table 9.2 provides information on the estimated value of arms 
imports as well as the burden of arms imports in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait during the 1973-85 period. It can be seen that, in Saudi 
Arabia, the value of estimated arms imports increased from 2.2 
billion riyals in 1973 to 16.4 billion riyals in 1977, representing an 
increase of over 65 per cent on average each year during this 
period. However, as a result of security threats (real or imagined) 
since the late 1970s, there has been a massive rise in the estimated 
value of arms imports. 
In fact, by 1983, the estimated value of arms imports had 
increased to 57 .1 billion riyals, representing an increase of 23 per 
cent on average each year since 1977. As for the arms-imports 
burden, it can be noted that, while in 1978 there was a 21 per cent 
burden, by 1985 it had increased to 29.5 per cent. (For more 
details see table 9.2.) 
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Table 9.2 The ratio of arms imports in total imports - burden of arms imports•, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 1973--85 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
Estimated arms Non-military A Estimated arms Non-military A 
import/' imports A+B imports import/' A+B 
A B % A B % 
1973 2.2 7.3 23.2 0.04 0.271 12.9 
1974 4.6 10.2 30.1 O.OIJ 0.456 16.5 
1975 11.9 14.8 44.6 0.11 0.632 17.4 
1976 16.2 30.7 34.5 0.16 1.0 13.8 
1977 16.4 51.7 24.1 0.15 1.2 11.1 
1978 17.9 69.2 21.0 0.16 1.3 10.9 
1979 28.0 82.2 25.5 0.20 1.5 11.8 
1980 34.3 96.2 26.0 0.24 1.7 12.4 
1981 49.8 120.0 29.0 0.29 2.1 12.1 
1982 55.3 138.2 28.4 0.29 2.3 11.2 
1983 57.1 137.1 29.4 0.26 2.2 10.6 
1984 47.6 118.0 29.0 0.29 2.2 12.7 
1985 38.4 90.2 29.5 0.33 1.7 16.3 
Total in 
bn. USS 110.3 272 - 8.7 61.2 
Notes: • Authon' calculation. All the figures, except those in the last row, are in current local currency, billion riyals for Saudi Arabia and billion dinan for 
Kuwait. 
b Military-related imports have been estimated at SO and 60 per cent of the total military expenditure for each year during the 1973-8 and 1979-85 
periods respectively. 'These assumptions are based on the actual value and volume of arms transfen to these countries. We, however, admit that these 
are at best only educated guesses. 
Sources: IMFa 1980 and 1986; IMFb 1980 and 1987; IISS 1973/4 to 198617; SIPRI 1974 to 1987; and USACDA 1969-78 and 1985 
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In Kuwait also there has been a rapid rise in the estimated value 
of arms imports. Indeed they have increased from 0.16 billion 
dinars in 1978 to 0.33 billion dinars in 1985, representing an 
average annual increase of 11 per cent during the same period. 
The arms-imports-burden ratio has correspondingly increased 
from 10.9 to 16.3 per cent during the same period. 
In all, table 9.2 demonstrates very clearly and beyond an ✓ doubt 
how these two countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, witn small 
populations, in absolute, as well as relative terms, have become a 
storage place for the weapon makers of the industriali7.ed countries. 
It can be seen from the list of confirmed arms suppliers to Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait during the 1973-8 period, which is illustrated 
in tables 9.7 and 9.8 at the end of this chapter, that, during this 
period, the USA was the major supplier of weapons to Saudi 
Arabia, followed by France and the UK. Many different types of 
weapons, including fighters, tanks, helicopters, armoured per-
sonr.el carriers and many different sorts of missiles, have been 
supplied by these countries. 
Arms acquisitions by the Kuwaitis are much smaller in value and 
quantity. Major suppliers include the USA, France and the UK. 
The Soviets had also joined in providing weapons to Kuwait, 
among them SAM missiles. 
Tables 9. 9-11 illustrate the list of arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia 
during the 1979-87 period. From these tables it becomes clear that 
the USA is by far the major supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia, 
followed by France and the UK. To arrive at an accurate share of 
each supplier, in the Saudis' total arms imports, given the avail-
ability of information at present, is apparently an impossible task. 
However, having analysed the tables, and noted the quantity and 
quality of arms supplied, we estimate that the USA has had a 55 
per cent share of the Saudis' arms imports, followed by France and 
the UK (jointly) 40 per cent, and the 'others' 5 per cent. We, 
however, admit that these are 'educated' guesses only. 
Therefore, given our estimates, the value of arms exports by the 
USA to Saudi Arabia during the 1973-85 period is the total of 
$60.6 billion. The corresponding figure for France and the UK 
(jointly) is $44.1 billion. 
These three countries, between them have supplied such an 
arsenal of weapons to Saudi Arabia that, one wonders, given the 
small size of the population, by whom or how these weapons are 
going to be used if, or when, there is a military need for their 
use. The seriousness of this problem will be seen at a later date 
when the Iran-Iraq war has ended. The security threat would 
therefore be removed, and the Saudis could find it too difficult to 
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produce any justification for maintaining such a high military 
portfolio. 
In all, as shown in tables 9.9 and 9.10, every kind of weapon 
possible, especially of the most advanced types, has been delivered 
to Saudi Arabia. The militarization of Saudi Arabia at such a 
break-neck speed will have a major impact on the post-war 
development of countries like Iran. Is Iran, in the post-war period, 
going to accept a lesser militarized posture than a country like 
Saudi Arabia, or is it going for a rapid build-up of its armed forces, 
accompanied by a massive increase in arms imports? If the second 
option is adopted, then there will be serious competition, given 
scarce resources, for the development of the civilian economy. 
Table 9.12 illustrates the list of countries supplying arms to 
Kuwait. It can be seen that, in this case also, the USA, France and 
the UK are the main beneficiaries of increased arms imports by the 
Kuwaitis. They have, among themselves, provided the most 
advanced weapon system to a country of only 1.8 million people. 
How and under what conditions these weapons can be used by the 
Kuwaiti citizens remains to be seen. 
Table 9.3 provides·information on the quantity and composition 
of major weapon systems held by the Saudi and Kuwaiti armed 
forces during the 1972/3 to 1987/8 period. It can be seen that the 
number of tanks in Saudi Arabia has increased from 85 to 550 
during the same period. The corresponding figures for combat 
aircraft, helicopters and AFVs were 71, 30 and 200, rising to 226, 
91 and 550 during the same period. 
Table9.3 Major weapon systems held by the armed forces, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, 1972/3, 1979/80, 1984/5, 1986/7 and 1987/8 
Tanks (S) 
(K) 




Armoured fighting vehicle (S) 
No~s: (S) Saudi Arabia. 
(K) Kuwait. 
? Not known exactly. 





























b The numbers of tanks in Kuwait falling since 197900 may be because most of them 
have been given to the Iraq army. 
Sources: IlSS 1972/3 to 1987/8 
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As for Kuwait, it can be noted that the number of tanks had 
increased from 100 in 1972/3 to 280 in 1979/80. However, this 
figure has declined to 160 in 1987/8. Therefore it is most likely that 
Kuwait, besides any other assistance it has provided to Iraq, has 
also supplied that country with many tanks. The number of 
combat aircrafts and helicopters on the other hand has increased 
from 28 and 7 to 80 and 40 during the same period. 
Table 9.4 provides information on military manpower and its 
composition in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the period under 
study. As can be noted, in Saudi Arabia, between 1972/3 and 1979/ 
80, the total military manpower had increased from 41,000 to 
45,000, representing an average annual growth rate of 1.3 per 
cent. 
Table 9.4 Military manpower and its composition, Saudi Arabia and 





















198011 1984/5 198617 198718 
48.0" 52.0" 48.0" 67.0" 
12.5d 12.5d 13.ld 16.ld 
31.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 
10.0 10.0 10.0 13.0 
15.0 14.0 14.0 15.0 
2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
0.5 0.5 1.1 1.1 
• For Kuwait (19741S). 
b Up to the end of 1979, military service in Saudi Arabia was voluntary; in 1980 
oonsc:ription was introduced. 
• Does not include foreign contract military personnel, estimated at 10,000 in 1987/8. 
d Excluding expatriate personnel. 
The figures above do not include paramilitary forces. 
Sources: 11SS 1972/3 to 1987/8 
However, in 1980, conscription was introduced. Therefore, the 
figures for military manpower have increased to 67,000 in 1987/8, 
representing an average annual growth rate of 5.1 per cent since 
1979. It is also important to note that this figure does not include 
foreign contract military personnel, estimated at about 10,000 in 
1987/8. 
The number of military personnel in Kuwait has also increased 
significantly. Their numbers increased from 10,200 in 1974/5 to 
11,200 in 1979/80, representing an average annual growth rate of 
1.9 per cent. 
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Since 1980, however, the total military manpower has increased 
to 16,100, which represents an average growth rate of 5 per cent 
per year since 1979. 
Once again, these two tables go a long way to demonstrate the 
rate at which Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have so rapidly been 
militarized since the Iran-Iraq war. 
The opportunity cost of the militarization of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait: 1973-85 
At this point an attempt is made to assess the cost of high military 
burdens arising from militarization, in terms of potential foreign-
exchange reserves forgone for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
In a choice situation the concept of opportunity costs refers to 
the benefits forgone by selecting one option at the expense of 
several others. When resources are scarce, if a society (i.e. the 
government) selects policy A, it forgoes the benefits derived from 
policies B and C. The classic illustration of opportunity costs for 
governmental decision-making is the 'guns vs. butter' dilemma. 
This dilemma depicts spending on the military and social welfare 
as inversely related to one another. As Milex rises, the benefits of 
alternative preferences in the areas of social welfare must suffer. 1 
However, it seems, given the massive oil revenues, especially 
since the early 1970s, the oil-exporting countries in the Gulf have 
not, in a real sense, faced a 'guns vs. butter' dilemma, in so far as 
social welfare expenditure is concerned. Therefore it can be 
argued that, given the serious problem of absorptive-capacity 
constraints that has been persistent in these countries, the most 
serious opportunity cost of the rapid increases in Milex in the 
Persian Gulf countries is the potential losses in their foreign-
exchange reserves. 
Therefore here the focus is to try to estimate the dollar value of 
the potential foreign-exchange reserves that could have been 
possible, if a lesser share of the GDP had been allocated to Milex. 
The purpose of this endeavour is not to shed light on past losses, 
but to identify the areas in which future gains can be made. 
In 1979, after the revolution, as noted in preceding chapters, the 
revolutionary government in Iran reduced the country's defence 
burden to a 4.5 per cent share of the GDP. This 'action' could have 
been followed by a 'reaction' from other countries in the region.2 
If it had, then less would have been spent on Milex. Therefore 
what we intend to do is to estimate what Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
could have accumulated in foreign-exchange reserves, if they had 
followed Iran's example and had reduced their Milex to a level of a 
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Table 9.5 The opportunity cost of Saudi Arabia's military expenditures (Milex) in terms of foreign-exchange reserves 
forgone,• through inability to keep Milex at 4.5 per cent of GDP each year, 1973--85 
Actual GDP Actual Actual share of Mi/ex shouldSums could have US certificate- Foreign- Equivalent in 
Mi/ex Milex in GDP have been, given been available of-deposit rate exchange bn. USS 
our assumptions for investment reserves, 
(4.5% of GDP/ abroad, given including 
year) our assumptions interests earned 
(compounded) 
A % B {A-BJ % 
1973 40.6 4.3 10.6 1.8 2.S 6.9S 
1974 99.3 9.2 9.3 4.S 4.7 7.82 2.67 0.76 
197S 139.6 23.7 17.0 6.3 17.4 7.49 7.98 2.28 
1976 164.S 32.4 19.7 7.4 25.0 6.77 27.3 7.81 
1977 205.1 32.7 1S.9 9.2 23.S 6.69 SS.84 1S.9S 
1978 223.8 3S.9 16.1 10.1 25.8 8.29 84.61 24.88 
1979 248.4 46.7 18.8 11.2 3S.S 11.22 119.SS 3S.16 
1980 385.8 S7.2 14.8 17.4 39.8 13.07 172.S S3.91 
1981 S20.S 83.0 1S.9 23.4 S9.6 1S.91 240.04 70.60 
1982 S24.7 92.1 17.6 23.7 68.4 12.3S 347.27 102.14 
1983 41S.2 9S.2 22.9 18.7 76.S 9.09 467.03 133.44 
1984 371.3 79.4 21.4 16.7 62.7 10.37 S92.91 169.40 
1985 339.2 64.0 18.9 1S.3 48.7 8.05 723.S9 206.77 
1986 834.47 231.79 
Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures quoted are all in bn. Saudi Arabian riyals, except where otherwise indicated. 
Sowca: IMFa 1980; 1982 and 1986; OPEC 1985 and 11SS 1973/4-198617 
Table9.6 The opportunity cost of Kuwait's military expenditures (Milex) in terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone,• 
through inability to keep Milex at 4.5 per cent of GDP each year, 1973--85 
Actual GDP Actual Actual share of Mila shouldSums could have US certificate- Foreign- Equivalent in 
Milex Mila in GDP have been, given been available of-deposit rate exchange bn. US$ 
our assumptions for investment reserves, 
(4.5% of GDP/ abroad, given including 
year) our assumptions interests earned 
(compounded) 
A % B (A-BJ % 
1973 2.2 0.074 3.4 
1974 3.5 0.179 5.1 0.157 0.022 7.82 
1975 3.2 0.210 6.6 0.144 0.066 7.49 0.024 0.08 
1976 3.8 0.312 8.2 0.171 0.141 6.77 0.096 0.32 
1977 3.9 0.300 7.7 0.176 0.124 6.69 0.253 0.84 
1978 4.2 0.309 7.4 0.189 0.120 8.29 0.402 1.34 
1979 6.7 0.339 5.1 0.302 0.037 11.22 0.562 1.87 
1980 7.8 0.400 5.1 0.351 0.049 13.07 0.669 2.23 
1981 6.9 0.478 6.9 0.311 0.167 15.91 0.813 2.71 
1982 6.1 0.476 7.8 0.275 0.201 12.35 1.135 3.78 
1983 6.3 0.429 6.8 0.284 0.145 9.09 1.501 5.00 
1984 6.6 0.491 7.4 0.297 0.194 10.37 1.796 5.99 
1985 5.9 0.548 9.3 0.266 0.282 8.05 2.195 7.32 
1986 2.676 8.92 
Notes: • Author's calculation. All figures quoted are in billion current Kuwaiti dinars, except those where otherwise indicated. 
Sources: IMFa 1980, 1982 and 1986; OPEC 1985; and IlSS 1973/4 to 198617 
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4.5 per cent defence burden. (We assume implicitly that this share 
corresponds to the utility of the nations concerned.) A corre-
sponding estimate for Iran and Iraq will be provided in the 
following chapter. 
Furthermore, in order to expand the period under study and to 
highlight the scale of the opportunity costs in terms of foreign-
exchange reserves forgone, we have extended the period under 
observation to cover the 1973--85 period. This is in order to find 
out what the above countries could have accumulated in foreign-
exchange reserves, if at the very early stages of the oil-price 
increases they had agreed on a 4.5 per cent defence burden across 
the board. 
Tables 9.5 and 9.6 illustrate the opportunity cost of Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait's Milex in terms of foreign-exchange reserves 
forgone by not maintaining a 4.5 per cent defence burden each 
year during the 1973--85 period. 
It can be seen that, if these countries had spent only 4.5 per cent 
of their annual GDP on Milex each year (in itself, a very large 
sum, given the large size of their GDPs in absolute and relative 
terms), they could have accumulated a significant sum in their 
foreign-exchange reserves. 
The opportunity cost is much more profound in the case of 
Saudi Arabia which has spent a very large share of its GDP on 
defence (see table 9.5). 
In all, if a 4.5 per cent defence burden had been maintained in 
Saudi Arabia and the difference between the actual and potential 
Milex (given our assumption) had been invested abroad, then, by 
the end of 1986, its compounded value could have increased to 
$231.8 billion. The corresponding figure for Kuwait is $8.9 billion. 
Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to demonstrate the impact of the 
revolution in Iran, the consequent rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism 
in the Gulf and the Iran-Iraq war on the pattern of Milex and arms 
imports in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
It was noted that in Saudi Arabia, the Milex has increased by 9 
per cent on average each year during the 1978--85 period. The 
corresponding figure for Kuwait is 8.5 per cent. It was also 
estimated that a major part of such expenditure has been on 
imports of major sophisticated weapon systems, mainly from the 
USA, France and the UK. Indeed, given our assumption, it was 
noted that, during the 1973--85 period, the Saudis' arms imports 
had amounted to $110.3 billion. The corresponding figure for 
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Kuwait is $8.7 billion. It was observed that the USA has accounted 
for 55 per cent of such imports, followed by the UK and France 40 
per cent and 'others' 5 per cent. 
It was also noted that, since the war, military manpower in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has been significantly increased. In fact, 
their numbers in both countries have increased by 5 per cent on 
average each year during the 1979-85 period. The corresponding 
figure for each country during the pre-war period was below 2 per 
cent on average each year. 
Therefore it can be argued that another major consequence of 
the Iran-Iraq war has been the rapid militarization of the neigh-
bouring countries in terms of increases in their Milex, arms 
imports and the number of military personnel. 
This chapter also noted that, if both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
had maintained a 4.5 per cent defence burden each year during the 
1973--85 period, they could have increased their potential foreign-
exchange reserves significantly. 
We noted that, if the difference between the actual and poten-
tial Milex (given our assumption) had been invested abroad, then, 
by the end of 1986, the Saudis' could have increased their potential 
foreign reserves by nearly $232.0 billion. The corresponding figure 
for Kuwait was estimated at nearly $9.0 billion. 
As noted above, the purpose in estimating the potential losses 
resulting from a high military burden has not been to shed tears on 
past losses, but to identify the areas in which future gains can be 
made. 
It is hoped that, given the result of our estimates, the significance 
of the potential foreign-exchange reserves forgone, will encourage 
further research into this subject for these countries, an area that, 
to the best of our knowledge, has not received enough or, for that 
matter, any attention at all. 
Table 9. 7 Confirmed arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia, 1973--8 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
USA Raytheon Hawk S-A missile 1973 
UK Sea King (for Egypt) Helicopter 1973 
France Commando (for Egypt) Helicopter 1973 
Dassault Mirage HE Fighter 1973 
Dassault Mirage 11 lD Trainer 1973 
Aerospatiale Aloutte 111 Helicopter 1974 
Dassault Mirage lllE Fighter 1974 
Dassault Mirage 5 (for Fighter 1973 
Egypt) 
Aerospatiale SS.11 A-T missile 1974 
Chatium S-A missile 1974 
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Table 9. 7 (continued) 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
AMX-30 Tank 1974 
AMX 101 Tank 1974 
Pakistan Warship 1974 
USA Bell AH-lJ Helicopter 1974 
Lockheed C-130 Hercules Transport 1974 
Lockheed KC-130H Tanker-Transport 1974 
Northrop F-5E Tiger 11 Fighter 1973 
Northrop F-5E Tiger 11 Fighter 1975 
Hughes Maverick A-S missile 1975 
Hughes Maverick A-T missile 1975 
MIM-23B S-A missile 1974 
Armoured personnel 1975 
carrier 
M-60Al Tank 1975 
Destroyer and guided 1974 
missile 
Lockheed C-130 Hercules Transport 1975 
Northrop F-5E/F Fighter 1975 
Hughes Maverik ASM 1975 
McDonnell-Douglas ShShM 1975 
Harpoon 
FR Germany Rheinstahl Marder APC 1976 
France Dassault Mirage F-1 Fighter 1976 
Aerospatiale Harpoon ATM 1974 
Aerospatiale/MBB Roland A TM 1974 
Crotale ShShM 1976 
Matra R.550 Magic AAM 1973, 1975 
AMX-10 Armoured Car 1976 
Aerospatiale Alouette 111 Helicopter 1975 
Dassault Mirage Ft Fighter 1975 
AMX-30SA SPA/A gun 1974 
France/ 
FR Germany Euromissile Roland ATM 1974 
UK BAC 167 Mk 81 Trainer 1976 
BAC Rapier SAM 1975 
Fox Scout Car 1974 
Alvis Scorpion Tank 1974 
Bell AH-1 Cobra Helicopter 1975 
Morthrop F-5E Fighter 1976 
G.E. Vulcan AIAGun 1976 
Hughes BGM-71 Tow ATM 1976 
FGM-77A ATM 1976 
AIM-9J-1 Sidewinder AAM 1976 
322#-Class Minesweeper 1975 
AIM-9J Sidewinder AAM 1975 
F-5E Tiger-2 Trainer 1976 
Italy S-61A-4 Helicopter 1977 
France AML-90 AC 1976 
AMX-30s MBT 1977 
MM-40 Exocet ShShM 1976 
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Table 9. 7 (continued) 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description 
P-32 PB 
USA Bell-209-AH-lS Helicopter 
Bell-212 Helicopter 
Boeing 747-131 Transport 
C130H Hercules Transport 
F-15A Eagle Fighter 




AIM-7F Sparrow AAM 
AIM-9J AAM 
MIM-23B Hawk SAM 





Note: For meanings of abbreviations, see pp. 155-7. 
Source: SIPRI lm-3 to 1979 
Table 9.8 Confirmed arms suppliers to Kuwait 197H 
























AerospatiaJe SA-330 Puma 
Aerospatiale SA-341 Gazelle 
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Table 9.8 (continued) 


















Note: For meanings of abbreviations, see pp. tSS-7. 


























Table 9.9 Confirmed arms agreements between Saudi Arabia and the 
USA, 1979--87 
Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
AGM-65A ASM 1979 
AIM-9P AAM 1979 
FGM-77A ATM 1979 
M-113-Al ICV 1979 
M-577-Al Cargo 1979 
M-60-Al MBT 1979 
M-88-Al ARV 1979 
RGM-84A ShShM 1979 
C-130H Transport 1979 
E-3A AEW 1980 
F-15c Fighter 1980 
KC-130h Transport 1979 
M-110-Al SPH 1980 
V-150 APC 1979 
AIM-9P AAM 1980 
TOW ATM 1980 
AIM-9L AAM 1981 
TOW ATM 1982 
F-SE Fighter 1982 
F-SF Trainer 1982 
M-198 TH 1981 
RF-SE Reece 1982 
AGM-65D ASM 1984 
TOW ATM 1983 
N-1 MBT 1983 
N-109-A2 SPH 1983 
M-113-A2 APC 1983 
N-198 TH 1983 
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Note: For meanings of abbreviations, see pp. 155-7. 
Source: SIPRI 1979 to 1987 














Table 9.10 Confirmed arms agreements between Saudi Arabia and 
France/UK, 1979-87 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
France AMX-10 AC 1979 
R-440 SAM 1979 
Mirage F-lA Fighter 1980 
SA-365N Hel 1980 
AS-15TT ASM 1980 
MM-40 Exocet ShShM 1980 
F-2000 Class Frigate 1980 
Support Ship 1980 
AMX-toP MICV 1979 
Mirage-4000 Fighter 1981 
OTOMAT-2 ShShM 1980 
Durance class Support Ship 1980 
AMX-30 AAV 1983 
ATL-2 Mar patrol 1983 
Shahine SAM 1983 
AMX-30 AAV 1984 
OTOMAT-2 SSHM 1984 
Shahine-2 SAM 1984 
ERC-90 AC 1986 
AS-365 Hcl 1985 
ERC-90 AC 1987 
UK FH-70 TH 1981 
Hawk Trainer/striker 1981 
SNR-6 Hovercraft 1980 
FH-70 TH 1982 
BH-7 Hovercraft 1982 
Hawk Trainer/striker 1985 
Tornado IDS Fighter 1985 
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Table 9.10 (continued) 



































Table 9.11 Confirmed arms agreements between Saudi Arabia and the 
major arms suppliers (excluding USA, UK and France), 1979-87 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
Austria Panzerjager K TD 1986 
Spain C-212-A Transport 1984 
Austria Cuirassier LT,TD 1986 
Germany FR Gepard AAV 1986 
Leopard-2 MBT 1985 
TP2-l APC 1982 
Italy VCC-1 APC 1982 
Brazil EE-11 Urutu APC 1982 
Spain CN-235 Transport 1984 
Austria Cuirassier LT,TD 1985 
Brazil EE-9 AC 1986 
Germany FR Gepard AAV 1979 
Indonesia CN-212 Transport 1979 
Spain CN-235 Transport 1985 
Austria Cuirassier LT,TD 1985 
Brazil EE-T2 MBT 1985 
Italy SH-3D Hel 1985 
Japan KV-107, 2A Hel 1982 
Switzerland 1 C-9 Trainer 1984 
Spain BMR-600 ICV 1986 
Brazil Astros-11-SS-40 MRS 1985 
Germany FR Wildcat AAV 1984 
Spain CN-235 Transport 1985 
Switzerland PC-9 Trainer 1985 
Note: For meaning of abbreviations, see pp. 1S5-7. 
Source: SIPRI 1979 to 1987 
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Table 9.12 Confirmed arms suppliers to Kuwait, 1979-87 
Supplier Weapon designation Weapon description Year of order 
France MM-38 Exocet ShShM 1978 
MM-40 Exocet ShShM 1980 
Combattante-2 FAC 1982 
Mirage F-lC Fighter 1982 
MM-40 Exocet ShShM/SShM 1982 
AM-39 Exocet AshM 1983 
AMX-13-90 LT 1983 
AMX-155 MK-FJ SPH 1982 
AS-332 Hel 1983 
Super-530 AAM 1982 
Mirage F-1B Trainer 1984 
Mirage F-lC Fighter 1983 
ARMAT ARM 1983 
UK 16M FPB 1979 
20M FPB 1979 
Chieftain-5 MBT 1981 
Chieftain-5 MBT 1984 
Hawk Trainer 1983 
LC 1983 
FV-101 Scorpion LT 1983 
SRM-6 Hovercraft 1980 
LC 1984 
Germany FR TNC-45 FPB 1980 
PC-57 PC,FAC 1980 
USA TOW ATM 1979 
Dhaher PB 1979 
M-113-Al ICV 1979 
MIM-23B Hawk SAM 1979 
M-113-A2 APC 1980 
M-125-A2 APC 1980 
M-577-A2 CPC 1980 
M-901-Tow ICV 1980 
L-100-30 Transport 1981 
TOW ATM 1982 
M-113-A2 APC 1982 
TOW APC 1982 
V-150 APC 1984 
V-300 APC 1984 
Soviet Union SA-7 SAM 1979 
SA-7 SAM 1984 
SA-8 SAM 1984 
Frog-7 SSM 1984 
Note: For meanings of abbreviations, see pp. lSS-7. 
Source: SIPRI 1979 to 1987 
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Chapter ten 
The economic cost of the war: the 
assignment of a dollar value, 
September 1980-August 1988 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will attempt to bring together the various 
component parts of the economic cost of the war to Iran and Iraq. 
We will also attempt to assign a dollar value to the war's cost. 
Here our task is not simply to add up or compare other 
estimates that have been made by different economists or research 
agencies. Indeed, on the contrary, given that this topic has 
received little attention, we should try to evaluate and use a 
number of different assumptions and estimating procedures in 
order to arrive at a figure for the economic cost of the Gulf War. 1 
In all, it should be said that the unavailability of necessary 
information and data, resulting from eight years of war, has made 
the task of describing, forecasting or estimating the economic cost 
of the Iran-Iraq war a daunting assignment indeed. 
However, given the available information, we have in this 
chapter attempted to provide a somewhat detailed estimation of 
the economic cost of the war. The present study is divided into 
three parts. The first examines the estimation of the economic cost 
of the war to Iran, the second estimates Iraq's costs, and the third 
is an attempt to assess the cost of higher military burdens arising 
from militarization, in terms of potential foreign-exchange forgone 
for Iran and Iraq. 
The economic cost of the war to Iran 
At the outset it should be noted that the Iranian authorities, in 
contrast to Iraq's, have, from time to time, published their 
estimates of the economic cost of the war to Iran. However, the 
estimated cost of the war provided by the Iranian government is 
most incomplete. Many components of the costs have either 
wittingly or unwittingly been left out. 
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Therefore, at this point, an attempt is made to provide the 
reader with a more comprehensive method of estimating the 
economic cost of the war. 
According to the Iranian authorities, the total economic cost of 
the war from September 1980 to June 1982 was a total of $150 
billion (EIU 1984). Therefore, during the period of21 months, the 
monthly cost of the war, on average had amounted to $7.14 
billion. This estimated cost does not include oil-revenue losses, 
although it includes losses incurred in the oil sector. It also 
includes losses in industry, agriculture, energy, telecommunica-
tions, housing and health. 
In a second estimate Iran maintained that, by the end of 1984, 
the total economic cost had increased to $200 billion (based on the 
same method of estimation) (EIU 1984). This means that, during 
the 30-month period, June 1982 to December 1984, a further $50 
billion of economic losses had been sustained. Therefore, during 
the second period of the war the losses had declined to $1.7 billion 
on average each month. However, if the losses are taken as a 
whole, from September 1980 to December 1984, they amounted to 
$4.00 billion on average each month. 
Finally, in a more recent estimate, according to a Plan and 
Budget Ministry publication, the economic losses incurred during 
the first five years of the war had increased to $309 billion (MEED 
27 September 1986). This estimate covers a 60-month period, 
representing a $5.2 billion loss on average per month. 
If, at this point, we assume that the economic losses of the war 
since September 1985 have amounted to an average of $4 billion a 
month ($4 billion = the average of the three previous estimates), 
we can note that the estimated economic losses, given Iran's 
method of estimation, could have increased to $369 billion by the 
end of 1986. 
However, as noted before, the estimates provided by Iran are 
most incomplete. We now, therefore, attempt to provide a more 
detailed estimate of the economic cost of the war to Iran from 
September 1980 to December 1986. To arrive at such an estimate, 
the following cost elements should be added to the above figure of 
$369 billion. They are: 
1 The cost of 1 million tonnes of oil given to Syria, as a gift, for 
closing the Iraqi oil pipeline in April 1982 (Stauffer 1985). This 
means that the period under consideration for our estimation is 
a total of 57 months. One million tonnes of crude oil a year is 
equal to 20 thousand barrels a day, and the price of oil per barrel 
during the period under study being $34 (1982), $29 (1983), $28 
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(1984), $28 (1985), $26 (1986), $18 (1987) and $14.6 (1988) 
means that the total cost to Iran for giving such a gift to Syria, 
for its support in the war against Iraq, has amounted to $11 
billion. 
2 As well as the gift of 1 million tonnes of oil, Iran also agreed 
to supply Syria with 2.5 million tonnes of crude at a discount 
of several dollars per barrel. A most quoted discount figure is 
$2.0/barrel (Stauffer 1985). Given the volume of oil exports (50 
thousand barrels/day) and the rate of discount provided, the 
total cost to Iran amounts to $183 million. 
3 In the spring of 1984, Iraq started an earnest attack on tanker 
traffic in the upper region of the Gulf. Between March 1984 and 
January 1987, 106 tankers carrying Iranian oil were attacked 
(MEES 6 July 1987). As a result, many ship owners have been 
reluctant to send their vessels to Kharg Island. Insurance rates 
for hull and cargo have increased between five and tenfold, so 
that total shipping rates from Kharg Island have risen from 
about world scale 20 (before the attacks) to as high as world 
scale 60-80 (since the attacks). The increase in insurance rates, 
as well as the increased wage demands by the crew, have 
resulted in an increase of about $2 to $3 per barrel on lifting oil 
from Kharg Island (Stauffer 1985). 
Iran, on the other hand, in order to persuade the ship owners 
to make the journey through what has become known as 
'Exocet Alley' has offered discounts on the price that it charges 
for its oil, thus reducing its potential foreign-exchange earnings. 
Therefore, during the period under observation (April 1984 to 
August 1988), given the volume and price of oil exports, the cost 
of such a discount has amounted to an estimated total of $3 
billion. 
4 Due to sustained Iraqi attacks on oil refineries and oil-
production facilities, as well as a reduced level of oil deliveries 
to the refineries themselves, a general shortage of oil products 
has been persistent in Iran since the war. Table 10.1 illustrates 
information on refining capacity, the actual production and 
domestic consumption of oil products in Iran, during the 197~ 
86 period. 
It can be seen that the refining capacity which had increased 
from 33,000 thousand tonnes in 1973 to 65,700 thousand tonnes 
in 1980, has been drastically reduced to only 30,500 thousand 
tonnes in 1986. However, domestic consumption has increased 
from 25,254 thousand tonnes in 1980 to 35,950 thousand tonnes in 
1986. Because of the inability of refineries to produce enough oil 
products for domestic consumption, there has been a serious shortage. 
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Table 10.1 Refining capacity: the actual production of refineries and domestic consumption of oil products, Iran, 1973--86 
( thousand tonnes) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Refining capacity ~~34~~~~oo~~~~~~M~n~n~ 33,~ 30,500 30,500 30,500 
Actual production 
from refineries ~m~~n~~~~~n~n~~mn~n~ 31,023 31,008 30,357 31,730 
Domestic consumption 
total 12,932 14,760 17,581 21,506 25,311 25,819 26,563 25,254 30,850 35,272 42,621 35,347 35,948 35,950 
of which:" 
Petrol 1,426 1,727 2,320 2,737 3,480 3,738 4,210 3,547 3,152 3,358 4,410 4,303 + + 
Kerosene 3,145 3,653 3,690 5,026 5,811 4,795 5,924 4,700" 4,470 5,382 6,933 5,918 + + 
Diesel oil 3,932 4,407 5,346 6,259 7,552 5,351 8,178 8,048 12,798 10,062 12,041 11,218 + + 
Fuel oils 3,808 4,205 4,883 5,467 5,919 8,984 6,173 6,908 8,426 8,335 9,604 12,492 + + 
Production less 
consumption 14,803 14,855 14,629 18,459 10,885 7,636 6,442 4,198 710 -2,491 -11,598 -4,339 -5,591 -4,220 
(298) (299) (295) 
Notes: • Due to rounding, it may not add up to total. 
+ Not known. 
(372) (219) (154) (130) (85) (14) (-50) (-234) (-87) (-113) (-85) 
( ) The figures in brackets represent one thousand barrels per day. They have been computed by the author using the following: 1 tonne = 7 .33 barrels. 
Sources: Statistiques 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986 
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It can be seen that by 1982 Iran had turned into a net importer 
of oil products, importing 50 thousand barrels/day that year, and 
more in subsequent years. In order to estimate the cost of oil 
product imports to Iran, we obviously have to know the price 
per barrel of different oil products, exported to Iran. However, 
it seems that a wall of secrecy surrounds this issue, as no oil 
company that we approached was prepared to supply us with the 
required information. 
However, in 1987, a contract with the Soviet Union for imports 
of 2 million tonnes of refined oil products by Iran in exchange for 5 
million tonnes of crude export to that country was signed (MEED 
31 October 1987). Does this mean that the price for oil products 
is generally 2.5 times the price of crude? If this was to be the 
case, then the cost of oil-product imports to Iran during the 
period under study is an estimated total of $14 billion. 
Another economic cost of the war is the potential loss in 
export of oil products by Iran. However, the lack of information 
and data precludes the possibility of even trying to estimate this 
potential loss. None the less, as most of Abadan's output was for 
the export market, the loss in foreign-exchange earnings could 
be substantial. 
5 At the outset of the war, the port facilities at Khoramshahr and 
Abadan were destroyed. This forced Iran to shift its imports to 
other smaller, less efficient ports, and also to direct more of its 
imports by rail and road links through the Soviet Union and 
Turkey. Table 10.2 provides information on the weight of 
commodities ( excluding oil products) unloaded at commercial 
ports during the 1978-84 period. 
Table 10.2 Weight of commodities (excluding oil products) unloaded at 
commercial ports, 197s-84 (thousand tonnes) 
Port 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Khorramshahr 3,641 1,278 856 0 0 0 0 
Imam Khomeini 5,833 4,019 4,106 3,466 2,137 3,803 2,284 
Anzali 385 395 561 519 803 839 508 
Bushehr 696 354 524 748 1,250 2,024 1,095 
Bandar-e-Abbas and 
Bandar-e-Shahid 
Rajavi 2,983 2,335 3,734 6,248 5,684 7,575 6,735 
Nowshahr 117 91 166 207 177 303 170 
Abadan 881 301 75 0 0 0 0 
Chahbahar X X X X X 428 502 
Total 14,536 8,773 10,022 11,183 10,051 14,972 11,294 
Note: X Negligible. 
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran 1986, 1987 
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It can be seen that in 1980 (9 months), Khoramshahr and 
Abadan had handled 856 thousand tonnes and 75 thousand 
tonnes of imports respectively. Since the war no cargo has 
arrived at these ports which originally had better links with 
markets. Moreover, since 1980, there has been a significant rate 
of increase in imports at Bushehr and Bandar-e-Abbas and 
Bandar-e-Shahid Rajavi. More recently, there has also been 
some development at Chahbahar to enable it to handle more of 
Iran's imports (see further table 10.2). 
The changes in ports handling imports as well as the higher rate 
of insurance premiums for shipping in the Gulf in general have 
resulted in an extra freight cost of $30-50 per ton of imports 
(Stauffer 1985). As noted in table 10.2, the total imports were 
10,022 thousand tonnes in 1980 (12 months). Therefore, the total 
imports for the last quarter of the year (i.e. since the war) 
amounted to 2,506 thousand tonnes. The corresponding figures for 
the whole of 1981 were (11,183 thousand tonnes), 1982 (10,051 
thousand tonnes), 1983 (14,972 thousand tonnes) and 1984 (11,294 
thousand tonnes). Given the overall reduction in imports since 
1983, it is most likely that the volume of imports has declined to 
about 10 million tonnes per year during the 1985-6 period. 
If, at this point, the above figures are multiplied by $40/tonne 
(which is the middle point between the lower and upper bounds 
of extra freight charges), we will arrive at the figure of $3.5 
billion, which represents the estimated extra cost of importing 
since the war. 
6 As will be demonstrated in more detail later in this chapter, 
where the opportunity cost of the militarization of Iran and Iraq 
is the subject of study, the total actual military expenditure 
(Milex) in Iran during the 1981-6 period (i.e. since the war) has 
amounted to $86.5 billion. We have also shown that, given the 
revolutionary government's desire for maintaining a 4.5 per cent 
defence burden, the, potential Milex during the same period 
could have been $37 billion. 
The difference between the actual and potential Milex is $49.5 
billion. This sum could, for example, have been invested 
abroad. It it had, given the actual interest rates during the same 
period, then by the end of 1986 its compounded value could 
have increased to the total of $76.1 billion. Therefore, another 
economic cost of the war is the loss of this potential earning. 
Given the actual Milex during the 1986-8 period, as well as our 
method of estimation of the potential Milex, as noted above, 
this means that the potential foreign exchange losses had 
increased to $84 billion by August 1988. 
125 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
At this point, if all the above figures are combined we will arrive 
at the semi-grand total economic cost of the war of $560.7 billion. 
However, in order to arrive at the grand total cost, the oil revenue 
losses should also be included. 
The estimation of oil revenue losses in Iran since the war, it 
seems, is an impossible task, as the country's oil production/ 
exports were much disrupted well before the war. However, at this 
point, an attempt is made to provide an educated guess concerning 
the estimation of the potential oil-revenue losses resulting from 
the war. 
Table 10.3 provides information on such estimation. The table 
first notes the actual total oil exports and revenues during the 
1980--6 period. They were 446,815 thousand tonnes and $91.5 
billion. 
Table 10.3 Estimation of potential oil revenue, Iran, 1980-6 
Actual oil Actual oil Actual oil Potential oil Potential oil 
prices per exports revenues exports• revenue• 
ba"el US$ (thousand bn. rials and, (thousand bn. rials and, 
tonnes) in braclcet:s, tonnes) in braclcet:s, in 
in bn. US$ bn. US$ 
1980 32 40,112 684 (9.7) 53,482 886 (12.5) 
1981 37 41,079 732 (9.3) 54,n1 1,163 (14.8) 
1982 34 81,724 1,508 (18.1) 108,963 2,270 (27.1) 
1983 29 81,100 1,621 (18.8) 124,980 2,295 (26.6) 
1984 28 72,600 1,066 (11.8) 129,229 2,387 (26.5) 
1985 28 72,100 1,157 (12.7) 129,229 2,387 (26.5) 
1986 26 58,100 873 (11.1) 138,404 2,079 (26.4) 
Total 446,815 7,641 (91.5) 739,058 13,467 (160.5) 
Note: • Author's estimation. 
Sources: For actual figures: IMFa 1987 and Statistiqua 1980 to 1986 
In order to arrive at the potential oil exports, we assumed that 
for 1980, the actual and potential oil exports were the same, except 
that during the last quarter of the year oil exports were severely 
disrupted. Therefore, 13,370 thousand tonnes of oil was added to 
the volume of actual oil exports in 1980 to arrive at the figure of 
53,482 thousand tonnes, representing the potential oil exports for 
the same year. 
To estimate the potential oil exports for 1981 and 1982, we 
assumed that they would have grown at the same rate at which the 
actual oil exports had grown, i.e. at 2.4 and 98.0 per cent during 
the 1980-1 and 1981-2 periods. 
From 1982 onwards, the oil prices started to fall. This coincided 
126 
The economic cost of the war 
with a serious oil glut that had developed earlier. At this point, we 
assumed that pragmatism would have prevailed in Iran, and that 
the authorities would have increased the volume of oil exports 
only by the rate at which oil prices were falling. 
If this scenario was to have been adopted, then, as oil prices fell 
by 14. 7 per cent during the 1982-3 period, oil exports would have 
increased at the same rate, to 124,980 thousand tonnes in 1983. 
The same line of reasoning was applied to our estimation of oil 
revenue losses for the rest of the period under study. Having 
estimated these figures and multiplied them by the oil prices, we 
were able to estimate the potential oil-revenue losses. In our 
estimation, we have used the actual oil prices; to do otherwise 
would have meant estimating the potential oil prices. This would 
have made our task even more daunting than it already is. In order 
to avoid the usage of so many unknown figures we decided to use 
the actual oil prices. 
In all, during the 1980-6 period, the potential oil revenues could 
have been a total of $160.4 billion. Therefore, the total potential 
loss in oil revenues since the war is the estimated sum of $69.0 
billion. The actual oil revenues during the last 17 months of the 
war were $14.2 billion. Thus, the total actual oil revenue during 
the war period is $105.7 billion. Therefore, the total potential oil 
revenue losses since the war (given our assumptions) is $83.6 
billion. 
If the above figure is added to the semi-grand sum of $560.7 
billion, we will arrive at the grand total economic cost of $644.3 
billion. This sum, represents only the monetary cost of the war to 
Iran. It does not include inflationary costs, the loss of services and 
earnings by the many hundreds of thousands of people killed, the 
depletion of national resources, the postponement of crucial 
development projects, the cost of the delayed training and educa-
tion of the young people, and finally the figure also excludes the 
cost of welfare payments to the hundreds of thousands injured in 
the war who are not able to contribute fully in the creation of 
wealth for the national economy. 
The economic cost of the war to Iraq 
The Iraqi government, in contrast to Iran's, has not published any 
estimates of the economic cost of the war. This makes the task of 
estimating such a cost to Iraq's economy a very complicated 
assignment indeed. 
In order to arrive at the value of the economic cost to Iraq, the 
following components should be identified: the estimated cost 
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of damages inflicted upon the infrastructure; the estimated oil 
revenue losses; and the estimated GNP losses. 
Then the combined figure of the above costs should be added to 
any other component parts of the economic costs in order to arrive 
at the grand total economic cost of the war to Iraq. The period 
under consideration for our estimation is the same period as in the 
case of Iran, from September 1980 to August 1988, or a total of 84 
months. 
Estimating the cost of damages to the infrastructure 
In order to arrive at this estimated cost, the following was 
assumed. We argue that, because of Iran's less efficient air force, it 
has not been possible to carry out many bombing missions and 
inflict serious damage throughout the war period. Furthermore 
most of the damage on the infrastructure was sustained during the 
early months of the conflict. 
Since then, air and missile attacks against cities and other 
economic targets in Iraq have been very sporadic. Given this 
observation, therefore, the monthly cost to Iraq can be assumed to 
be much less than that sustained by Iran. We assume that the 
average economic loss to Iraq's economy during the period under 
study to be $0.8 billion each month, as compared to Iran's $4.9 
billion. Therefore the total cost of damage to Iraq's infrastructure 
since the war and up to August 1988 is the sum of $67 .0 billion. 
This cost does not include oil-revenue losses, although it includes 
losses incurred in the oil sector. It also includes losses in industry, 
agriculture, energy, telecommunications, housing and health. 
Estimating oil-revenue losses 
Table 10.4 provides information for estimating potential oil 
exports and revenue during the 1980-6 period. In order to gauge 
the potential oil revenue during the period under study, we took 
the actual figure for 1980 (for the first 9 months of the year only), 
assumed that exports would have continued at the same rate for 
the last 3 months of the year and added to it the figure of 40,133 
thousand tonnes to arrive at the potential oil export figure. 
Therefore the potential oil exports for 1980, given our assump-
tion, is a total of 160,533 thousand tonnes. For 1981 we assumed 
that Iraq's oil exports would have grown at the same rate as Iran's 
potential exports, that is at 2.4 per cent. Therefore, by 1981, Iraq's 
potential oil exports would have increased to 164,386 thousand 
tonnes. 
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Table 10.4 Estimation of potential oil revenue, Iraq, 1980--6 
Actual oil Actual oU Actual oil Potential oil Potential oil 
prices per exports revenues exports• revenue• 
barrel US$ (thousand bn. dinars and, (thousand bn. dinars and, 
tonnes) in brackets, in tonnes) in brackets, in 
bn. US$ bn. US$ 
1980 32 120,400 7,718 (22.4) 160,533 10,291 (29.8) 
1981 37 34,100 3,068 (8.9) 164,386 12,934 (44.6) 
1982 34 39,300 3,014 (9.3) 164,386 13,287 (41.0) 
1983 29 32,500 3,000 (9.3) 183,290 12,903 (40.0) 
1984 28 33,500 3,495 (10.8) 183,290 12,168 (37.6) 
1985 28 48,549 3,862 (11.9) 183,290 12,168 (37.6) 
1986 26 62,100 3,782 (12.1) 183,290 10,908 (34.9) 
Total 370,449 27,939 (84. 7) 1,222,465 84,659 (265.5) 
Note: • Author's estimation. 
Sourcu: For actual figures: IMFa 1987 and St11tistiqut1s 1980 to 1986 
In 1982, however, Iran's potential oil exports, as noted above, 
had increased to 108,963 thousand tonnes, a figure which was only 
12,224 thousand tonnes less than the actual oil exports in 1979. 
Given this, we argue that Iraq would have found it difficult to 
increase its oil exports further. Therefore, for 1982, it is probable 
that Iraq would have kept its oil exports at the 1981 level. 
However, in 1983, oil prices fell to $29/barrel. This represents a 
decline of 11.5 per cent since 1981. Given such a fall in oil prices, 
we then assume that Iraq would have increased its oil exports by 
11.5 per cent in order to maintain its financial position. So for 
1983, the potential oil exports would have increased to 183,290 
thousand tonnes. This figure is by far the largest volume of oil 
exports, when compared with Iraq's historical actual exports. The 
highest volume of actual oil exports was in 1979 when they reached 
160,400 thousand tonnes. 
Therefore, at this point we assume that by 1983, Iraq's potential 
oil exports had reached a point where a higher output had become 
very difficult to achieve. Therefore, in our estimation, we have 
said that, from 1983 onwards, Iraq's potential oil exports would 
have remained the same, at 183,290 thousand tonnes/annum for 
1984, 1985 and 1986. We then noted that Iraq's potential oil 
revenue during the 1980-6 period would have been a total of 
$265.5 billion. By comparing this figure with the actual total 
revenue during the same period, we arrive at an estimated total 
lost revenue of $180.0 billion. The actual oil revenues for the last 
17 months of the war were $17.3 billion. Therefore, the total 
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potential losses in oil revenues during the entire war period is 
$197.7 billion (given our assumptions). 
Estimating GNP losses 
In addition to the cost elements for infrastructure damage and oil-
revenue losses, we should also add to the cost of the war that part 
of the national output which would have been produced if Iraq's 
economy had not been severely disrupted as a result of the war. 
Similar calculations for Iran were not necessary, since such GNP 
loss had already been included by the Iranian government in its 
own estimates of the cost of the war to Iran's economy. 
Table 10.5 provides information on the estimation of Iraq's 
potential GNP during the 1980-6 period. In order to estimate the 
potential GNP, we first looked at the relationship between actual 
oil revenue and GNP during the 1976--80 period. It was noted that 
during this period on average each year oil revenue had accounted 
for 50 per cent of the GNP figures. 
Table 10.5 Estimation of Iraq's potential GNP, 19~ 
Actual GNP Potential GNP-
1980 15.8 (45.8) 20.6 (59.7) 
1981 11.1 (32.2) 25.9 (75.1) 
1982 12.6 (39.1) 26.6 (82.5) 
1983 13.1 (40.6) 25.8 (80.0) 
1984 13.9 (43.1) 24.3 (75.3) 
1985 16.8 (52.1) 24.3 (75.3) 
1986 17.le (54.7) 21.8 (69.8) 
Total 100.4 (306.7) 169.3 (518.5) 
Notes: • and • Author's estimation. The actual and potential GNP figures are in billion current 
Iraqi dinars and the figures (in brackets) are their equivalent in billion US$. 
Sources: IMFa 1987 and March 1988 and United Nations Economic Commission for Western 
Asia 1986b 
We then said that, in the absence of war, Iraq's potential oil 
revenue would again have accounted for 50 per cent of the 
country's potential GNP. We were then able to calculate the 
potential GNP figures. Thus, we arrived at the total potential GNP 
figure of $518.5 billion. The actual total GNP figure during the 
same period is $307.6 billion. The difference between these two 
($210.9 billion) is that part of the national output which could have 
been produced if Iraq was not at war. During the last 17 months of 
the war the actual GNP was $79.7 billion, while the potential 
figure (given our assumptions) could have been $90.0 billion. 
130 
The economic cost of the war 
Therefore, the total estimated losses in GNP during the war period 
are $222.1 billion. 
However, in order to avoid double counting, we should subtract 
from the $222.1 billion loss of GNP, the $197.7 billion loss of 
potential oil revenue. By doing so, we will arrive at the figure of 
$24.4 billion which is considered to be the output lost because 
of the war above and beyond lost oil revenue. 
At this point, if the estimated cost components (infrastructure, 
oil revenue, GNP) are added together, we will arrive at the semi-
grand total economic cost of the war to Iraq, $289.1 billion. 
However, in order to arrive at a more comprehensive figure of the 
grand total economic cost, the following various cost elements 
should be added: 
1 As was noted before, at the start of the war Iraq had accumu-
lated $35 billion in foreign-exchange reserves. By the second or 
third year of the war the foreign reserves had been totally 
depleted. Hence a major economic consequence of the war 
must be the almost complete erosion of the country's foreign 
reserves. If this sum, namely the original $35 billion, had been 
kept in overseas banks and had been allowed to receive a 
compounded interest, by the end of the war, Iraq's foreign 
exchange reserves would have increased to $78.8 billion.2 
This sum does not take into consideration the possibility that, 
indeed, Iraq might have been able to increase its original 
foreign-exchange reserves. Given our estimation of Iraq's 
potential oil revenue since 1980, it is most likely that in the 
absence of the war, Iraq by now could have become another 
Kuwait, with massive foreign-exchange reserves. 3 
2 Iraq is landlocked, except for a very narrow outlet on to the 
uppermost end of the Gulf. None the less, Iraq had traditionally 
relied upon the sea for its imports. However, at the very early 
stages of the war Basrah, the main port, and the smaller port, 
Fao, were put out of action. 
The serious disruption at Basrah and Fao meant that Iraq had 
to find other routes for transporting its imports. Here the 
assistance given to Iraq by its Arab neighbours has proved 
invaluable. Not only have they financed some of Iraq's imports, 
but they have also opened their ports to Iraq-bound shipping. 
Certain quays at Shuaiba, Shuwaikh and Damman have been 
put aside to handle Iraqi-bound cargoes. Jordan has also worked 
out special arrangements with Iraq. The port of Aqaba has been 
put at Iraq's disposal. Finally, Turkey, on a purely commercial 
basis, has permitted a greatly expanded overland truck traffic 
across Anatolia to Iraq (Stauffer 1985). 
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It is estimated that the above changes in import routes have 
added an extra cost of $600 million on average each year to 
Iraq's import bill since the war (Stauffer 1985). Therefore 
another component part of the economic cost to Iraq is the sum 
of $4. 7 billion. 
3 As will be demonstrated later, the total actual military expendi-
ture (Milex) in Iraq during the 1981-6 period (i.e. since the war) 
has amounted to $60.6 billion. However, based on an action-
reaction model, and given the reduction in Iran's defence 
burden to 4.5 per cent soon after the revolution, it is possible to 
argue that Iraq's total potential Milex could have been $20.6 
billion (based on a 4.5 per cent defence burden on average each 
year). The difference between the above two figures ($40.0 
billion) is the military cost of the war. If this sum had been 
invested overseas, then by the end of 1986 its compounded value 
would have been $50.7 billion. Given the actual Milex during 
the last 17 months of the war and the potential Milex (given our 
assumptions), it is possible to argue that the difference between 
these two figures by the end of the war could have increased to 
$55.3 billion, which in fact is the military cost of the war to Iraq. 
If this sum had been invested overseas, then by July 1988 its 
compounded value would have been $80 billion. This sum 
represents another item of the economic cost of the war. 
At this point, if all the component parts of the economic cost to 
Iraq's economy are added together, we will arrive at the grand 
total cost of $452.6 billion. If the figures of the economic cost of 
the war to Iran and Iraq are compared, it can be seen that, in the 
case of Iran the total cost includes more actual cost, while in the 
case of Iraq it includes more opportunity cost. This is because in 
the case of Iran, we assumed a much higher rate of actual damage 
inflicted on the infrastructure. The difference in the size of the 
different cost components for estimating the economic cost of the 
war can best be seen in figure 10.1 which illustrates the cost 
components of the war to Iran and Iraq. 
At this point it should be noted that, in line with the policy 
adopted by other economists and research institutions that have 
estimated the cost of other wars such as Vietnam (Stevens 1986), 
we too have made no attempt to estimate the cost of the Gulf War 
in constant prices. To have done so -if it were at all possible, given 
the many different cost components that we have used - would 
have produced a 'hodge podge' - to quote Robert Warren Stevens 
(1986) - of price- and time-adjusted figures that could have been 
compared only with great difficulty and confusion with one 
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(a) Iran: total cost: $644.3 bn. 
$445 brt potential GNP losses: losses incurred in the 
oil sector, industry, agricuture, energy, 
telecomnulications, housing and health 
$84 bn. potential losses in foreign-exchange reserves 
resulting from a high Milex 
$83.6 bn. oil-reverue losses 
$11 bn. cost of free and discounted oil to Syria 
$14 bn. cost of importing oil products 
$3 bn. cost of discounts in oil prices 
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(b) Iraq: total cost: $452.6 bn. 
$91.4 bn. potential GNP losses: losses lllCU!Ted 1n the 
oil sector, industry, agriculture, energy, 
telecomrnlllications, housing and health 
$197.7 bn. oil-revenue losses 
$78.8 bn. losses in foreign-exchange reserves due to 
loss of $3.5 bn. in original reserve 
$4.7 bn. cost of redirecting the imports 
$80 bn. potential losses in foreign-exchange reserves 
resuting from a high Milex 
Figure 10.1 Estimated economic cost of the war to (a) Iran and (b) Iraq 
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To return to our original discussion a further serious consquence 
of the war for Iraq's economy, especially for the future, is the rise 
in Iraq's international indebtedness. 
As noted above, on the eve of the war, Iraq had $35 billion in 
foreign-exchange reserves. However, by the first quarter of 1987, 
Iraq had accumulated debts of between $50 and $80 billion. The 
largest portion of the total debt is owed to Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. 
Between 1980 and 1982, the Arab supporters of Iraq, in 
particular the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, had provided Iraq with a 
cash loan of $1 billion/month, amounting to a total of$24 billion 
during the same period. Since 1982 the assistance has mostly been 
in the form of exporting oil on behalf of Iraq. It has been noted 
that from 1982 approximately 300,000 barrels a day of Saudi and 
Kuwaiti oil have been dedicated to Iraq. This oil is sold by Iraq for 
physical delivery by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It is agreed that 
Iraq is under an obligation to repay these volumes of oil as well as 
the payment of loans in kind at some point in the future (Stauffer 
1976). 
Therefore, the sale of oil on behalf of Iraq has meant that Iraq 
has received $3.7 billion in 1983, $3.5 billion in 1984, $3.2 billion in 
1985 and $2.9 billion in 1986. If the above figures are added to the 
$24 billion of cash loans, it can be seen that by the end of 1986 Iraq 
had received the cash equivalent of $37 .3 billion from Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 
However, of more immediate significance is the $20 billion or so 
in commercial debt to non-Arab sources. Not all these debts are 
covered by export-credit agencies. None the less, exposure with 
these agencies at 31 March 1987 was increased to $11.6 billion, 
compared with $9.3 billion in September 1985. Short-term debt 
was $1.9 billion during the same period (MEED 29 August 1987). 
The most heavily exposed countries include Japan. The Export 
Insurance Division of the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (EID/MITI) has a total exposure of $2.4 billion. More-
over, around 50 per cent of the total exposure is in the form of 
short-term loans. 
France is another major creditor of Iraq. However, unlike EID/ 
MITI, the bulk of the French export-credit agency Cofac's 
exposure to Iraq, which totals $2.3 billion, is medium- and long-
term. This figure includes only the civilian debt. Iraq's military-
related debt to France is understood to have increased to $3. 7 
billion during the period under study. Therefore, by the spring of 
1987, the total Iraqi debt (civilian and military) to France amounted 
to $6 billion. 
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Italy's export-credit agency, SACE, reported a total exposure of 
$2.4 billion at the end of 1986. According to the West German 
export-credit agency, Hermes, their total exposure by 31 December 
1986, had increased to $1.8 billion. Debt owed to the UK is mostly 
medium-term debt, and by early 1987 had increased to about $1.2 
billion (MEED 29 August 1987). 
The countries mentioned above ( excluding the UK) have to 
some extent limited their export-credit agencies in the granting of 
credit to Iraq. However, two Western countries, the UK and the 
USA, have adopted a more flexible attitude to Baghdad's payment 
problems and continue to provide funding to Iraq. The UK has 
arranged for a short-term credit facility to provide loans of $50 
million at a time to Baghdad (MEED 29 August 1987). 
Eximbank of the US has arranged for 180-day transactions, 
limited to international letters of credit issued by the Central Bank 
of Iraq. Eximbank apart, the US is one of Baghdad's most crucial 
sources of funding through its agricultural-credit programme. 
This type of credit allows Iraq to import a wide range of produce. 
The programme has provided Iraq with an allocation of $573 
million in 1987, up from $500 million in 1986. The additional 
allocation for 1987 includes financing for freight charges. Iraq is 
the only country to receive such assistance from the USA (MEED 
29 August 1987). 
At this point, if the grand total economic costs of the war to both 
countries (the total of $644.3 billion for Iran and $452.6 billion 
for Iraq) are combined, then we will arrive at the grand total 
economic cost of the war to both countries: $1,097.0 billion. This 
figure, which should be read as 1 trillion, and 97 billion dollars, is 
indeed a mind-boggling sum. 
To put the total economic cost of the war in meaningful 
perspective, it suffices to say that the cost of the war exceeds the 
total oil revenue which Iran and Iraq have received throughout 
this century. From 1919 to July 1988 in Iran's case, and from 1931 
to the same period in the case of Iraq, the total joint oil revenues 
earned is the sum of $418.5 billion. That is, the cost of the war 
exceeded by $678.5 billion the entire revenue from oil ever since 
the two countries started to sell their oil on the world market. 
If the cost of the war is related to their GNP, it can be seen 
that, on average each year, the cost of the war has absorbed 60 per 
cent of Iran's and 112 per cent of Iraq's GNP during the 1980--8 
period. 
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Table 10.6 The opportunity cost of Iran's military expenditure (Milex) in terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone,a 
through inability to keep a 4.5 per cent defence burden each year, 1981-6 
Actual GDP Actual Mi/ex Actual share of Milex could have Sums could have US certificate-of- Foreign-exchange 
Milexin GDP been, if 4.5% been available for deposit rate reserves, including 
% defence burden investment abroad % interests earned 
each year (compounded) 
A B (A-BJ 
1981 8,218 1,007 (12.9) 12.3 370 (4.7) (8.2) 15.91 (9.0) 
1982 10,621 1,300 (15.5) 12.3 478 (5.7) (9.8) 12.35 (20.6) 
1983 13,471 1,500 (17.4) 11.1 606 (7.0) (10.4) 9.09 (32.3) 
1984 15,030 1,833 (20.4) 12.3 676 (7.5) (12.9) 10.37 (50.6) 
1985 15,306 1,295 (14.2) 8.5 689 (7.5) (6.7) 8.05 (71.3) 
1986 15,609" 482 (6.1) 8.0 356 (4.5) (1.6) 6.8 (76.1) 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
b Author's estimation. Figures quoted are in billion current rials, except those in brackets which are in current billion dollars. 
Sources: IMFa 1987; 11SS 1979/80 to 1987/8 
Table JO. 7 The opportunity cost of Iraq's military expenditures (Milex) in terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone,• 
through inability to keep Milex at 4.5 per cent of GDP each year, 1981-6 
Actual Actual Actual share Potential Potential Mi/ex, if Sums could have US certificate- Foreign exchange 
GDP Milex of Milex in GDP Milex = 4.5% of been available for of-deposit reserves, including 
GDP(%) GDP each year investment abroad rate(%) interests earned 
(compounded) 
A B (A-BJ 
1981 11.1 1.4 (4.7) 12.6 25.9 1.2 (3.4) (1.3) 15.91 (1.5) 
1982 12.6 2.4 (7.7) 19.0 26.6 1.2 (3.7) (4.0) 12.35 (6.2) 
1983 13.1 3.2 (10.2) 24.0 25.8 1.2 (3.6) (6.6) 9.09 (13.9) 
1984 13.9 4.3 (13.7) 31.0 24.3 1.1 (3.4) (10.3) 10.37 (26.8) 
1985 16.6 4.0 (12.7) 25.0 24.3 1.1 (3.4) (9.3) 8.05 (39.0) 
1986 17.lb 3.7 (11.6) 21.6 21.8 1.0 (3.1) (8.5) 6.8 (50.7) 
Notes: • Author's calculation. 
b Author's estimation. Figures quoted are in billion current dinars, except those in brackets which are in current billion dollars. 
Sources: IMFa 1987; 11SS 1979/80 and 1987/8; and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 1986a 
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Estimating the military cost of the war (1981-6) as well as the 
opportunity cost of the mllltarlzatlon of Iran and Iraq: 1973-75. 
At this point an attempt is made to assess the cost of high military 
burdens arising from militarization, in terms of potential foreign-
exchange reserves forgone, for Iran and Iraq. The underlying 
assumptions in our estimate are the same as those given in chapter 
nine. 
However, before estimating the opportunity cost of militariza-
tion, we will first attempt to estimate the military cost of the war to 
Iran and Iraq, whose figures were noted on pages 125 and 132. The 
underlying assumption in all the estimates here is that a 4.5 per 
cent defence burden has been operational during the period under 
study in all of the countries under observation. The potential and 
actual Milex will then be compared. The changes that occur are in 
a sense the opportunity costs. 
Table 10.6 illustrates the opportunity cost of Iran's Milex in 
terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone as a result of not being 
able to keep to a 4.5 per cent defence burden each year during the 
1981-6 period. The corresponding information for Iraq is provided 
in table 10. 7. 
It can be seen that the total actual Milex in Iran during the 
1981-6 period (i.e. since the war) has amounted to $86.5 billion. 
However, if Iran had maintained a 4.5 per cent defence burden, 
its potential Milex could have been $37 billion during the same 
period. The difference between the actual and potential Milex 
($49.5 billion) is the opportunity cost of the increased defence 
burden since 1981. This sum also represents the military cost of the 
war to Iran (i.e. $37 billion is the total Milex that Iran would have 
spent in the absence of the war). 
Furthermore, if the above $49.5 billion had been invested 
abroad, then, by the end of 1986, its compounded value (given our 
assumption) could have increased to $76.1 billion. 
Iraq's total actual Milex since the war has amounted to $60.6 
billion. (This sum does not include the financial assistance pro-
vided by the Gulf Co-operation Council to Iraq). Given the 
potential GDP/Milex, Iraq's potential military expenditure could 
have amounted to $20.6 billion (given our assumption). The 
difference between these two figures ($40.0 billion) is the military 
cost of the war to Iraq. 
Moreover, if the above figure was invested abroad, by the end of 
1986, its potential value could have increased to a total of $50. 7 
billion. Therefore, if Iran and Iraq were not at war, and had kept 
to a 4.5 per cent defence burden each year, together they could 
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have accumulated a golden sum of $126. 7 billion in foreign-
exchange reserves during the 1981~ period. 
Moreover, from tables 10.8 and 9 at the end of this chapter, it 
can be seen that, if both Iran and Iraq had maintained a 4.5 per 
cent defence burden since the first oil-price increase of the 1973/4 
period, they could have accumulated $133.2 billion and $62.4 
billion in foreign-exchange reserves during the 1973-85 period 
respectively. At this point, if the estimated figures for the potential 
foreign-exchange reserve losses for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
(which were noted in chapter nine) are added to those of Iran and 
Iraq's, we will arrive at the grand total figure of $436.3 billion, 
which these four countries could have accumulated between 
themselves, given our assumptions. 
Now the reader is invited to compare this potential loss with the 
potential gains that could have been possible, if the above sum 
had, for example, been invested for Third World Development 
under the supervision of the potential Gulf World Development 
Bank that could have been established by the above countries. 
Food for thought, we hope. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we attempted to bring together the various 
component parts of the economic cost of the war to Iran and Iraq. 
The estimated opportunity cost of the militarization of both 
countries in terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone was also 
noted. 
Given our assumptions, we estimated that the total economic 
cost of the war to Iran, from 1980 to 1986, is the total of $644.3 
billion. The corresponding figure for Iraq is $452.6 billion. The 
above sums represent only the monetary cost of the war to both 
countries. They do not include inflationary costs, the loss of 
services and earnings by the many hundreds of thousands of 
people killed, the depletion of natural resources, the postpone-
ment of crucial development projects, the cost of delayed training 
and education of the young people and finally too the figures do 
not include the cost of welfare payments to the hundreds of 
thousands injured in the war who are not able to contribute fully to 
the creation of wealth for the national economy. 
This chapter also noted that, although the total economic cost of 
the war to Iran and Iraq's economies are very close, none the less a 
major difference exists in the way they were arrived at. That is, in 
the case of Iran the total cost includes more actual costs, while in 
the case of Iraq its total includes more opportunity costs. This was 
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because in the case of Iran a much higher rate of actual damage to 
the infrastructure was assumed. 
We also noted that the grand total economic cost of the war to 
both countries together is the sum of $1,097 billion. In order to put 
this figure into better perspective, we noted that this figure exceeds 
by $678.5 billion the entire oil revenue received by both countries 
ever since they started to sell their oil on the world market, a 
mind-boggling price to be paid for the execution of war by any 
standards. 
The chapter also noted that the military cost of the war to Iran 
during the 1981-8 period (given our assumption) is the sum of 
$49.5 billion. The corresponding figure for Iraq is $55.3 billion. 
It was also argued that, if Iran and Iraq had agreed on a 4.5 per 
cent defence burden since 1973, then, by 1986, they could have 
accumulated a combined sum of nearly $196 billion in foreign-
exchange reserves, a substantial sum of money by any standard. 
We also noted that the combined foreign-exchange reserve losses 
for Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, during the 1973-85 
period, by not maintaining a 4.5 per cent defence burden each 
year has amounted to $436.3 billion. 
It was argued that, if the above potential loss had been turned 
into a potential gain (i.e. by maintaining a 4.5 per cent defence 
burden), then the above sum, for example, could have been 
turned into capital for the establishment of the potential Gulf 
World Development Bank to foster and promote development 
projects in the Third World. 
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Table 10.8 The opportunity cost of Iran's military expenditures (Milex) in terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone,• 
through inability to keep Milex at 4.5 per cent of the GDP each year, 1973-85 
Actual GDP Actual Milex Actual share Milexshould Sums could US certificate- Foreign-exchange Equivalent in 
of Milex in have been, have been of-deposit rate reserves, including bn. US$ 
GDP given our available for (%) interests earned 
assumptions investment (compounded) 
(4.5% of abroad, given 
GDP/year) our assumpions 
A B {A-BJ 
1973 1,784 145 8.1 80 65 6.95 
1974 3,072 218 7.1 138 80 7.82 69.5 1.02 
1975 3,479 700 20.3 156 551 7.49 161.2 2.4 
1976 4,480 665 14.8 202 463 6.n 765.5 10.9 
1m 5,207 561 10.8 234 327 6.69 1,311.7 18.5 
1978 4.917 693 14.1 221 472 8.29 1,748.3 24.6 
1979 6,053 278 4.5 278 - 11.2 2,355.6 33.2 
1980 6,759 317 4.7 304 13 13.00 2,619.4 38.9 
1981 8,218 1,000 12.3 370 637 15.91 2,976.5 30.2 
1982 10,621 1,300 12.3 478 822 12.35 4,188.4 49.9 
1983 13,471 1,500 11.1 606 894 9.09 5,629.2 65.5 
1984 15,030 1,833 12.3 676 1,157 10.37 7,116.2 79.1 
1985 15,306 1,295 8.5 689 606 8.05 9,131.1 100.3 
1986 10,520.9 133.2 
Notes: • Author's calc:ulation. All the figures quoted - except where otherwise indicated - are in current billion rials. 
Sources: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1349, 1351, 1359, 1362; IMFa 1986 and August 1987; and USS, 197sn6 to 198617 
Table 10.9 The opportunity cost of Iraq's military expenditures (Milex) in terms of foreign-exchange reserves forgone* 
through inability to keep Milex at 4.5 per cent of GDP each year, 1973--85 
Actual GDP Actual Milex Actual share Milexshould Sums could US certificate• Foreign-exchange Equivalent in 
of Milex in have been, have been of-deposit rate reserves, including bn. US$ 
GDP given our available for (%) interests earned 
assumptions investment (compounded) 
(4.5% of abroad, given 
GDP/year) our assumpions 
A B [A-BJ 
1973 1.6 0.165 10.9 0.072 0.093 6.95 
1974 3.4 0.236 6.9 0.153 0.083 7.82 0.182 0.61 
1975 4.0 0.356 8.9 0.018 0.176 7.49 0.372 1.28 
1976 5.2 0.394 7.6 0.234 0.160 6.77 0.600 2.01 
1977 5.9 0.492 8.3 0.266 0.226 6.69 0.867 3.00 
1978 7.0 0.586 8.4 0.315 0.271 8.29 1.12 3.86 
1979 11.4 0.789 6.9 0.513 0.276 11.22 1.495 5.17 
1980 15.8 0.879 5.6 0.711 0.168 13.07 1.831 6.20 
1981 11.1 1.4 12.6 1.2 0.2 15.91 2.971 10.0 
1982 12.6 2.4 19.0 1.2 1.2 12.35 5.276 17.10 
1983 13.1 3.2 24.4 1.2 2.0 9.09 8.539 27.41 
1984 13.9 4.3 31.0 1.1 3.1 10.37 13.267 42.90 
1985 16.8 4.0 25.0 1.1 2.9 8.05 17.895 57.74 
1986 19.335 62.37 
Notes: • Author's calculation. The figures quoted are all in bn current Iraqi dimm except those in wlumn (8). 
Sources: IMFa 1980, 1982 and 1986; OPEC 1985; and USS 197Y74 to 19861117. Yearbooks 
Chapter eleven 
Conclusion 
In this book an attempt has been made to analyse the economic 
consequences of the war on Iran and Iraq. This final chapter not 
only summarizes the conclusions to the previous chapters, but also 
tries to put forward some recommendations concerning post-war 
reconstruction. In this chapter we will also identify the measures 
that must be introduced by the countries concerned in order to 
bring about long-term peace and security in the region. 
The chapter is therefore divided into three parts. The first 
summarizes the conclusions to the chapters. From the account of 
the destruction caused by the war, it becomes clear that both Iran 
and Iraq, sooner or later, must start the gigantic task of recon-
struction and development. Therefore, in the second part, some 
aspects of the nature of the reconstruction process, its stages and 
the possible strategies will be noted. 
No attempt at reconstruction and further development can be 
successful if it is not accompanied by attempts to establish a just 
and lasting peace, not only between Iran and Iraq, but also in the 
Persian Gulf as a whole. 
Given the above, in the third part, we shall put foward certain 
recommendations which, if adopted, we would expect to provide 
the necessary conditions for long-term development and stability 
in the area. 
Economic consequences of the war: a summary 
As noted throughout this study, the economic consequences of the 
war on Iran and Iraq have been catastrophic, to say the least. 
However, although, as observed, Iran's infrastructure has suffered 
most, it should not be forgotten that, at the time of the invasion, 
Iran, as a result of the revolution, had already been subjected to 
chaos and economic disorder, while Iraq was at its 'apex of 
development' with a promising future ahead of it. Thus, when the 
143 
The economic consequences of the Gulf War 
impact of the war on Iraq is the subject of analysis, the above 
observation should not be underestimated. 
To recall some of the more important points established in this 
study, it can be seen that, as far as Iran is concerned, the most 
damaging consequence of the war has been the failure of the 
Islamic Republic to reverse the Shah's policies and bring any 
tangible positive changes in the economic direction of the country. 
As noted, the revolution had promised to reduce Iran's depen-
dency on oil revenues, diversify the economy, increase non-oil 
exports, reduce Iran's dependency on trade with the West, make 
agriculture the 'axis of development', increase food/agricultural 
production, reduce consumer-goods imports and finally put an end 
to the rural-urban migration. 
Throughout this study these issues were addr~ssed, discussed 
and analysed. The changes since the revolution/war were noted. It 
was established that, in all cases, the situation has become much 
more problematic and intensified. We noted that, as the revolution 
was a popular mass movement, then the chances were that, if not 
all the objectives of the revolution, at least some of them could 
have been achieved by now. 
To reduce Iran's military expenditure (Milex), as noted, was 
another major promise by the revolutionary leaders. Indeed it 
was observed that in the first two years before the Iraqi invasion, 
the new government in Tehran, adhering to their promise, rapidly 
and significantly reduced Iran's Milex and arms imports. 
However, since the invasion, both Milex and arms imports as 
well as the corresponding defence and arms-import burdens have 
all increased rapidly and significantly. 
In all, it can be said that the failure to realize any of the 
economic and defence expenditure objectives of the revolution 
and to part with the past policies can be identified as one of the 
most serious consequences of the war. 
The war correspondingly has had a devastating impact on Iraq. 
It was noted that there has been a very serious deterioration in all 
aspects of the economy, with oil production/exports and revenues 
suffering most. We also established that, since the war, there has 
been a massive increase in Iraq's import dependency, as well as a 
major deterioration of the agricultural sector, leading to a great 
reduction in food production and consequently causing a major 
rise in agricultural import-dependency. 
As for Iraq's Milex since the war, it was shown that, although there 
has been a major decline in Iraq's GDP since the invasion, none the 
less there has been a rapid increase in military expenditure, 
resulting in an unparalleled rise in the country's defence burden. 
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We also noted that, since the war, there has been a huge 
increase in the number of people under arms in Iraq. In fact, it can 
be argued that Iraq has been turned into a military machine, as the 
percentage share of the total population involved with the armed 
forces has increased from 1.7 per cent in 1979 to 17 per cent in 
1987. 
In this book we also attempted to demonstrate the world's 
hypocrisy and double standards in so far as the sales of arms to 
areas of conflict, i.e. the Iran-Iraq war, are concerned. 
We noted that there has been hardly a country in East or West, 
South or North, where the rules of the game have not been 
allowed to be broken, so that weapons could be exported or re-
exported to one or both countries. 
It was established that, during the first part of the war (i.e. 
1980-3), there were 26 countries supplying all kinds of weapons to 
Iran and Iraq. This figure had, however, increased to 41 by the end 
of the second period (i.e. 1983-6). 
We also observed that the Gulf War has led to the rise of a 
few prominent Third World arms exporters, in particular China 
and Brazil, who have developed a thriving arms-export business 
because of the war. It was argued that, as long as the war 
continues, there exists an easy and ready market for outside 
penetration. However, this might not necessarily be the case 
whenever the war ends and should Iran and Iraq return to their 
more traditional arms suppliers, to purchase the best weapons and 
not the second-best ones. The consequences of such an action on 
Brazil and China could be profound, to say the least. 
Furthermore, as was noted, Turkey has also become a major 
trading partner of both Iran and Iraq since the war began, 
exporting civilian goods and services and importing vast quantities 
of oil in exchange. 
We argued that, while Turkey has been receiving oil from Iran 
and Iraq, she has been selling to them goods and services which 
might not have been sold elsewhere, i.e. in the West, with such 
ease. 
Moreover, it was contended that trade of this kind must have 
been highly advantageous to Turkey, leading to a great improve-
ment in her foreign-exchange earnings and economic well-being. 
However, when the war ends, it was argued, should Iran and 
Iraq decide to curtail their trade with Turkey and spend their 
moneys on importing sophisticated technology and higher-quality 
goods and services from the West instead, then the result 
could be a serious blow to Turkey's economy, with some major 
consequences. 
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In all, it was argued that, if the above scenarios should happen, 
peace might bring economic hardship or even instability to those 
countries that have greatly benefited from the war and have 
become dependent on trade with the warring nations in the 
Gulf. Peace might bring many changes in war-time trading and 
friendship. 
In this book we also attempted to demonstrate the impact of the 
revolution in Iran, the consequent rise of Shi'ite fundamentalism 
in largely Sunni-dominated countries in the Gulf, and the war on 
the pattern of military expenditure and ar"!s imports in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait. 
It was noted that, since the early 1980s, there has been a 
significant rise in Milex, both in absolute and relative terms in 
these countries. It was established that a major share of such 
increases in Milex has been on imports of major sophisticated 
weapon systems, mainly from the USA, France and the UK. 
It was also established that, since the war began, the figure for 
military manpower in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has significantly 
increased. In fact, the figures in both countries have increased by 
5 per cent on average each year during the 1979--85 period, as 
opposed to 2 per cent during the pre-war period of 1973-8. 
Therefore it can be argued that another major consequence of 
the war has been the further escalation of the militarization of 
neighbouring countries in terms of increases in their Milex, arms 
imports and the number of military personnel. 
We also argued that, if Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had 
agreed to limit their military expenditure to a level representing a 
4.5 per cent defence burden each year since the first oil-price 
increase of 1973/4, then, by 1986, they could have accumulated a 
combined sum of $436.3 billion in their foreign-exchange reserves. 
It was then suggested that the above sum could have been 
turned into capital for the creation of the potential Gulf World 
Development Bank to foster, promote and finance development 
projects in the Third World. 
Finally, in this book, we attempted to bring together the various 
component parts of the economic cost of the war to Iran and 
Iraq. 
We estimated that the total economic cost of the war to Iran, 
from 1980 to August 1988 (in current prices) was $644.3 billion 
and to Iraq $452.6 billion. These were the purely monetary costs of 
the war to both countries and did not include losses through 
inflation, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of the working 
population, the depletion of natural resources, the halt to crucial 
development, the interruption training and education and welfare 
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payments to the hundreds of thousands injured in the war who can 
no longer contribute fully to the national economy. 
We also noted that, although the economic costs of the war to 
Iran and Iraq's economies are very close, none the less a major 
difference exists in that, in the case of Iran, the total cost includes 
more actual costs, while in the case of Iraq, its total includes 
more opportunity costs. This was because, in the case of Iran, a 
much higher rate of actual damage to the infrastructure was 
assumed. 
Finally, it was noted that the grand total economic cost of the 
war to both countries is the sum of $1,097 billion. In order to put 
this figure into better perspective, we noted that it exceeds by 
$678.5 billion the entire oil revenue received by both countries, 
ever since they started to sell their oil on the world market. 
Destruction and reconstruction 
From the analysis presented in the previous section, it becomes 
clear that Iran and Iraq face a gigantic task of reconstruction of 
their war-damaged economies and regions. 
Reconstruction must start soon after the cessation of hostilities 
in order to allow the homeless and displaced population to return 
to their places of origin, to raise the hopes and faith of the affected 
masses, to prevent problems from building up and multiplying 
and, finally, to move towards a more normal life. 
The scale of destruction has presented the planners and policy-
makers with an unparalleled opportunity to change or formulate 
new policies and introduce strategies to bring about changes in the 
physical and socio-economic structure of the countries concerned 
that would not have been possible otherwise. 
However, the need for immediate action should not justify and 
legitimize unplanned and unco-ordinated policies or projects. 
Lack of planning would undoubtedly lead to the risk of chaos, 
waste, duplication and socio-political instability (note the outcome 
of unplanned and unorganized policies in Iran after the 1973-4 oil-
price increases). 
Immediately after a disaster public officials almost always speak 
of making things better than ever before and of rebuilding the city 
better than it ever was. But, if this is to happen, how should these 
and other promises be delivered? 
It is striking to note that, given the frequent occurrence of 
disasters, man-made or natural, and the ensuing destruction, there 
are very few comparative studies in reconstruction.1 However, the 
existing literature indicates that reconstruction after a disaster is 
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an orderly and predictable process (Hass et al. 1977: xxvi). For 
example, towns and cities are rebuilt on the same sites, while the 
pre-disaster trends, i.e. population and ruraVurban growth, con-
tinue during the reconstruction period, and dominant economic 
sectors or social groups continue to be dominant (Amirahmadi 
1987: 141). 
Trends tend to continue and are reinforced by two powerful 
factors: uncertainties about the future for those who live and work 
in the city, and the bias of the existing institutions in restoring the 
pre-disaster, i.e. pre-war, order (Hass et al. 1977: xxvi). 
In all, the central issues and decisions are value choices that give 
varying emphasis to an early return to normality, the reduction 
of future vulnerability, opportunities for improved efficiency, 
equality and amenities. 
The post-disaster/war reconstruction process/recovery can be 
divided into four different but somewhat overlapping periods/ 
stages. They are: emergency, restoration, replacement and dev-
elopmental reconstruction (Hass et al. 1977). The rate of recovery 
during each stage is varied and depends on the extent of the actual 
damage, the availability of resources, the conditions during the 
pre-disaster period, the degree of planning comprehensiveness, 
and such qualities as leadership, management and bureaucratic 
efficiency (Hass et al. 1977: xxviii and 142). 
The emergency stage is the immediate period after the occur-
rence of a disaster, e.g. bombardment or a missile attack. Depend-
ing on its severity, the disaster leaves behind problems caused by 
destruction and a large number of dead, injured, homeless and 
missing people. 
At this stage normal social and economic activities are dis-
rupted. Given the community's ability to recover, this period may 
last only days or a few weeks. The cessation of search and rescue 
and a massive reduction in emergency feeding/housing marks the 
end of the emergency period. 
The restoration period begins during the final part of the 
emergency operations. It is marked by the patching-up of public 
utilities, housing, industrial and commercial structures which can 
be restored and the return to more normal social and economic 
activities. 
The end of this period is marked by the return of major urban 
services, transport and utilities, the return of those evacuees 
wanting to return and substantial rubble removal. The completion 
period of this stage is generally 20 to 30 times longer than that of 
the emergency period. 
The replacement/reconstruction period aims to restore the city's 
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destroyed capital stock of various types (including buildings, 
bridges, roads and highways) to a pre-disaster level. At this stage, 
reconstruction, rather than patching up or coping as far as one is 
able, is emphasized. However, it should be noted that, during this 
period, activities are limited to restoring what has been destroyed, 
rather than to the creation of anything new. 
During this period, regular planning, as opposed to the emer-
gency programmes of the previous two stages, becomes essential. 
The replacement period is 100 to 150 times longer than the 
emergency period, and five to eight times longer than the restora-
tion period. While self-help activities and motivations are funda-
mental to a speedy recovery and the successful completion of 
the first two periods, the replacement stage requires increased 
government assistance and intervention. 
The final stage, namely developmental reconstruction, is 
primarily concerned with the improvement of existing ( or pre-
disaster) activities, organization and structure, and also with the 
creation of new ones, leading to further growth and development. 
Large-scale projects should be carefully planned and evaluated 
to reflect people's needs and available or easily obtainable 
resources. Such projects, by their nature, are government financed. 
Self-help activities lose their importance in such projects, although 
they remain in supporting small-scale projects in and out of the 
city. 
Activities during this final period should be directed to further-
ing material goods and objectives and should adhere to the 
sectoral mix and regional balance of reconstruction strategies. 
Development reconstruction is generally two or three times longer 
than the replacement reconstruction period. 2 
Reconstruction activities in Iran and Iraq have so far been 
largely limited to the first two periods and early parts of the third 
stage. Therefore the main and the most important task of rebuild-
ing the war-damaged areas remains to be started and completed in 
future years. 
The actions taken in these areas are directly affected by nation-
wide decisions, and thus they will undoubtedly influence the 
outcomes of national policies. This is to say that the objectives of 
post-war reconstruction and national goals must be compatible 
and reinforce each other. 
The following goals of national policy, amongst others, which 
have been identified by both countries in the past, are particularly 
sensitive to the type and strategy of reconstruction, and the quality 
of its outcome: 
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1 Export diversification and less dependency on oil revenues. 
2 Reduction of reliance on foreign technology. 
3 Increase in agricultural productivity and reduction of reliance on 
food imports, with the ultimum goal of self-sufficiency in future. 
4 Provision of the basic needs for all, in the areas of education, 
health care, housing, food and clothing. 
5 The efficient use of scarce resources. 
6 Creation of an integrated national settlement system. 
7 Elimination of unemployment. 
These material goals and objectives will, one way or another, 
direct the style, and therefore most profoundly influence the 
realization of post-war policies. The achievement of these goals 
will be enhanced by policy and the strategy of industrialization and 
modernization in the post-war era. 
Given the outcome of unsuitable policies in the past and present 
we recommend an immediate change in industrialization policy 
and the adoption of a new and more suitable strategy. 
We recommend that planners and policy makers in Iran and 
Iraq should adopt an appropriate technology policy of industrial-
ization, not only in the war-damaged areas, but also in the rest of 
their countries as a whole. 
The adoption of such a strategy which relies on indigenous 
techniques, using local resources, will lead to the realization of 
many nationaVpost-war reconstruction goals, such as the reduction 
in dependency on oil revenues, reduced reliance on foreign tech-
nology, the efficient use of scarce resources, increased employ-
ment and reduction in rural-urban migration. 
We should, at this point, emphasize that we are not arguing that 
countries like Iran and Iraq should eliminate the use of modem, 
externally produced technology. What we are suggesting is the 
adoption of a balanced mix of technologies, leading to a two-tier 
technology policy: the use of advanced techniques in heavy and 
large-scale industries, and the use of intermediate and traditional 
technology in light industries and small-scale production. 
The many advantages of adopting such a policy have been 
discussed at some length by the present author elsewhere, and, 
therefore, we do not attempt to elaborate on them any further 
here (Mofid 1987: chapter 9, 267-75). 
In all, it must be said that, given the hardship endured by the 
people of both countries, the principles of social justice and 
economic development should guide the respective governments 
in their policies of post-war reconstruction. They should also 
devise measures for redistribution of income and wealth amongst 
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the population. The main concern, in the short run at least, should 
be the provision of basic needs for all. 
An important question at this point should be, how is the 
reconstruction going to be financed? Financial resources for post-
war reconstruction may be mobilized in various ways. The most 
important source, given that Iran and Iraq are major oil-exporting 
countries, seems to be their oil revenues. 
However, the crash in oil prices, accompanied by a huge surplus 
in oil supplies, has meant that Iran and Iraq, for many more years 
to come, cannot expect an oil revenue higher than $7 billion to $9 
billion each year (if we assume no further drastic fall in oil prices 
occurs). 
Such a low level of expected future income is hardly enough to 
finance imports of food and other essential commodities, let alone 
to enable Iran and Iraq to start the huge task of reconstruction. If 
the shortage of money is going to be a major obstacle to recon-
struction, what are the possibilities for other resources to be 
mobilized? The following recommendations are expected to go a 
long way towards removing the financial constraints on post-war 
reconstruction. 
1 Self-help: the sale of 'reconstruction loan drive' bonds by the 
two governments to their respective nationals. 
2 Regional help: the setting up of a 'regional grant reconstruction 
drive'. Grants to be given to Iran and Iraq by the countries in 
the region, especially by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As noted in 
chapter ten, these two countries have financed Iraq's 'engine of 
war' with $0.5 billion per month during the 1980-6 period. Why 
should they not be expected to finance the post-war reconstruc-
tion of Iran and Iraq by the same amount each month? This is 
only logical, if they want peace and stability in the region. 
3 International help. The setting up of an 'international low 
interest, long-term loan reconstruction drive'. As noted in this 
study, the major arms suppliers have been directly or indirectly 
the main beneficiaries of the war, fuelling the engine of destruc-
tion in Iran and Iraq. Now is the time to expect them to finance 
the engine of reconstruction in these countries. 
4 Japan and South Korea will be among those benefiting most 
from post-war reconstruction. They should also join the pro-
posed international reconstruction drive, by providing financial 
assistance to Iran and Iraq. 
All in all, nothing short of a Marshall-type plan of reconstruc-
tion is needed for Iran and Iraq to enable them to start the task of 
rebuilding. 
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Measures to enhance peace and stability in the region 
As noted before, no attempt at reconstruction and furthering 
development can be successful if it is not accompanied by attempts 
to establish a just and lasting peace, not only between Iran and 
Iraq, but also in the region as a whole. Indeed, given the present 
power of destruction that comes with today's war technology, 
lasting reconstruction and redevelopment are possible only under 
the condition of a lasting peace. 
As a first step towards the establishment of conditions necessary 
to bring about stability and peace in the region, we suggest an 
immediate action to reduce the burden of high military expendi-
ture in the Gulf countries. This recommendation adheres to the 
understanding that the high levels of Milex and arms imports by 
the developing countries of the Third World has decreased rather 
than increased the sense of security and stability in these countries. 3 
Furthermore, given the rapid decline in oil prices in the last few 
years and with no forecast of any significant price rises in the near 
future, now, more than ever before, there exists a serious oppor-
tunity cost, even in major oil-exporting countries of maintaining a 
high rate of defence burden. Indeed today the 'haves' as well as 
the 'have nots' are facing the 'guns vs. butter' dilemma. 
However, in order to reduce the level of Milex and to stop the 
arms race in the region, with a view to demilitarizing the Gulf, as a 
minimum the following conditions must first be met. 
1 The acceptance by the countries in the region of 'Principles to 
guide mutual relations' among the countries concerned. 
2 Recognition of the invisibility of frontiers. This implies a 
definitive recognition of the state frontiers and renunciation of 
all territorial claims. 
3 Respect for the sovereign equality of the participating states. 
4 Prohibition of the use or threat of force against the territorial 
integrity of states. 
5 Non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other 
states. 
6 Non-assistance to terrorist or other subversive activities directed 
against the regime of another state ( on these issues see Goldblat 
1987: 3). 
In order to increase the credibility and legitimacy of these 
principles, they must be enshrined in a declaration signed at the 
highest political level and have a comparable force to that of an 
international treaty. 
In order to further the conditions of peace and stability, 
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these principles must then be underlined with a certain series of 
confidence-building measures. These measures should include: 
1 Withdrawal of troops from border zones, leaving police forces 
only. 
2 Establishment of 'hot-line' communication systems to reduce 
the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities in the region by 
accident or misunderstanding. 
3 Notification of any significant changes introduced or planned in 
the military sector (Goldblat 1987: 3). 
The above measures must then be accompanied by other 
confidence-building actions in other areas. For example, there 
should be: 
1 A serious attempt to increase trade and business between the 
states concerned. An economic interdependency is one of the 
most effective measures for reducing the possibility of war. 
Note, for example, what has happened since World War II in 
and between the European Economic Community, the USA 
and Japan. 
Therefore we recommend the establishment of the Gulf 
Heads of States Yearly Economic Summit to discuss their 
bilateral trade and to further the possibility of an eventual 
economic integration. 
2 Introduction of cultural exchanges and measures to increase 
interstate travel by the nationals of the states concerned. 
3 Provision of measures to promote most seriously the learn-
ing of Parsi in the Arab countries of the Gulf and Arabic in 
Iran. 
If there is unreserved acceptance of these principles and 
confidence-building measures by the states concerned, the next 
logical step for their successful implementation is to give them an 
international stamp of approval. 
Furthermore, as noted clearly in this book, the main arms 
suppliers are the ones who have benefited most from the mili-
tarization of the Gulf. Without their agreement and co-operation 
in reducing the flow of arms to the area, we can expect no 
mitigation of crisis and no serious chance of a successful 'get 
together' by the Gulf countries themselves. 
Given the seriousness of the problems, we recommend the 
establishment of an international conference to limit the transfer 
of conventional arms to the Persian Gulf. The conference, which 
should include the USA, Soviet Union, UK, France and China, as 
well as the Gulf countries themselves, should make policies and 
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recommendations on how to reduce the value and volume of arms 
exports to the region. 
The above suggestions and recommendations on the style and 
strategy of reconstruction, as well as the provision of measures and 
policies to bring about peace and security in the region, constitute 
the groundwork necessary for the reconstruction of Iran and Iraq. 
Their adoption does not promise the attainment of impossible 
goals but will enhance the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
in the region, without which any reconstruction and development 
will, sooner or later, be again a journey into destruction. 
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Air defence version 
Advanced 
Armoured engineering vehicle 
Airborne early-warning system 
Air Force 
Air-launched cruise missile 
Amphibious vehicle/amphibian aircraft 
Armoured personnel carrier 
Anti-radar missile 


















































Command post carrier 
Electronic countermeasures 
Electronic warfare 
Fast attack craft (missile/torpedo-armed) 
Fire support combat vehicle 
Helicopter 




Light armoured vehicle 
Heavy-lift ship 
Tank landing ship 
Light tank 
Maritime patrol aircraft 
Main battle tank 
Machine-gun 
Mechanized infantry combat vehicle 
Mark 
Memorandum of understanding 
Mobile protected weapon system 






























Submarine-launched ballistic missile 
Self-propelled gun 
Self-propelled howitzer 














1 The literature on historical, military and religious/cultural aspects of the 
conflict is indeed voluminous. The following provide a sample of such 
coverage: J.M. Abdulghani 1984; R. C. Johansen and M. G. Renner 
1985; P. Marr 1985; S. Tahir-Kheli and S. Ayubi 1983; W. 0. 
Staudenmaier 1983; C. Wright 1985; MERIP 1984; E. Karsh 1987, 
1988; A. Cordesman 1984; R. King 1987; S. Chubin 1986; G. 
Nonneman 1986; Foreign Policy Association (1985a); W. Goldstein 
1984; J. A. Bill 1984; D. Ross 1984. 
2 In contrast to the socio-political, historical and military analysis of the 
Gulf War which, as note 1 describes, has received voluminous cover-
age, the economic consequences of the conflict, on the other hand, have 
received scanty coverage. For example, the only study known to the 
present author which has attempted to estimate the economic cost of 
the Gulf War is by Abbas Alnasrawi (1986). Other studies that have 
somehow dealt with some aspects of the economic impact of the war 
include J. Townsend 1984; Keith Mcl...achlan and George Joffe 1984, 
1987; T. Stauffer 1985; and also short articles by different reporters in 
publications such as the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Middle 
East Economic Digest (MEED) and Middle East Economic Survey 
(MEES). It should also be noted that the two publications by 
Mcl...achlan and Joffe, although detailed and credit-worthy, were 
written by non-economists. It seems that, once again, the economists 
have, by and large, virtually ignored the study of wars. Rosen (1968 in 
G. Harris 1986) regards this as 'the most important abdication of any' 
by economists. For evidence on this statement see G. Harris 1986. 
However, at least not all the economists, it seems, have ignored this 
topic. E. Kanovsky (1970) and R. W. Stevens (1976) are the most noted 
ones. 
3 For evidence on the figures quoted, see M. Yamaoka 1987. 
4 For an excellent reading on this statement see John G. Stoessinger 
1987. 




6 The 1937 Agreement contained two major provisions: first, in 
designating the low-water mark on the eastern bank of the Shatt 
al-Arab as the frontier, it conferred control over the waterway on Iraq 
with the exception of the area adjacent to the Iranian ports of Abadan, 
Khoramshar and Khosrowabad where it was fixed at the thalweg (the 
deep-water line); and second, as a result of that demarcation, it 
provided that vessels in the Shatt should employ Iraqi pilots and fty the 
Iraqi ftag (again with the exception of these three areas in which the 
boundary was determined by the thalweg). For further reading on these 
issues see Karsh 1987. 
7 On these issues see further Stephen D. Goose 1987: chapter 8. 
8 For an excellent account of the purges of the Iranian armed forces see 
W. F. Hickman 1982. 
Chapter three 
1 By the end of 1985 only 24 per cent of the economically active 
population was engaged in agriculture as opposed to 30 per cent in 
1980. For evidence see FAOa 1985. 
Chapter four 
1 Militarization as used here refers to a process in which increasing state 
resources are allocated to the armed forces and/or military-related 
activities. Militarism, according to A. Vagtas (1957) refers to a 
preference or bias favouring military force, institutions, symbols and 
rituals which may be manifested by civilians as well as military men. 
Similarly anything beyond the scientific application of necessary 
resources for external defence is defined as militaristic. For further 
reading see Wolpin 1983: 129-55. 
2 The exchange rates were as follows: $1 = rials 68.9 (1973), 67.6 (1974), 
67.6 (1975), 70.2 (1976), 70.6 (1977) and 70.5 (1978). 
Chapter five 
1 For evidence on the formation and development of the Revolutionary 
Guard Corps see IISS 1987/8. 
Chapter six 
1 The exchange rates during the period under study were as follows: 
$1 = 0.30 dinars (1973) and 0.29 (1974-8). 
Chapter eight 
1 The interested reader in following this topic could consult the following 
works amongst others: COPAT 1978; Links 1983; IDS 1985; Eccles 
1983; N. Harris 1983; Jolly 1979; Kaldor and Eide 1980; McMahan 




1 For an excellent study of opportunity costs of military expenditure see 
David Dabelko and James M. McCormick 19TI: 145-54. 
2 For an excellent reading on 'action/reaction' model see L. F. 
Richardson 1960. 
Chapter ten 
1 See chapter 1, notes 1 and 2. 
2 The actual rate of interest used in our calculations is the US certificate-
of-deposit rate which was 13.97 per cent in 1980, 15.91 per cent {1981), 
12.35 per cent (1982), 9.09 per cent {1983), 10.37 {1984), 8.05 {1985) 
and 6.8 (1986). 
3 For an excellent reading on Kuwait's overseas portfolio, see 'Kuwait 
comes out buying', Business Week, 7 March 1988. 
4 It is important to note that the most frequently used Defense 
Department estimates of the budgetary cost of the Vietnam War are all 
in current prices covering a span of years in which average prices paid 
by the federal government rose some 65 per cent. See further Stevens 
1976: 178-9. 
Chapter eleven 
1 The following list of references demonstrates this very clearly: Jack 
Hirschleifer 1963; Bates et al. 1963; Ciborowski 1969; Dacy and 
Kunreuther 1969; Douty 1969; Kates et al. 1973: 981-90; Cochrane 
1974; Rosental 1974; Hass et al. 19n; Amirahmadi 1987: 134-47. 
2 For further reading on different stages of reconstruction see Hass et al. 
19TI: xxv-xxxv and 141-2. 
3 For further reading on these and other related issues see Goldblat 1987: 
1-4; Ball 1983: 507-27; Faini, Annez and Taylor 1984: 487-98; 
Thorsson 1983: 113-17; Aben 1986; Arlinghaus 1984; Bisinas and Ram 
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